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Interim efficient mechanisms for a public decision making in a discrete framework

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de EconomĂ­aes
dc.contributor.authorPĂ©rez-Nievas, Mikel
dc.contributor.editorUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomĂ­a
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-10T11:09:34Z
dc.date.available2010-03-10T11:09:34Z
dc.date.issued2000-02
dc.description.abstractIn this paper. I characterize the set of Bayesian incentive compatible anonymous mechanisms in a discrete public good problem when preferences are private information. With this result in hand, I characterize the set of interim incentive efficient mechanisms as voting schemes in which votes are weighted according to the tax paid by each agent.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.issn2340-5031
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/7221
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUC3M Working papers. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries2000-21-07
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomĂ­a
dc.subject.otherPublic goods
dc.subject.otherVoting mechanisms
dc.subject.otherInterim efficiency
dc.titleInterim efficient mechanisms for a public decision making in a discrete framework
dc.typeworking paper*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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