Publication: Doubts and equilibria
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2008-02
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Abstract
In real life strategic interactions decision-makers are likely to entertain doubts about the
degree of optimality of their play. To capture this feature of real choice-making, we present here
a model based on the doubts felt by an agent about how well is playing a game. The doubts are
coupled with (and mutually reinforced by) imperfect discrimination capacity, which we model
here by means of similarity relations. We assume that each agent builds procedural preferences
defined on the space of expected payoffsstrategy frequencies attached to his current strategy.
These preferences, together with an adaptive learning process lead to doubt-based selection
dynamic systems. We introduce the concepts of Mixed Strategy Doubt Equilibria, Mixed
Strategy Doubt-Full Equilibria and Mixed Strategy Doubtless Equilibria and show the
theoretical and the empirical relevance of these concepts
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Doubts, Bounded rationality, Evolutionary dynamics, Decision theory