Publication: Necesidades, igualdad y justicia. Construyendo una propuesta igualitaria de necesidades básicas
Loading...
Identifiers
Publication date
2011-01
Defense date
Authors
Advisors
Tutors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Instituto de Derechos Humanos Bartolomé de las Casas; Dykinson
Impact
Export
Abstract
Las necesidades han sido y continúan siendo un tema recurrente tanto en la filosofía del derecho como en la filosofía política, y en las ciencias sociales en general, aunque se han tratado la mayoría de las veces de manera inadecuada, de forma poco atractiva y poco sistemática, lo que ha provocado, entre otras cosas, que la filosofía jurídica la distancie de su escenario de intereses. Así, salvando algunas muy buenas excepciones, hay pocos estudios sobre las necesidades básicas desde la preocupación por lo jurídico, lo que conlleva, también, a que sea un tema poco discutido y sobre el que la mayor parte de los juristas demuestra cierta aprehensión, bastante desconocimiento y muchos prejuicios. En el presente artículo voy a ofrecer una propuesta de necesidades y una clasificación de las mismas, partiendo de la importancia de la teoría de las necesidades para la filosofía del derecho y la relevancia de retomar los estudios y las investigaciones al respecto desde un conocimiento claro sobre las mismas que permita tomar una postura coherente sobre cuál es la teoría de las necesidades que puede resultar más funcional a un determinado modelo de derecho. Y, sobre todo, enfatizando que discutir sobre las necesidades debería ser una prioridad de las teorías de la justicia, vinculando estrechamente la idea de igualdad con la de necesidades y viendo en éstas unas muy buenas razones para fundamentar derechos
The question of basic needs has been, and still is, a recurrent topic not only in philosophy of law and political philosophy, but also in the social sciences in general. However, most of the times, it has been treated not only inappropriately, but also in an unattractive and unsystematic manner. As a result, inter alia, discussions on legal philosophy have very seldom addressed the topic. Besides some strong exceptions, there is a small number of studies on basic needs that reflect legal concerns. Because the topic has not been sufficiently discussed, basic needs remains a subject about which most jurists still manifest apprehension, a good deal of ignorance and much prejudice. In this article I want to advance a proposal of needs and their classification, departing from the importance that the theory of needs has in the philosophy of law. I will also stress the relevance of resuming their study, based on a clear understanding of what they are, so to be able to adopt a consistent stance on which theory of needs can be more functional to a certain model of law. Finally, I will also defend that the discussion on basic needs should have a prioritary position within the broader discussion of the theories of justice, closely linking the idea of equality with that of needs, and by taking them as very good reasons to base rights.
The question of basic needs has been, and still is, a recurrent topic not only in philosophy of law and political philosophy, but also in the social sciences in general. However, most of the times, it has been treated not only inappropriately, but also in an unattractive and unsystematic manner. As a result, inter alia, discussions on legal philosophy have very seldom addressed the topic. Besides some strong exceptions, there is a small number of studies on basic needs that reflect legal concerns. Because the topic has not been sufficiently discussed, basic needs remains a subject about which most jurists still manifest apprehension, a good deal of ignorance and much prejudice. In this article I want to advance a proposal of needs and their classification, departing from the importance that the theory of needs has in the philosophy of law. I will also stress the relevance of resuming their study, based on a clear understanding of what they are, so to be able to adopt a consistent stance on which theory of needs can be more functional to a certain model of law. Finally, I will also defend that the discussion on basic needs should have a prioritary position within the broader discussion of the theories of justice, closely linking the idea of equality with that of needs, and by taking them as very good reasons to base rights.
Description
Keywords
necesidades, Igualdad, Justicia, Necesidades básicas, Necesidades estrictamente humanas, Necesidades sociales, Gustos caros, Preferencias extravagantes, Jerarquía de necesidades, Needs, Equality, Justice, Basic needs, Genuine human needs, Social needs, Expensive tastes,, Extravagant preferences, Hierarchy of needs
Bibliographic citation
Derechos y Libertades: revista de filosofía del derecho y derechos humanos, enero 2011, n. 24, pp. 259-299