Archivo Abierto Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid: On the generic strategic stability of nash equilibria if voting is costly

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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/280

Google™ Scholar. Others By: De Sinopoli, Francesco - Iannantuoni, Giovanna

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Title:	On the generic strategic stability of nash equilibria if voting is costly
Author(s):	De Sinopoli, Francesco Iannantuoni, Giovanna
Issued date:	Nov-2002
URI:	http://hdl.handle.net/10016/280
Abstract:	We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons.
Serie / Nº.:	UC3M Working Paper. Economics 2002-20
Appears in Collections:	Economists Online DE - Working Papers. Economics. WE

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