Publication:
Upstream horizontal mergers, bargaining, vertical contracts

Thumbnail Image
Identifiers
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/336
ISSN: 2340-5031
Files
we051507.pdf (464.6 KB)
Publication date
2005-03
Defense date
Authors
Advisors
Tutors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Impact
Google Scholar
Export
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Abstract
Contrary to the seminal paper of Horn and Wolinsky (1988), we demonstrate that upstream firms, which sell their products to competing downstream firms, do not always have incentives to merge horizontally. In particular, we show that when bargaining takes place over two-part tariffs, and not over wholesale prices, upstream firms prefer to act as independent suppliers rather than as a monopolist supplier. Moreover, we show that horizontal mergers can be procompetitive, even in the absence of efficiency gains.
Description
Keywords
Bibliographic citation
Collections
DE - Working Papers. Economics. WE
Economists Online