Publication:
Endogenous Formation of Coalitions in Non-Cooperative Games

Simple item page
dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorFerreira, José Luises
dc.date.accessioned2014-05-27T15:08:20Z
dc.date.available2014-05-27T15:08:20Z
dc.date.issued1999-01es
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we extend the definitions of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium and communication-proof equilibrium to situations of partial communication. Then we use the model of endogenous formation of coalitions of Aumann and Myerson to find that one of these situations in which the corresponding equilibrium exists will be endogenously determined by the players in the gameen
dc.description.sponsorshipFinancial support by DGES (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, Spain), through projects PB95-0287 and UE95-0042 is gratefully acknowledged.en
dc.description.statusPublicadoes
dc.format.extent19
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationGames and Economic Behavior (1999), 26(1), 40-58en
dc.identifier.doi10.1006/game.1998.0631
dc.identifier.issn0899-8256
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage40
dc.identifier.publicationissue1
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage58
dc.identifier.publicationtitleGames and Economic Behavioren
dc.identifier.publicationvolume26
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10016/5139
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherElsevieren
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0631
dc.rights© 1999 Academic Pressen
dc.rights.accessRightsopen accessen
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomíaes
dc.subject.jelC70
dc.subject.jelC72
dc.subject.otherFormation of coalitionsen
dc.subject.otherCoalition-proofen
dc.subject.otherCommunication-proofen
dc.titleEndogenous Formation of Coalitions in Non-Cooperative Gamesen
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.hasVersionAM*
dc.type.reviewPeerRevieweden
dspace.entity.typePublication
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
endogenous_ferreira_GEB_1999_ps.pdf
Size:
3.98 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Download
Collections
DE - Artículos de Revistas