Archivo Abierto Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid: Nash Bargaining with Downward Rigid Wages

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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3707

Google™ Scholar. Others By: Cabrales, Antonio - Hopenhayn, Hugo

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Title:	Nash Bargaining with Downward Rigid Wages
Author(s):	Cabrales, Antonio [acabrale] Hopenhayn, Hugo
Publisher:	Elsevier
Issued date:	1997
Citation:	Economics Letters. 1997, vol. 57, nº. 2, p. 213-218
URI:	http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3707
ISSN:	1350-4851
DOI:	10.1016/S0165-1765(97)00224-3
Abstract:	We study the effect of downward wage rigidity in a dynamic model when wages are negotiated according to Nash bargaining. Downward rigidity causes a decrease in the worker’s expected utility. For the firms the effect is ambiguous.
Review:	PeerReviewed
Publisher version:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(97)00224-3
Keywords:	Downward wage rigidity Nash bargaining Labor market flexibility
JEL Classification:	J30
Rights:	© 1997 Elsevier Science S.A.
Appears in Collections:	Economists Online DE - Artículos de Revistas