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    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10016/587</link>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 18 Jun 2013 04:39:05 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2013-06-18T04:39:05Z</dc:date>
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      <title>El contenido de la territorialidad del artículo 69.1 CE: una aproximación politológico electoral</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10016/11299</link>
      <description>Title: El contenido de la territorialidad del artículo 69.1 CE: una aproximación politológico electoral
Author(s): Garre Pelegrina, Santiago
Abstract: As it has been analyzed, the Spaniard Senate suffers a dysfunctional problem: on the one hand it’s established on the 69.1 CE the Senate is the territorial chamber of representatives and on the other one it’s established that it is a sober second thought chamber. At the same time it has been observed that the general elections have driven to symmetrical majorities between the House of Representatives and the Senate even when the electoral formulas are substantively different. This paper identifies the main reason on the constituency. Through electoral simulations it has been proved that the electoral formula and the simultaneity on time of the elections for the Spaniard Parliament (Cortes Generales) are less influential than the constituency. The scenarios proposed introduce the autonomic community as constituency and shows the psychological effects on the electorate changing the symmetrical majorities on most of the elections.</description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 30 Apr 2011 22:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2011-04-30T22:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>El conflicto tribal de Irlanda del Norte</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10016/10876</link>
      <description>Title: El conflicto tribal de Irlanda del Norte
Author(s): Ruiz Martínez, Javier
Abstract: From the end of the 60s to the end of the 90s, Northern Ireland underwent a tough process of political violence. The political conflict passed to be placed into the sphere of party competition to the arena of tribal violence and back again. This paper summarizes the main facts and reasons that provoked the conflict and the way to get out of it. It finishes with the conclusion of the Belfast Agreement and the devolution of powers to the new Northern Ireland government.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 31 Mar 2011 22:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/10016/10876</guid>
      <dc:date>2011-03-31T22:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>Regional Cleavage Influence towards Island Electoral Behavior: evidences from the Canaries</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10016/9261</link>
      <description>Title: Regional Cleavage Influence towards Island Electoral Behavior: evidences from the Canaries
Author(s): Tuñón, Jorge
Abstract: The Canary Islands are a region with legislative capacities within the European Union (EU). It has had always serious socio-economic deficits. Its distance to its political and geographical centers, its fragmentation and the weakness of its geographical neighbours highly remarked its Centre-Periphery cleavage towards both, Madrid and Brussels. Regarding to the regional/national cleavage (at political level mainly represented by the non-State wide parties), the Canary political framework has been large and varied. Therefore, Canary politics presents so often insular parties, local ones, several large electoral coalitions and independent candidatures. Among this political parties diversity, the Coalición Canaria (CC) birth (1993) and immediate electoral success and regional government performance (until nowadays), represents the main issue of the contemporary Canary nationalism (Tuñón, 2008b). The specific Archipelago electoral regulations and the lack of regional political arch fragmentation (only the left and the right-wing national parties, PSOE and PP, get significant records within the Archipelago) promoted the CC regional government leading majorities’ continuity during the last fifteen years. However, the regional coalition electoral decline has been progressive since it got its top ballot boxes records in 1999 and 2000. How does then the regional/national cleavage influence the Islands voters? Has its importance decreased over the years? Does the centre-periphery issue variable influence equally Canary voter’s choices within Local, Regional, National and European elections? How would it then be possible to measure the Regional cleavage influence towards electoral behaviour in the Canary Islands? The proposed exploratory research will be carried out through findings, mainly due to the available Islands electoral records and its qualitative analysis method interpretation. Thus, the text will seek to analytically answer every above single proposed question about how the Ultra-Peripheral (Regional) cleavage influences both, the political parties’ framework and the electoral behaviour in the Canary Islands.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 31 Dec 2009 23:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2009-12-31T23:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Silvio Berlusconi's party of only children: the organizational model of Forza Italia</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/10016/9260</link>
      <description>Title: Silvio Berlusconi's party of only children: the organizational model of Forza Italia
Author(s): Mariotti, Claudia
Abstract: Since it was founded in 1994, Silvio Berlusconi’s party, “Forza Italia”, turned over the traditional shape of the Italian political system. Its structure doesn’t fit any of the classifications which have been created from the time of Duverger on, except perhaps for Angelo Panebianco’s definition (1982) of charismatic party. The object of the paper is the parliamentary class of Forza Italia, which can be almost totally overlapped to the party class, differently from what happened in mass ideological parties. This overlap has two main reasons: the gain for the party in having its executives paid directly from public institutions, and above all – the degree of control that the party leader achieves, having the power to choose the candidates and - as a result - a huge direct power on the party structure itself, making party statutes actually uneffective. The research, conducted by interviewing 50 members of the Parliament of Forza Italia with the methods of vignettes and open interviews, tries to explain the power relationships between party executives, members of the Parliament and the leader.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 31 Dec 2009 23:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/10016/9260</guid>
      <dc:date>2009-12-31T23:00:00Z</dc:date>
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