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Contingent Commodities and Implementation

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorSubir, Chattopadhyay
dc.contributor.authorCorchón, Luis C.
dc.contributor.authorNaeve, Jörg
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-10T10:59:46Z
dc.date.available2009-02-10T10:59:46Z
dc.date.issued1998
dc.description.abstractIn this note we consider the problem whether contingent commodity allocations can be used when the states are not directly contractible. In such a setting a contigent commodity allocation takes the form of a social choice funtion, and the question in whether this function is implementable (in the sense of full implementation). Using only very mild assumptions on the rule for selecting contingent commodity allocations, we derive a strnog negative result which also proves to be robust with respect to different solution concepts employed for implementation. These findings have interesting implications for the interpretation of Arrow-Debreu economies
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/octet-stream
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/3609
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherUniversidad de Bonn
dc.relationpenAccess
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers;
dc.relation.ispartofseries1998
dc.relation.publisherversionftp://web.bgse.uni-bonn.de/pub/RePEc/bon/bonsfa/bonsfa572.pdf
dc.rightsopenAccess
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.subjectContingent Commodities
dc.subjectImplementation
dc.subjectSingle-Crossing
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.titleContingent Commodities and Implementation
dc.typeworking paper*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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