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Adaptive Dynamics and the Implementation Problem with Complete Information

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URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4246
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2530
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Adaptive_JET_1999_CABRALES_ps.pdf (1.76 MB)
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1999
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Elsevier
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Abstract
This paper studies the equilibrating process of several implementation mechanisms using naive adaptive dynamics. We show that the dynamics converge and are stable, for the canonical mechanism of implementation in Nash equilibrium. In this way we cast some doubt on the criticism of “complexity” commonly used against this mechanism. For a mechanism that implements using the iterated deletion of dominated strategies, the dynamics converge but are less stable
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implementation, bounded rationality, evolutionary dynamics, mechanisms
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Journal of Economic Theory. 1999, vol. 86, nº 2, p. 159-184
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