Publication:
Board of directors' characteristics and conditional accounting conservatism : Spanish evidence

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economía de la Empresaes
dc.contributor.authorGarcía-Lara, Juan M.
dc.contributor.authorGarcía Osma, Beatriz
dc.contributor.authorPenalva, Fernando
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-03T15:24:20Z
dc.date.available2011-11-03T15:24:20Z
dc.date.issued2007-12
dc.description.abstractUsing a sample of Spanish listed firms for the period 1997-2002 we find that firms where the CEO has low influence over the functioning of the board of directors show a greater degree of accounting conservatism. We measure the influence of the CEO over the board of directors using two aggregate indexes combining 6 (8) characteristics of the functioning of the board of directors and its monitoring committees: board size, proportion of non-executive directors, proportion of independent directors, whether the chairman of the board is an executive director, the number of board meetings, and the existence of an audit committee, a nomination/remuneration committee and an executive committee. We define conservatism as the asymmetric recognition speed of good and bad news in earnings, and we measure it following Basu (1997) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005). Our results are robust to alternative specifications and specific controls for investment opportunities and for the endogenous nature of corporate governance and earnings quality. Overall, our evidence shows that firms with strong boards use conservative accounting numbers as a governance tool, even in an institutional setting with low litigation risk such as Spain
dc.description.statusPublicado
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.mimetypetext/plain
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationEuropean Accounting Review, 2007, v. 16, n. 4 pp. 727-755
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/09638180701706922
dc.identifier.issn0963-8180
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage727
dc.identifier.publicationissue4
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage755
dc.identifier.publicationtitleEuropean Accounting Review
dc.identifier.publicationvolume16
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/7425
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherTaylor & Francis (Routledge)
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09638180701706922
dc.rights©European Accounting Association
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.subject.ecienciaEmpresa
dc.subject.jelM41
dc.subject.jelM44
dc.subject.jelM47
dc.subject.jelG34
dc.subject.otherConservatism
dc.subject.otherGovernance
dc.subject.otherCEO
dc.subject.otherBoard of Directors
dc.subject.otherEarnings Timeliness
dc.subject.otherSpain
dc.titleBoard of directors' characteristics and conditional accounting conservatism : Spanish evidence
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.reviewPeerReviewed
dspace.entity.typePublication
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