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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4097

Google™ Scholar. Others By: Einy, Ezra - Monderer, Dov - Moreno, Diego
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Title: The least core, kernel, and bargaining sets of large games
Author(s): Einy, Ezra
Monderer, Dov
Moreno, Diego [dmoreno]
Publisher: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
Issued date: Jun-1996
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4097
Abstract: We study the least core, the kernel, and bargaining sets of coalitional games with a countable set of players. We show that the least core of a continuous superadditive game with a countable set of players is a non-empty (norm-compact) subset of the space of all countable additive measures. Then we show that in such games the intersection of the prekernel and least core is non-empty. Finally, we show that this intersection is contained in the Aumann-Maschler and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets.
Serie / Nº.: UC3M Working Paper. Economics;
1996-40-22
Keywords: Coalitional games
Least Core
Kernel
Bargaining Sets
Appears in Collections:DE - Working Papers. Economics. WE
Economists Online

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