Publication:
Cooperative production and efficiency

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URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3545
ISSN: 0165-4896
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.09.006
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CORCHON_MSS_2008_CL.pdf (146.99 KB)
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2008
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Elsevier
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Abstract
We characterize the sharing rule for which a contribution mechanism achieves efficiency in a cooperative production setting when agents are heterogeneous. This rule differs from the one obtained by Sen for the case of identical agents. We also show for a large class of sharing rules that if Nash equilibrium yields efficient allocations, the production function displays constant returns to scale, a case in which cooperation in production is useless.
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Cooperative production, Efficiency, Incentives
Bibliographic citation
Mathematical Social Sciences. ( Octubre 2008), p. 1-12
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