Publication: Co-evolution of strategies and update rules in the prisoner's dilemma game on complex networks
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2010-10
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Institute of Physics
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Abstract
In this paper, we study a weak prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game in
which both strategies and update rules are subjected to evolutionary pressure.
Interactions among agents are specified by complex topologies, and we consider
both homogeneous and heterogeneous situations. We consider deterministic and
stochastic update rules for the strategies, which in turn may consider single links
or the full context when selecting agents to copy from. Our results indicate
that the co-evolutionary process preserves heterogeneous networks as a suitable
framework for the emergence of cooperation. Furthermore, on those networks
the update rule leading to a larger fraction, which we call replicator dynamics, is
selected during co-evolution. On homogeneous networks, we observe that even
if the replicator dynamics again turns out to be the selected update rule, the
cooperation level is greater than on a fixed update rule framework. We conclude
that for a variety of topologies, the fact that the dynamics co-evolves with the
strategies leads, in general, to more cooperation in the weak PD game.
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New Journal of Physics: the open access journal for physics, vol. 12, October 2010. Pp. 1-14