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The effect of short-selling of the aggregation of information in an experimental asset market

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Estadísticaes
dc.contributor.authorVeiga, Helena
dc.contributor.authorVorsatz, Marc
dc.contributor.editorUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Estadística
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-15T12:39:22Z
dc.date.available2008-07-15T12:39:22Z
dc.date.issued2008-07
dc.description.abstractWe show by means of a laboratory experiment that the relaxation of short--selling constraints causes the price of both an overvalued and an undervalued asset to decrease. Hence, the aggregation of information by the market price becomes better in case the asset is overvalued but worse if the asset is undervalued. With respect to payoffs, we find that not only uninformed but also some of the imperfectly informed traders suffer from the weakening of short--selling constraints.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.repecws083808
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/2745
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesStatistics and Econometrics Series
dc.relation.ispartofseries2008-38
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.subject.ecienciaEstadística
dc.subject.otherAsset market
dc.subject.otherRational expectations
dc.subject.otherExperiment
dc.subject.otherShort Sales
dc.titleThe effect of short-selling of the aggregation of information in an experimental asset market
dc.typeworking paper*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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