Publication:
How to sell to buyers with crossholdings

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorLoyola, Gino
dc.contributor.editorUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.date.accessioned2007-05-30T07:35:11Z
dc.date.available2007-05-30T07:35:11Z
dc.date.issued2007-04-30
dc.description.abstractThis paper characterizes the optimal selling mechanism in the presence of horizontal crossholdings. We find that this mechanism imposes a discrimination policy against the stronger bidders so that the seller´s expected revenue is increasing in both the common crossholding and the degree of asymmetry in crossholdings. Furthermore, it can be implemented by a sequential procedure that includes a price-preferences scheme and the possibility of an exclusive deal with the weakest bidder. We also show that a simple sequential negotiation mechanism, although suboptimal, yields a larger seller´s expected revenue than both the first-price and the second-price auctions.
dc.format.extent324150 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.issn2340-5031
dc.identifier.repecwe075025
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10016/834
dc.language.isoeng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUC3M Working papers. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries07-25
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.subject.otherOptimal auctions
dc.subject.otherCrossholdings
dc.subject.otherAsymmetric auctions
dc.subject.otherPrivate values
dc.titleHow to sell to buyers with crossholdings
dc.typeworking paper*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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