Publication:
Strategy-Proof Mechanisms With Private And Public Goods

Thumbnail Image
Identifiers
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3820
Files
CORCHON_WPIIE_2004_CL.pdf (374.24 KB)
Publication date
2004
Defense date
Authors
Advisors
Tutors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas (Valencia)
Impact
Google Scholar
Export
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Abstract
In this paper we develop a differentiable approach to deal with incentives in a, possibly small, subset of a general domain of preferences in economies with one public and one private good. We show that, for two agents, there is no social rule which is efficient,nondictatorial and strategy-proof. For the case of more agents the same result occurs when nondictatorship is replaced by Individual Rationality or by Envy-Freeness. Journal of Economic Literature.
Description
Keywords
Bibliographic citation
Collections
DE - Otros documentos
Economists Online