Publication: Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
dc.affiliation.dpto | UC3M. Departamento de EconomÃa | es |
dc.contributor.author | Alcalde, J. | |
dc.contributor.author | Romero-Medina, Antonio | |
dc.contributor.editor | Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-12-16T12:55:11Z | |
dc.date.available | 2009-12-16T12:55:11Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1999-02 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper analyzes simple mechanisms implementing (subselections of) the core correspondence of matching markets. We provide a sequential mechanism which mimics a matching procedure for many-to-one real life matching markets. We show that only core allocations should be attained when agents act strategically faced with this mechanism. We also provide a second mechanism to implement the core correspondence in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.identifier.issn | 2340-5031 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10016/6124 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | UC3M Working papers. Economics | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 99-13-07 | |
dc.rights | Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España | |
dc.rights.accessRights | open access | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ | |
dc.subject.eciencia | EconomÃa | |
dc.subject.other | Matching markets | |
dc.subject.other | college admissions problems | |
dc.subject.other | mechanism design | |
dc.title | Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems | |
dc.type | working paper | * |
dspace.entity.type | Publication |
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