

## 9. Rejecting the Past: Central Government and Family Policy in Post-Authoritarian Spain (1975-94)\*

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Spain differs from many other European Union member states in that its central government devotes only a small amount of its resources to family policy<sup>1</sup> (see Table 9.1), an area of policy characterised by its institutional 'invisibility', for Spain does not have a designated ministry or department for family affairs.

Table 9.1 Social expenditure on families as a proportion of total social protection spending in EU member states (1980, 1991)

	1980	1991
Belgium	10.7	8.0
Denmark	9.9	10.3
France	10.7	8.2
Germany	9.0	6.0
Greece	3.6	1.4
Ireland	8.0	10.6
Italy	6.9	3.6
Luxembourg	8.8	9.5
Netherlands	8.9	5.5
Portugal	6.8	5.4
<b>Spain</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>0.6</b>
United Kingdom	11.4	9.6
Europe 12	9.2	6.4

Note: The benefits included under the label 'family' do not correspond exactly with the family policies studied in this paper. On the one hand, only current transactions are included in the table. Fiscal expenditure is excluded although it is covered in the paper. On the other hand, the paper focuses on the programmes aimed at parents and their dependent children, while the table includes expenditure on family programmes pertaining to other dependent relatives, for instance older people. Nevertheless, this table is useful in showing that expenditure on family policy in relation to total social spending was lower in Spain than in all other EU member states during the 1980s and 1970s.

Source: Based on data from the Commission of the European Communities (1993).

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The weaknesses of family policy in Spain cannot be explained in terms of fertility patterns. Fertility rates are in fact lower than in many other Western countries (see Table 9.2). The decline in fertility has been an incentive for policy-makers in some countries to establish family policies with pronatalist objectives, but not in Spain in recent years. This paper attempts to explain the specificity of Spain in terms of the rejection of the family policies formulated during Franco's regime (1936-1975) by post-authoritarian policy-makers.

Table 9.2 Fertility rates in Spain (1922-89)

1922	4.14
1925	3.98
1930	3.63
1935	3.22
1940	2.98
1945	2.85
1950	2.46
1955	2.50
1960	2.76
1965	2.96
1970	2.90
1975	2.78
1980	2.21
1985	1.64
1989	1.36

Source: Data for 1922-65 from Nash (1991:164); data for 1970-89 from IW (1992:12).

Francoist family policies were both pronatalist and antifeminist. Their chief aim was to increase population, and one of the most important means they used was to confine women to the private sphere, defined as their 'family responsibilities'. The salience of family programmes in official discourse and propaganda was such that they were remembered by political elites and the population in general long after 1975. The influence of these vivid memories is so strong that, since the 1970s, most actors have associated all family policies with the symbols displayed and the measures enacted during Franco's regime. They have thus tried to avoid policy-making in the area of the family. This was due in part to the consensual style of policy-making during and after the transition, which implied that measures were enacted only after agreement had been reached amongst the most important social and political forces. Any political initiative strictly directed against the supporters of the previous regime was excluded. The rejection of the legacies of the authoritarian past did not imply the dismantling of most Francoist policies. Only some of the programmes which were most markedly antifeminist were abolished after 1975: for instance, the contributory benefit paid monthly for a dependent spouse, the implicit argument being that the State should not promote the status of

housewives who do not work outside the home, but rather encourage female waged work. Most of the other measures were not rescinded, and in general the level of benefits was not updated. As a result, their real value today is only symbolical due to inflation.

The first section of the paper sets out the ideological trends underlying Francoist family policies, as well as the characteristics of the most noteworthy family programmes up to 1975<sup>2</sup>. The second section includes a description of the general characteristics of family policy and the main programmes in post-authoritarian Spain. The third section presents the theoretical insights upon which the explanatory argument of the paper is based, by identifying circumstances under which post-authoritarian policy-makers tend to reject public policies made by former authoritarian political elites. The final section examines the role played by the different actors in the area of family policy: family organisations, feminists, state feminists<sup>3</sup>, parliamentarians, politicians and high ranking civil servants.

