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Interdependent preferences and segregating equilibria

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorCabrales, Antonio
dc.contributor.authorCalvó-Armengol, Antoni
dc.contributor.editorUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.date.accessioned2007-04-02T08:09:46Z
dc.date.available2007-04-02T08:09:46Z
dc.date.issued2007-03
dc.description.abstractThis paper shows that models where preferences of individuals depend not only on their allocations, but also on the well-being of other persons, can produce both large and testable effects. We study the allocation of workers with heterogeneous productivities to firms. We show that even small deviations from purely “selfish” preferences leads to widespread workplace skill segregation. This result holds for a broad class and distribution of social preferences. That is, workers of different abilities tend to work in different firms, as long as they care somewhat more about the utilities of workers who are “close”.
dc.format.extent253643 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.issn2340-5031
dc.identifier.repecwe072313
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/674
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUC3M Working papers. Economics;
dc.relation.ispartofseries07-13
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.subject.otherContract theory
dc.subject.otherMechanism design
dc.subject.otherEnvy
dc.subject.otherSocial preferences
dc.subject.otherSkill segregation
dc.titleInterdependent preferences and segregating equilibria
dc.typeworking paper*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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