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http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3574
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| Title: | Rational Sabotage in Cooperative Production with Heterogeneous Agents |
| Author(s): | Beviá, Carmen
Corchón, Luis C. [lcorchon] |
| Publisher: | Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía |
| Issued date: | 2006 |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3574 |
| Abstract: | We present a model of cooperative production in which rational agents might carry out sabotage activities that decrease output. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium without sabotage. It is shown that the absence of sabotage in equilibrium depends on the interplay between technology, relative productivity of agents and the degree of meritocracy. In particular we show that, ceteris paribus, meritocratic systems give more incentives to sabotage than egalitarian systems. |
| Serie / Nº.: | Working Papers;
2006 |
| Keywords: | Cooperative production
Sharing rules
Sabotage |
| JEL Classification: | D20
D72
D78
J54 |
| Appears in Collections: | DE - Working Papers. Economics. WE
Economists Online
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