#### Family policy in Franco's Spain (1936-1975)<sup>4</sup>

Two ideological trends were at the basis of Francoist family policy: nationalism and National Catholicism. On the one hand, as was the case in other countries (both democratic and authoritarian), a large population was considered one of the most important assets of the nation. Political elites thought that, in order to increase the strength of the country and to attain an international position as a world power, population growth should be actively encouraged. Francoist family policy thus had a clear pronatalist objective. On the other hand, Roman Catholicism had traditionally supported the view that families were the fundamental unit of society and that the formation of new families and the conservation of those which already existed were two objectives the State should promote. Religious teachings had reinforced the pronatalist drive behind family policy from the beginning of the regime.

Francoist family policies did not seek to promote all families. Rather, they were directed at a very specific family model. Most measures were established only for married (heterosexual) couples and their legitimate children. In addition, the family was hierarchical: the authority within it rested with the father. This traditional family model was reflected in many aspects of family policy: for instance, in the fact that family allowances and other benefits were generally paid to male breadwinners and only very rarely to mothers (Nash, 1991:172-3).

Finally, Francoist policy-makers defined motherhood as the main duty of women towards the State and society and affirmed that the role of mothering was incompatible with other roles, such as that of waged worker. Therefore, in the first two decades of the regime, family policies were formulated in parallel with measures against the waged

labour of married women outside the home, such as the marriage bar<sup>5</sup> (Valiente, 1994:149-84).

It is important to note that in the mid-1930s very few family policies were formulated and implemented in Spain. In most cases, Francoist policy-makers therefore established these measures from scratch.

Family allowances (*subsidio familiar*) were first instituted in 1938 and affected most male waged workers (except domestic servants and home workers). They were financed by the state, employers and all workers. The amount varied according to the number of children.

Secondly, family bonuses (*plus de cargas familiares*), which has been in existence since 1945, were a supplementary wage paid to most male waged workers in a country where salaries were low. In most cases, 10 per cent of the total wages paid in a company were distributed mainly among the married male breadwinners according to the number of children. Family bonuses were financed by employers and were managed independently in each company by a committee formed by the employer and workers.

Thirdly, married couples were rewarded with nuptiality prizes from 1948 and with preferential loans whose repayment was reduced at the birth of children (Nash, 1991:171).

Lastly, a few programmes targeting large families (*familias numerosas*) were established in Spain in 1926 (Royal Decree Law of 21 June 1926). Nevertheless, it was during Franco's time that the most important and largest number of such policies were developed. In 1943 large families were defined as those who supported four or more dependent children. The policies consisted chiefly of preferential treatment and discounts on public transport, loans, public housing and school fees. Moreover, some measures aimed at families in general particularly affected large families. Finally, annual prizes were awarded to the Spanish families with the largest number of children (Nash, 1991:171-72).

Fragmentation was one of the main features of Francoist family policy, in the sense that there was not a coherent set of measures, but rather several fragmented programmes, each of which had its own form of funding, targeted a different type of recipient and was administered by a different institution.

At least until the mid-1950s or early 1960s, the economic importance of family programmes was considerable, because some of them constituted an additional income for many male waged workers (Iglesias and Meil, 1994:526). Furthermore, family policy was not a hidden policy, but a recurrent theme in the rhetoric and propaganda of the regime. In spite of this, and of the economic importance of family programmes, they never achieved their pronatalist goals (see Table 9.2). As Nash affirms:

unlike other immediate post-war periods, there was not a 'baby-boom' in Spain in the early forties. Demographic data point to the

maintenance of the previous rhythm of population growth. Birth-rates steadily declined in the first decade of the Franco regime; demographic patterns did not change until the mid-fifties when an upward fertility trend can be observed in the decade between 1955 and 1965. (Nash, 1991:173)

Francoist family policies were ineffective in achieving pro-natalist goals probably because they could not counterbalance the calculations that many Spaniards had been making about the appropriateness of small families since at least the 1920s and 1930s. Fertility rates in Spain did not start decreasing at that time because women were entering the waged labour force in large numbers or were being enrolled in educational programmes, and wanted to make professional, educational and family responsibilities more compatible. Rather, they declined because an increasing number of women and men thought it was better for them to have small families because of the cost of raising and educating children, amongst other things (Nash, 1991:167).

