Quantitative restrictions in experimental posted-offer markets

Publication:
Quantitative restrictions in experimental posted-offer markets

dc.affiliation.dpto	UC3M. Departamento de Economía	es
dc.contributor.author	Kujal, Praveen
dc.date.accessioned	2006-11-09T11:31:41Z
dc.date.available	2006-11-09T11:31:41Z
dc.date.issued	2003-11
dc.description.abstract	The effect of imposing binding and non-binding quantity restrictions upon price convergence in posted-offer markets is discussed. Unlike in the price control experiments prices do not jump after the removal of quantity restrictions. Further, a surprising property of prices was observed in these experiments, prices converge from below the competitive equilibrium. This result contradicted the well established empirical regularity that price convergence is from above the competitive equilibrium in Posted-Offer markets. Thus, the asymmetric distribution of surplus, or the imposition of quotas themselves affected price convergence in the quota experiments.
dc.format.extent	198005 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.identifier.issn	2340-5031
dc.identifier.repec	we036125
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10016/305
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries	UC3M Working Paper. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries	2003-25
dc.rights	Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRights	open access
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.eciencia	Economía
dc.title	Quantitative restrictions in experimental posted-offer markets
dc.type	working paper	*
dspace.entity.type	Publication