Publication:
Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/366
ISSN: 2340-5031
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we057238.pdf (169.42 KB)
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2005-11
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We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, that a social choice function that chooses a particular correlated equilibrium distribution from this class does not satisfy the Maskin monotonicity condition and therefore can not be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium
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DE - Working Papers. Economics. WE
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