During the 1960s and 1970s family policies remained on the agenda and continued to be proclaimed in the ceremonies and rituals of the regime. In 1966 (Decree № 2945 of 24 November 1966), family allowances and family bonuses were replaced for most beneficiaries by contributory benefits. The beneficiaries were contributors to the Social Security System (*Seguridad Social*), that is, mainly waged workers. The most important benefits of this kind were monthly payments for each dependent child up to sixteen years old and for a dependent spouse, and one-off payments for marriage and at the birth of each child (Coll and Martín, 1989:70). Once again, the level of benefits was the same for all families (except large ones), irrespective of their income level. In addition, the level of benefits (in monetary terms) did not vary between 1971 and 1975. Therefore, due to the impact of high inflation, the real value of benefits had already started to fall even before the process of transition to democracy was initiated (Velarde, 1990:164-67).

### Family policy in post-authoritarian Spain

Besides low levels of spending and institutional 'invisibility', four other features characterise family policy in post-authoritarian Spain in comparison with other EU member states. Firstly, until recently most benefits have been contributory. Universal benefits and means-tested benefits have been rare, although their number has been increasing in recent years (later than in other EU member states). Secondly, the relative importance of tax relief (in relation to other measures, such as transfer payments) is higher than in other EU member states (Coll and Martín, 1989:71). Thirdly, an important part of family policy is directed towards large families. Fourthly, Spanish family policy is fragmented.

Most of the contributory benefits for families that existed in Spain after 1975 were instituted under Franco's rule in 1971 (Decree № 55 of

7 January 1971, concerning waged workers, but civil servants received very similar benefits): 250 pesetas paid monthly for each dependent child (large families received higher amounts); 375 pesetas paid monthly for a 'dependent spouse' (generally the wife); 6000 pesetas as a one-off payment on marriage; and 3000 pesetas as a single payment at the birth of each child. These benefits were not updated in monetary terms between 1971 and 1985. Therefore, their real value had become almost symbolic by the mid-1980s<sup>6</sup>.

In 1985 (Royal Decree Nº 2364 of 18 December 1985), all these contributory benefits for waged workers, except the monthly payments for dependent children, were abolished. In 1986, following this reform, the level of payments for dependent children was lower in Spain than in any other EU member state. Moreover, elsewhere in the European Union, other family allowances existed (and continue to exist), for instance, for lone parents, or at childbirth, which are not available in Spain (Coll and Martín, 1989:72).

The same reform also instituted a new means-tested supplementary benefit (1050 pesetas), to be added to the monthly payments for dependent children of certain low-income families. The introduction of this benefit coincided with the increasing importance that means-tested benefits were acquiring in the family policies of most EU countries during the 1980s (Dumon, 1990:352, 361).

In 1989 most children (approximately 11,000,000) were indirect beneficiaries, but very few low-income families received the means-tested supplementary benefit of 1050 pesetas added to the monthly payments for dependent children (Coll and Martín, 1989:71).

Finally, in 1990 (Act Nº 26 of 20 December 1990), an annual non-contributory (and means-tested) benefit of 36,000 pesetas was introduced for dependent children up to the age of eighteen. It is financed by a contribution from the state to the social security system.

From 1978 personal income taxation was reformed, with the creation of a new tax, the *Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas* (IRPF). Under IRPF, if the couple was married, families could receive tax relief for each dependent child (up to twenty-five years old) living in the family home, and whose income did not reach a certain level. Such tax exemptions have been updated every year since 1978.

Joint taxation was mandatory (husbands and wives must pay personal income tax together) until the Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional) declared it unconstitutional, because, among other reasons, it penalises families with more than one wage earner, and therefore the salary of the second waged worker (generally the wife) may increase the family revenue so as to bring it into a higher tax bracket<sup>7</sup>. Since 1988 couples can choose either joint or individual taxation (each member of the family pays taxes in accordance with her/his income and independently of the income of other family members). In 1991 the age of the 'dependent child' was raised to thirty

years. In certain circumstance families could receive tax relief for childcare expenses.

The number of families who reduced the amount of tax to be paid because the parents were taxed as a married couple rose every year, from 4,853,989 in 1981 to 5,835,659 in 1987, the last year of existence of this tax relief. The number of families (and individuals, since 1988) who paid less taxes because they were supporting 'dependent' children also increased almost every year: from 3,679,989 in 1981 to 5,542,142, as did the number of families (and individuals, since 1988) who filled in an IRPF tax form<sup>8</sup>.

