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The value of public information in a cournot duopoly

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorEiny, Ezra
dc.contributor.authorMoreno, Diego
dc.contributor.authorShitovitz, Benyamin
dc.date.accessioned2006-11-09T11:16:50Z
dc.date.available2006-11-09T11:16:50Z
dc.date.issued2002-03
dc.description.abstractWe derive alternative sufficient conditions for the value of public information to be either positive or negative in a Cournot duopoly where firms technology exhibits constant returns to scale.
dc.format.extent457263 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.issn2340-5031
dc.identifier.repecwe024617
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/278
dc.language.isoeng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUC3M Working Paper. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries2002-17
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.titleThe value of public information in a cournot duopoly
dc.typeworking paper*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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