Limited liability in business groups

Publication:
Limited liability in business groups

dc.affiliation.dpto	UC3M. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa	es
dc.contributor.author	Ropero Moriones, Eva	es
dc.date.accessioned	2006-11-07T11:23:35Z
dc.date.available	2006-11-07T11:23:35Z
dc.date.issued	2005-12	es
dc.description.abstract	We consider a model in which a holding company has to decide whether to finance an investment project in a subsidiary. The project can be financed either through internal capital or through debt. The subsidiary's manager has private information on the quality of the project and has empirebuilding preferences. When bankruptcy is costly for the subsidiary's manager, the choice between internal and external financing is part of an optimal mechanism that induces truthful revelation of the information. The first best solution can be approached if the cost of bankruptcy for the manager is high enough.	es
dc.format.extent	572079 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.identifier.repec	wb057617
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10016/117
dc.language.iso	eng	es
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Workings Paper. Bussiness Economics	es
dc.relation.ispartofseries	2005-17	es
dc.rights.accessRights	open access
dc.subject.eciencia	Empresa
dc.title	Limited liability in business groups	es
dc.type	working paper	*
dspace.entity.type	Publication

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