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On the Non-Cooperative Foundations of Cooperative Bargaining

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URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4330
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OntheNon-Cooperative_WP-AD-92-06.pdf (518.33 KB)
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1992
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IVIE
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In this note we challenge the non-cooperative foundations of cooperative bargaining solutions on the grounds that the limit operation for approaching a frictionless world is not robusto We show that when discounting almost ceases to play a role, any individually rational payoff can be supported by some subgame perfect equilibrium. To seLect the "correct" point imposes excessive informationaL requirements on the anaLyst.
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