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The core of a class of non-atomic games which arise in economic applications

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4221
ISSN: 1432-1270 (Online)
DOI: 10.1007/s001820050094
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the-core_IJGT_1999_ps.pdf (348.1 KB)
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1999-02
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Springer
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Abstract
We study the core of a non-atomic game v which is uniformly continuous with respect to the DNA-topology and continuous at the grand coalition. Such a game has a unique DNA-continuous extension on the space B 1 of ideal sets. We show that if the extension is concave then the core of the game v is non-empty iff is homogeneous of degree one along the diagonal of B 1. We use this result to obtain representation theorems for the core of a non-atomic game of the form v=f where μ is a finite dimensional vector of measures and f is a concave function. We also apply our results to some non-atomic games which occur in economic applications.
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Coalitional game, Core, Non-atomic games
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International Journal of Game Theory. 1999, vol. 28, nº 1, p. 1-14
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