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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3817
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| Title: | Rational Sabotage in Cooperative Production with Heterogeneous Agents |
| Author(s): | Corchón, Luis C. [lcorchon]
Beviá, Carmen |
| Publisher: | Berkeley Electronic Press |
| Issued date: | 2006 |
| Citation: | The B.E. Journals in Theoretical Economics: Topics. 2006, vol. 6, nº 1, art. 16 |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3817 |
| ISSN: | 1935-1704 |
| Abstract: | We present a model of cooperative production in which rational agents might carry out sabotage activities that decrease output. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium without sabotage. It is shown that the absence of sabotage in equilibrium depends on the interplay between technology, relative productivity of agents and the degree of meritocracy. In particular we show that, ceteris paribus, meritocratic systems give more incentives to sabotage than egalitarian systems. |
| Review: | PeerReviewed |
| Publisher version: | http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1240&context=bejte |
| Keywords: | coorperative production
sharing rules
sabotage |
| Appears in Collections: | DE - Artículos de Revistas
Economists Online
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