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Delegation in International Monetary Policy Games

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URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3314
ISSN: 0014-2921
DOI: 10.1016/0014-2921(94)90037-X
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delegation_dolado_EER_1994_ps.pdf (787.45 KB)
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1994-05
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Elsevier
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In this paper, we show that delegation of monetary policy to an independent and more conservative central banker is an optimal policy in a multi-country framework with monetary spillovers among countries, even in the absence of time inconsistency (credibility) issues. We also study the welfare implications of delegating monetary policy and extend our analysis to the case of coordination of monetary policies.
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European Economic Review, 1994, 38, 5, p. 1057-1069
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