Publication:
The Joker effect: cooperation driven by destructive agents

Simple item page
dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Matemáticases
dc.affiliation.grupoinvUC3M. Grupo de Investigación: Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos (GISC)es
dc.contributor.authorArenas, Alex
dc.contributor.authorCamacho, Juan
dc.contributor.authorCuesta, José A.
dc.contributor.authorRequejo, Rubén J.
dc.date.accessioned2015-02-20T08:34:28Z
dc.date.available2015-02-20T08:34:28Z
dc.date.issued2011-06-21
dc.description.abstractUnderstanding the emergence of cooperation is a central issue in evolutionary game theory. The hardest setup for the attainment of cooperation in a population of individuals is the Public Goods game in which cooperative agents generate a common good at their own expenses, while defectors "free-ride" this good. Eventually this causes the exhaustion of the good, a situation which is bad for everybody. Previous results have shown that introducing reputation, allowing for volunteer participation, punishing defectors, rewarding cooperators or structuring agents, can enhance cooperation. Here we present a model which shows how the introduction of rare, malicious agents &- that we term jokers &- performing just destructive actions on the other agents induce bursts of cooperation. The appearance of jokers promotes a rock-paper-scissors dynamics, where jokers outbeat defectors and cooperators outperform jokers, which are subsequently invaded by defectors. Thus, paradoxically, the existence of destructive agents acting indiscriminately promotes cooperation.en
dc.description.sponsorshipFinancial support from Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologíıa (Spain) under projects FIS2009-13730-C02-02 (A.A.), FIS2009-13370-C02-01 (J.C. and R.J.R.) and MOSAICO (J.A.C.); from the Director, Office of Science, Computational and Technology Research, U.S. Department of Energy under Contract No. DE-AC02-05CH11231 (A.A.); from the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics and of the Government of Catalonia (A.A.); from the Generalitat de Catalunya under project 2009SGR0838 (A.A.) 2009SGR0164 (J.C. and R.J.R.) and from Comunidad de Madrid under project MODELICO-CM (J.A.C.). R.J.R. acknowledges the financial support of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (PIF grant) and the Spanish government (FPU grant).en
dc.format.extent7es
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationJournal of Theoretical Biology, 279(1), Jun. 2011, pp. 113–119en
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.03.017
dc.identifier.issn0022-5193
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage113es
dc.identifier.publicationissue1es
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage119es
dc.identifier.publicationtitleJournal of theoretical biologyen
dc.identifier.publicationvolume279es
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/20071
dc.identifier.uxxiAR/0000010596
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherElsevieren
dc.relation.projectIDComunidad de Madrid. S2009/ESP-1691/MODELICOes
dc.relation.projectIDGobierno de España. FIS2009-13730-C02-02
dc.relation.projectIDGobierno de España. FIS2009-13370-C02-01
dc.relation.projectIDGobierno de España. FIS2006-01485/MOSAICO
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.03.017es
dc.rights© Elsevier Ltd.en
dc.rights.accessRightsopen accessen
dc.subject.ecienciaMatemáticases
dc.subject.otherPublic goodsen
dc.subject.otherCooperationen
dc.subject.otherDestructive agentsen
dc.subject.otherCyclesen
dc.titleThe Joker effect: cooperation driven by destructive agentsen
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.hasVersionSMUR*
dspace.entity.typePublication
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
joker_JTB_2011_pp.pdf
Size:
396.09 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Download
Collections
DM - GISC - Artículos de Revistas