Fiscal federalism with a single instrument to finance government

Publication:
Fiscal federalism with a single instrument to finance government

dc.affiliation.dpto	UC3M. Departamento de Economía	es
dc.contributor.author	Maravall Rodríguez, Carlos
dc.date.accessioned	2006-11-09T11:37:10Z
dc.date.available	2006-11-09T11:37:10Z
dc.date.issued	2005-04
dc.description.abstract	The structure of each level of government in the United States has changed over the last 200 years. Wallis (2000) has presented empirical evidence that relates the dominance of each level not to the functions government decides to undertake (the expenditures it commits to), but to the costs and benefits of the financial instruments each level has available (the way each level extracts revenues). In this paper we provide theoretical evidence for this hypothesis. We show why two different levels of government (e.g. state and federal) would not want to use a common instrument to finance the same good.
dc.format.extent	345965 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.identifier.issn	2340-5031
dc.identifier.repec	we052213
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10016/342
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries	UC3M Working Paper. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries	2005-13
dc.rights	Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRights	open access
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.eciencia	Economía
dc.title	Fiscal federalism with a single instrument to finance government
dc.type	working paper	*
dspace.entity.type	Publication