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Exclusive dealing and compatibility of investments

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorMilliou, Chrysovalantou
dc.date.accessioned2006-11-09T11:33:30Z
dc.date.available2006-11-09T11:33:30Z
dc.date.issued2004-10
dc.description.abstractWe examine a final product manufacturer's incentives to engage in exclusive dealing with an input supplier when both market sides invest in quality and bargain over their trading terms. Taking into account that the investments' compatibility can be higher under exclusive dealing we find, in contrast to previous literature, that bargaining power distribution plays a crucial role both for investment incentives and for incentives to adopt exclusive dealing. We also find that there exist cases in which although investments are higher under exclusive dealing, the manufacturer chooses non-exclusive dealing. Our welfare analysis indicates that the manufacturer's choice of exclusive dealing in equilibrium is never welfare detrimental.
dc.format.extent462370 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.issn2340-5031
dc.identifier.repecwe044919
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/326
dc.language.isoeng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUC3M Working Paper. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries2004-19
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.titleExclusive dealing and compatibility of investments
dc.typeworking paper*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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