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Endogenous strength in conflicts

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorBeviá, Carmen
dc.contributor.authorCorchón, Luis C.
dc.contributor.editorUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-22T08:32:51Z
dc.date.available2011-06-22T08:32:51Z
dc.date.issued2011-06-13
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we study a two stage contest where the strength of players in the second stage depends on the result of the contest in the first stage. We show that this contest displays properties that are not present in one shot contests. Non-symmetric players make different efforts in the first stage and rent dissipation in the first period may be large. We study the conditions under which the discouragement effect holds. In addition, new issues emerge like the evolution of the strengths and the shares of the prize during the game.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.issn2340-5031
dc.identifier.repecwe1113
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/11621
dc.identifier.uxxiDT/0000000900
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUC3M Working papers. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries11-13
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.titleEndogenous strength in conflicts
dc.typeworking paper*
dc.type.hasVersionSMUR*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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