It should be noted, firstly, that these forms of tax relief mainly affect families whose income reaches a certain level and who are, therefore, obliged to fill in an income tax return and pay taxes according to their level of income. Secondly, the age (thirty years) up to which a child can be considered 'dependent', and therefore entitling his/her parents to claim tax relief, is higher in Spain than in other EU member states. This reflects the Spanish social reality that many children and young people live in their parents' homes until they are, on average, in their mid- and late twenties.

Benefits for large families, most of which have been in place since Franco's regime, are still in existence today. Since 1975 their economic importance has decreased for two reasons: fewer and fewer families of this type exist in Spain; and inflation has taken its toll. Nevertheless, in December 1994 the level of these benefits was raised significantly.

### **Political legacies: the changing role of the past**

Hugh Heclo's study of modern politics in Britain and Spain concluded with the remark that public policies in a given period are not only responses to problems of the time, but also reactions of policy-makers to past policies, that is, to former governmental attempts to cope with the same or similar problems (Heclo, 1974:315-18). Margaret Weir and Theda Skocpol (1985:119-21) have suggested that policy-makers tend to introduce only minor changes in existing programmes rather than making radical moves away from the past when dealing with problem situations. In other words, policy legacies tend to favour continuity in the policy-making process.

This may not always be so. Bermeo's (1992) argument is useful here: she defends the view that the opposite may be the case after a radical change in the political regime (from authoritarianism to democracy), as in Spain. Bermeo affirms that political experiences under a dictatorship might make policy actors reject some practices specially associated with authoritarianism. Accordingly, she defines the concept of 'political learning' as 'the process through which people modify their political beliefs and tactics as a result of severe crises, frustrations, and dramatic changes in environment' (Bermeo, 1992:274). She also suggests that 'the

process of 'discrediting' old beliefs is what political learning is all about' (Bermeo, 1992:281).

Bermeo's insights can be developed further by trying to answer the question formulated by Peter Hall (1989) in the following terms:

It is all very well to say that policy-makers are influenced by the lessons drawn from past policy experience, but the lessons that history provides us with are always ambiguous. Why are some lessons learned from a given policy experience, rather than others? (Hall, 1989:362).

It is argued in this paper that, contrary to what Weir and Skocpol stated (for the cases they analysed, that is of policy-making in democratic periods where the political regime has not changed), policy legacies do not always favour the maintenance of past policies when a transformation of the political regime occurs. Policy-makers tend to reject the policies of the former authoritarian regime under six conditions.

Firstly, it is more probable that policy-makers will reject previous public policy when it had its origins in such a regime. It is no accident that, in this situation, post-authoritarian political elites associate any programme in the policy area with the programmes instituted during the authoritarian past.

Secondly, democratic political elites tend to avoid the development of measures similar to those of the authoritarian regime, if the latter has a prominent position in its rituals and ceremonies. This is so because the ideas underlying such measures remain very vivid in the memories of the future policy-makers and of citizens in general. Moreover, their importance in official discourse might be a more influential factor for future democratic policies than other more substantive aspects of the authoritarian policies, such as the amount of resources devoted to financing them.

Thirdly, democratic policy-makers are more prone to avoid authoritarian policies when they dealt with 'non-technical' issues. Two reasons support this view. On the one hand, technical matters are generally treated by staff (politicians and bureaucrats) who are specially trained to deal with them. These specialists may try to defend their positions within the State during the transition period. On the one hand, policies which deal with non-technical matters are formulated and implemented by politicians and bureaucrats with general political and administrative skills. It is generally easy later on to dismantle the policy units where these policy-makers are working and transfer them to other departments. On the other hand, technical issues are not easily understood by the general public, so that they are usually removed from discussions in broader political arenas and absent from the propaganda of the regime.

Fourthly, democratic policy-makers probably reject past public policies in the absence of powerful associations that have a strong



interest in maintaining and even expanding the measures already in place.

