Publication:
Effective Scrappage Subsidies

dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorEsteban, Susanna
dc.date.accessioned2016-03-09T12:05:02Z
dc.date.available2016-03-09T12:05:02Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.description.abstractIt is a common practice for governments to offer scrappage subsidies in order to stimulate the early removal of used cars and modify the distribution of vehicle holdings. In this paper, we analyze the market implications of such subsidies when producers have market power and face competition from a secondary used car market. One key result is that, with market power, a subsidy can induce scrappage even if it pays less than the price of a used car in the absence of the subsidy. We provide a full characterization of the effects of scrappage subsidies on primary and secondary markets for the case of a monopoly, and show that the subsidy that maximizes aggregate welfare lowers prices in the used car market. Our results contrast with the predictions derived from a model with perfect competition.es
dc.description.statusPublicadoes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationThe B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. 2007, vol. 7, nº 1, (Contributions), Article 9, p. 1200- 1200en
dc.identifier.doi10.2202/1935-1704.1200
dc.identifier.issn1935-1704
dc.identifier.publicationissue1
dc.identifier.publicationtitleThe B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economicsen
dc.identifier.publicationvolume7
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/4988
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherDe Gruyteren
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1200
dc.rights© De Gruyter
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomíaes
dc.subject.otherscrappage subsidyen
dc.subject.othersecondary marketen
dc.subject.othermarket poweren
dc.subject.otherautomobile industryen
dc.titleEffective Scrappage Subsidiesen
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.hasVersionAM*
dc.type.reviewPeerReviewed
dspace.entity.typePublication
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