Publication:
On asymmetric behaviors if voting is costly

Thumbnail Image
Identifiers
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/348
ISSN: 2340-5031
Files
we053320.pdf (174.71 KB)
Publication date
2005-05
Defense date
Authors
Advisors
Tutors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Impact
Google Scholar
Export
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Abstract
Most of the voting models restrict themselves to the analysis of symmetric equilibria, i.e. equilibria in which "similar" voters make "similar" voting decisions. In this paper we investigate this assumption under costly plurality voting. In any pure strategy equilibrium, if two active voters have the same preference order over candidates, they do vote for the same candidate. However, as an example shows, this type of result cannot be hoped for mixed strategies equilibria.
Description
Keywords
Bibliographic citation
Collections
DE - Working Papers. Economics. WE
Economists Online