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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/12890

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Title: It is Hobbes, not Rousseau: an experiment on voting and redistribution
Author(s): Cabrales, Antonio [acabrale]
Nagel, Rosemarie
Rodríguez Mora, José V.
Publisher: Springer
Issued date: Sep-2011
Citation: Experimental Economics, September 2011, nº 10683, 31 p.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/12890
ISSN: 1386-4157 (print version)
1573-6938 (electronic version)
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-011-9300-x
Abstract: We perform an experiment which provides a laboratory replica of some important features of the welfare state. In the experiment, all individuals in a group decide whether to make a costly effort, which produces a random (independent) outcome for each one of them. The group members then vote on whether to redistribute the resulting and commonly known total sum of earnings equally amongst themselves. This game has two equilibria, if played once. In one of them, all players make effort and there is little redistribution. In the other one, there is no effort and nothing
Sponsor: We thank Iris Bohnet, Tim Cason, David Cooper, John Duffy, Maia Guell, John Van Huyck and Robin Mason for helpful conversations and encouragement. The comments of the Editor and two referees helped improve the paper. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from Spain’s Ministry of Science and Innovation under grants CONSOLIDER INGENIO 2010 CSD2006-0016 (all authors), ECO2009-10531 (Cabrales), ECO2008-01768 (Nagel) and the Comunidad de Madrid under grant Excelecon (Cabrales), the Generalitat de Catalunya and the CREA program (Nagel), and project SEJ2007-64340 of Spain’s Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (Rodríguez Mora).
We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from Spain’s Ministry of Science and Innovation undergrants CONSOLIDER INGENIO 2010 CSD2006-0016 (all authors),ECO2009-10531(Cabrales),ECO2008-01768(Nagel)and the Comunidad de Madrid under grant Excelecon(Cabrales),the Generalitat de Catalunya and the CREA program(Nagel),and project SEJ2007-64340 of Spain’s Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia(RodríguezMora).
Version of: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/672
Publisher version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-011-9300-x
Keywords: Redistribution
Political equilibrium
Voting
Multiple equilibria
Experiments
JEL Classification: C72
C92
D72
E24
H24
I31
O38
Rights: © Economic Science Association 2011
Appears in Collections:Economists Online
DE - Artículos de Revistas

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