Fifthly, post-authoritarian political elites may want to distance themselves from the programmes existing in the former dictatorship if they could be perceived as contrary to the fundamental rights of groups of citizens wishing to be incorporated into the political system (for instance, women).

Sixthly, when a process of transition to democracy is based on the achievement of consensus among the most important political and social forces, it is likely that the actors who lead such processes avoid policy-making in areas which can be easily identified as being preferred by the former political regime (in which some political and social forces were illegal and repressed).

### **Social and political actors in the area of family policy after 1975**

In countries like France or Belgium family organisations matter in policy-making because of their large membership and political and social influence. In the Netherlands, Belgium and France, family associations participate in consultative bodies for family policies (Dumon, 1990:363-64). In Spain the influence of family organisations in the policy-making process is negligible, due to the low number of members, to the fact that the majority of them are organised at the local or provincial level and to the absence of platforms at the national level (Iglesias and Meil, 1994:540-42).

As far as the feminist movement is concerned<sup>9</sup>, it is important to note that many feminist groups were formed in Spain in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and together with other (illegal) political organisations they participated in the opposition to the authoritarian regime (Scanlon, 1990:94).

In this context, Spanish activists rejected the system of beliefs which had inspired Francoist policy-makers when they were establishing family policies. Feminists believe that the family is one of the main *loci* where the subordination of women takes place. These views were formed in the process of opposition to the authoritarian regime, as well as through exposure to international feminist theory. Spanish feminists have made only a very small contribution to feminist thinking, and have imported most of it from abroad, mainly by reading translations of foreign theoretical writings (Threlfall, 1985:59-60). In general, and with important exceptions, many international feminist theoreticians have placed a great deal of emphasis on studying the family as a place where women have an inferior status (Eisenstein, 1991:86-96). These interpretations became very widespread, partly because their authors were reacting against traditional views of families as places where most individuals (irrespective of their gender and age) find self-fulfilment.

Activists in Spain were receptive to international feminist theoretical approaches and, with their help, analysed the Francoist experience, and/or confirmed their own partly formed views on family and family policies.

Feminists' views were manifested in Spain not only in public discourse (writings and speeches) but also in actual behaviour (political action and inaction). Feminists believed almost unanimously that the best family policy (as defined in this paper) is a non-policy. Some of them concentrated their political activity on the area of the regulation of relations within the family, denouncing the inequality of relations in Spain in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and pressurising policy-makers for legislative change. Besides, some other feminists tried to make public the hidden and dark face of some families, for example in cases of wife battering or sexual abuse, and demanded the establishment of public policies to deal with them.

The beliefs and strategies of state feminists in relation to family policies were the same as those of feminists. Femocrats have existed in Spain since the mid- to late 1970s. The main feminist institution of the central state, the Instituto de la Mujer (IM, Institute for Woman), was founded in October 1983, six years after the first democratic elections were held in Spain and one year after the Social-democratic Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE) first came to power, where it has remained ever since. Because the IM is the most important feminist institution of the central State, the role played by IM femocrats is examined here (it should be noted that no IM department has responsibility for family affairs)<sup>10</sup>.

It is hardly surprising that both feminists and femocrats agreed on the rejection of Francoist family policies. A few femocrats had been former activists in the feminist movement. They were inspired in the early 1980s by international examples, mainly by the French case (Valiente, 1995). In France, equality matters fell within the competence of the Ministry for Woman's Rights, while family issues were the concern of the Secretary of State for the Family, dependent on the Ministry of Social Affairs (Jenson and Sineau, 1994:21-22). Finally, some high ranking femocrats and other people who participated in the establishment of the IM were members of the PSOE or were very close to it. As explained below, this party paid little or no attention to the promotion of families through public policies.

Since 1975 the views and/or strategies of those involved in family policy-making — parliamentarians, politicians and high ranking civil servants — have also been affected by the historical legacy of family policies under Franco. They were working mainly in the areas of social security (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, Ministry of Labour and Social Security), tax law (Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, Ministry of Economy and Finance) and social services (Ministerio de Asuntos Sociales, Ministry of Social Affairs). Most of these policy-

makers obtain their positions because they are members of political parties, or are close to them<sup>11</sup>.

