Publication:
Insider trading: regulation, securities markets, and welfare under risk neutrality

Simple item page
dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorEstrada, Javier
dc.contributor.editorUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.date.accessioned2008-09-04T10:31:47Z
dc.date.available2008-09-04T10:31:47Z
dc.date.issued1994-10
dc.description.abstractI evaluate in this paper the impact of insider trading regulation (ITR) on a securities market and on social welfare. I show that ITR has both beneficial and detrimental effects on a securities market. In terms of welfare, I show that ITR has a purely redistributive effect; that is, it generates trading gains and trading losses that cancel out at the aggregate level. However, the goods and services that could have been produced with the resources allocated to enforce such a wealth redistribution are a net social cost of restricting insider trading. Finally, although I establish two conditions under which ITR is beneficial, I argue that neither condition provides sufficient support to the imposition of such a regulation.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.issn2340-5031
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/2922
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUC3M Working Papers. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries1994-34-16
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.subject.otherInsider trading
dc.subject.otherSecurities Regulation
dc.titleInsider trading: regulation, securities markets, and welfare under risk neutrality
dc.typeworking paper*
dspace.entity.typePublication
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
we943416.pdf
Size:
560.63 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
Download
Collections
DE - Working Papers. Economics. WE
Economists Online