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Delegation and firms’ ability to collude

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economía de la Empresaes
dc.contributor.authorTrombetta, Marco
dc.contributor.authorLambertini, Luca
dc.date.accessioned2010-04-12T12:09:21Z
dc.date.available2010-04-12T12:09:21Z
dc.date.issued2002-04
dc.description.abstractIn amodel of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, we showthat delegation has no effect on cartel stability if managers collude, while it may hinder cartel stability when owners collude in setting the incentive schemes. If owners can choose whether to delegate or keep control of their respective firms, and both groups of individuals collude or play non-cooperatively in their respective variables according to the level of intertemporal discount factor, then if managers are not able to collude in output levels, owners’ delegation decision is non-monotone in the discount factor.
dc.description.statusPublicado
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.mimetypetext/plain
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization, abril 2002, 47, 4, p. 359-373
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00203-7
dc.identifier.issn0167-2681
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10016/7347
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00203-7
dc.rights© Elsevier
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.subject.ecienciaEmpresa
dc.subject.otherDelegation
dc.subject.otherCartel stability
dc.titleDelegation and firms’ ability to collude
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.reviewPeerReviewed
dspace.entity.typePublication
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