Stability in one-sided matching markets

Cechlárová, Katarína; Romero-Medina, Antonio

Publication:
Stability in one-sided matching markets

dc.affiliation.dpto	UC3M. Departamento de Economía	es
dc.contributor.author	Cechlárová, Katarína
dc.contributor.author	Romero-Medina, Antonio
dc.contributor.editor	Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.date.accessioned	2009-05-07T11:54:01Z
dc.date.available	2009-05-07T11:54:01Z
dc.date.issued	1998-07
dc.description.abstract	The stable roommates problem may be unsolvable for sorne instances, therefore we study a relaxation, when it is allowed to form groups of any size (the stable partition problem). Two extensions of preferences over individuals to preferences over sets are suggested. For the first one, derived from the most prefered member of a set, it is shown that a stable partition always existis if the original preferences are strict and a simple algorithm for its computation is derived. This algorithm turns out to be strategy proof. The second extension, based on the least prefered member of a set, produces solutions very similar to those for the stable roornmates problem.
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.identifier.issn	2340-5031
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4158
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries	UC3M Working Paper. Economics;
dc.relation.ispartofseries	1998-52-18
dc.rights	Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRights	open access
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.eciencia	Economía
dc.subject.other	Matching markets
dc.subject.other	Stable partition
dc.subject.other	Digraphs
dc.subject.other	Algorithms
dc.title	Stability in one-sided matching markets
dc.type	working paper	*
dspace.entity.type	Publication