It is reasonable to suppose that a centre-right party, such as the UCD, would have been interested in family matters and would have proposed the development of family policies, as was the case for several centre-right and conservative parties in other Western countries. Surprisingly, the UCD was not an advocate of more (and more extensive) family policies. This was reflected, firstly, in the low priority that such issues received initially in electoral programmes and, later, in the actual behaviour of the UCD. On the one hand, although each electoral programme contained one or two statements about the family as 'the basic institution of society' (UCD, 1977:13), or as 'the best sphere for the development of human beings and their basic values', and the 'school of solidarity for children' (UCD, 1979:25), very little or almost nothing was said about concrete family policies (as defined in this paper). On the other hand, it was under the UCD mandate that funding for some of the family programmes was cut back substantially in real terms.

Other issues than family policies occupied a more prominent place in the UCD platforms and actual policy-making. UCD electoral programmes focused rather on the reform of the relationships among family members in order to make them more egalitarian. Between 1977 and 1982 policy-making also reflected this emphasis. For instance, the December 1978 Constitution proclaimed the equality of both spouses within marriage (article 32.1) as well as of children born both in and out of wedlock (articles 39.2 and 39.3). Furthermore, legislation passed in the following years developed these and other constitutional precepts, such as the recognition of equal rights of husbands and wives to administer common property within marriages (1981) or the legalisation of divorce (1981).

Several factors help to explain the near-absence of family policy issues in UCD public discourse and in political behaviour. Obvious as it may seem, other matters usually take precedence in the transition to democracy and in the consolidation process, such as the legalisation of political parties and trade unions, the writing of the Constitution or negotiations with the army in order to avoid a military backlash. All this is congruent with what in fact happened: that policy-makers intervened very little in the area of family policy, leaving unchanged the measures which existed from Franco's time.

In addition, the transition to democracy took place in Spain through a consensus reached among all political and social forces. In order to achieve general agreements like this, it is appropriate for actors to concentrate on and emphasise what they have in common and can agree about. In order to do this, UCD policy-makers tried to avoid symbols and discourse and the enactment of measures which could be associated with the authoritarian regime, where many of the political and social forces which intervened in the transition process were illegal and

repressed. Family programmes were precisely the kind of programmes to be avoided, because of their high saliency in Francoist rhetoric.

Finally, the rejection of policy-making in the area of the family during UCD (and PSOE) mandates was facilitated by the absence of a powerful and specialised bureaucracy, organised to defend the continuation and even the intensification of such measures.

Family policy has also been a non-priority area for the PSOE over the past two decades, as is shown in its electoral programmes (PSOE, 1977; 1979; 1982; 1986; 1989; 1993). They do not devote sections exclusively to the family. Moreover, since 1982 the financing of many family programmes has continued to decline in real terms.

PSOE feminists were particularly active in their attempt to avoid any explicit family policy. In 1976 a women's caucus, *Mujer y Socialismo*, was formed within the party. In 1981, a member of this caucus was elected to the PSOE's Executive Committee, and others followed her in successive years. In December 1984 the women's caucus was raised by the party to the status of a women's secretariat at Federal Executive level (Threlfall, 1985:48-49). These feminist socialists rejected family policies even more than male activists, arguing that women had traditionally been associated with the care of children, dependent people and the family, in general. Feminist socialists wanted to act politically on behalf of women alone, and not in the name of women as part of their families<sup>12</sup>. The subsequent strategy was then the enactment of equality policies directed towards women as individuals in order to reduce the differences (for instance, in terms of education or employment) between female and male citizens, and the avoidance of family policies, which indirectly stressed the tasks performed by women in their families. Family policies were therefore perceived by PSOE feminists as threats to the status of women, a group of citizens who wanted to be included on equal terms in the new political order. This conception of family policy was important not only because it was held by a minority sector within the PSOE, but because it became preponderant within the whole party.

A former head of the women's secretariat, Matilde Fernández, was appointed as the first Minister of Social Affairs in 1988, when the Ministry was established. One of its aims is the development of public policies directed towards groups of citizens in particularly disadvantageous circumstances, such as immigrants or the handicapped. Not surprisingly, this Ministry does not have an important section with responsibility for 'the family', although some of its departments are responsible for programmes targeting underprivileged families.

