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Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorMoreno, Diego
dc.contributor.editorUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.date.accessioned2008-09-04T09:31:20Z
dc.date.available2008-09-04T09:31:20Z
dc.date.issued1994-06
dc.description.abstractThis paper provides a characterization of the class of incentive compatible (i.e., strategy-proof) allocation mechanisms for decision problems associated with classical economic environments. It is shown that when at least one public good is provided, then only dictatorial allocation mechanisms are incentive compatible. Dictatorial mechanisms are very unsatisfactory, as any conflict of interest is always resolved in favor of a single individual (the dictator). This result reveals a basic incompatibility between incentive compatibility and any other desirable property (e.g., any kind of efficiency, fairness, etc.) of an allocation mechanism. In particular, incentive compatible allocation mechanisms typically produce inefficient outcomes.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.issn2340-5031
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/2917
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUC3M Working Papers. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries1994-23-13
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.titleStrategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods
dc.typeworking paper*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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