Publication:
The bargaining set of a large economy with differential information

Thumbnail Image
Identifiers
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4224
ISSN: 1432-0479 (Online)
DOI: 10.1007/PL00004195
Files
bargaining_ET_2001_ps.pdf (293.22 KB)
Publication date
2001-09
Defense date
Authors
Advisors
Tutors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Springer
Impact
Google Scholar
Export
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Abstract
We study the Mas-Colell bargaining set of an exchange economy with differential information and a continuum of traders. We established the equivalence of the private bargaining set and the set of Radner competitive equilibrium allocations. As for the weak fine bargaining set, we show that it contains the set of competitive equilibrium allocations of an associated symmetric information economy in which each trader has the “joint information” of all the traders in the original economy, but unlike the weak fine core and the set of fine value allocations, it may also contain allocations which are not competitive in the associated economy.
Description
Keywords
General equilibrium in large exchange economies with differential information, Weak fine bargaining set, Core, Value
Bibliographic citation
Economic Theory. 2001, vol. 18, nº 2, p. 473-484
Collections
DE - Artículos de Revistas
Economists Online