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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4677
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| Title: | Contract enforcement, capital accumulation, and Argentina's long-run decline |
| Author(s): | Prados de la Escosura, Leandro [prados]
Sanz Villarroya, Isabel |
| Publisher: | Springer Berlin / Heidelberg |
| Issued date: | Jan-2009 |
| Citation: | Cliometrica, 2009, v. 3, n. 1, pp. 1-26 |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4677 |
| ISSN: | 1863-2505
1863-2513 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11698-008-0026-8 |
| Abstract: | Argentina has slipped from being among the ten world’s richest countries by the eve of World War I to its current position close to mid-range developing countries. Why did Argentina fall behind? We employ a structural model to investigate the extent to which the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights, as measured by Clague et al.’s “contract intensive money” (CIM), conditioned broad capital accumulation and, subsequently, economic performance in Argentina. Our results suggest that poor contract enforcement played a significant role at the origins of Argentina’s unique experience of long-run decline. |
| Review: | PeerReviewed |
| Publisher version: | http://www.springerlink.com/content/m7871v68442760j5/fulltext.pdf |
| Keywords: | Contract intensive money
Economic decline
Argentina |
| Rights: | ©Springer Berlin / Heidelberg |
| Appears in Collections: | DHEI - Artículos de Revistas
Economists Online
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