Publication:
Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems

dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorAlcalde, J.
dc.contributor.authorRomero-Medina, Antonio
dc.contributor.editorUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.date.accessioned2009-12-16T12:55:11Z
dc.date.available2009-12-16T12:55:11Z
dc.date.issued1999-02
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes simple mechanisms implementing (subselections of) the core correspondence of matching markets. We provide a sequential mechanism which mimics a matching procedure for many-to-one real life matching markets. We show that only core allocations should be attained when agents act strategically faced with this mechanism. We also provide a second mechanism to implement the core correspondence in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.issn2340-5031
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/6124
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUC3M Working papers. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries99-13-07
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.subject.otherMatching markets
dc.subject.othercollege admissions problems
dc.subject.othermechanism design
dc.titleSimple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
dc.typeworking paper*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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