The modest role played in family policy-making by the main party in opposition since 1982, the PP, is particularly striking. Their electoral programmes pay more attention to family policy issues than those of the UCD and PSOE (AP, 1977:16, 34; 1982, 135-136; CD, 1979:7, 11-12, 21-22, 37-39; CP, 1986:55; PP, 1989:28-30, 60; 1993:96-98). Some

written documents and lectures by former PP president, Manuel Fraga (1977:97-101; 1984), have stated that the family is one of the basic institutions in society, and that more active family programmes must be established in Spain. Iglesias and Meil (1994:529-31) who have studied PP parliamentary activity in the area of family policy between 1977 and 1994, show that it contained very few legislative proposals aimed at increasing the amount of family contributory benefits. PP members of parliament have also asked the Ministry of Social Affairs questions on family matters. It can be concluded that PP parliamentary activity in this area has not been intense. When PP political behaviour is examined, the importance conferred to family issues by PP policy-makers is in fact not so great as PP public discourse might suggest.

Historical memories help us understand why PP politicians have acted differently from conservative political elites in other EU member states. Since the transition to democracy, the PP has tried to present itself to the electorate as a new and truly democratic party, and not as the heir of Francoism. This was not an easy task, since some PP leaders, for instance, its former president, Manuel Fraga, had also been prominent politicians under the authoritarian regime. Therefore, PP leaders carefully avoided the use of issues and symbols such as the promotion of families which could be associated by the electorate with the problematic past of almost forty years of authoritarianism.

To conclude this analysis of public discourse and the behaviour of political parties, it should be stressed that no important Christian Democratic party exists in Spain, in part because the Catholic Church did not support the formation of such a political force. In other countries, Christian Democratic parties are one of the main advocates of broad and comprehensive family policies.

### **Power of memories**

This paper has shown that in comparison with other EU member states, Spain is distinguished by the low importance accorded to family policy. This specificity can be understood in terms of historical memories. The only advocates of strong public policies, family organisations, were too unimportant to play a significant role in the policy-making process. The other actors wanted, at any price, to be seen as distant and opposed to the pronatalist and anti-feminist Francoist family policies, and therefore, avoided policy-making in this area.

Although much more research on social policies in post-authoritarian regimes is needed, it is reasonable to suppose that a rejection of authoritarian measures occurs under the following six circumstances: firstly, when public policies originate in a former dictatorship; secondly, when they are given a high profile in the propaganda of the authoritarian regime; thirdly, when they deal with non-technical issues; fourthly, when their permanency is not effectively defended by any

important social actor; fifthly, when their continuation endangers the rights of groups of citizens wishing to be included in the new political system; and, sixthly, when the process of transition to democracy is of a consensual nature. These propositions could be tested either for other social policies in Spain, or for family policies in countries such as Greece or Portugal, which also experienced periods of authoritarian rule, and in which family policy today still has a low profile.

### Footnotes

1. I share Jenson and Sineau's definition of family policy as those 'social programs involving direct or indirect expenditures on families and their needs. These types of expenditures, via transfer payments and tax expenditures, [are] made by the state'. This definition leaves out another aspect of family policy: 'the regulation of relations within the family, through laws on marriage, divorce, and inheritance, which establish the respective rights and duties of family members' (Jenson and Sineau, 1994:24).
2. Two points of clarification are necessary here. First, although the targets of family policies can be families composed of one or two parents and children as well as other relatives, only the programmes aimed at parents (one or two) and their dependent children are examined. This choice was made due to constraints of time and space, and to the scarcity of secondary sources on family policy in Spain.
3. Since the 1960s, institutions with the concrete purpose of promoting gender equality have been set up, developed (and sometimes even dismantled) in most industrial countries. In social science literature such institutions have been called 'state feminist' institutions or bureaucracies. The people who work in them are described as 'femocrats' or 'state feminists'. All these terms are used synonymously in this paper.
4. This section is based mainly on Nash (1991).
5. When a marriage bar exists in a company or a sector of the economy, women who marry must leave their jobs.
6. In 1971 the monthly payment for a dependent child and for a dependent spouse amounted to 6.13 per cent and 9.19 per cent respectively of the minimum wage (*salario mínimo interprofesional*) or 4080 pesetas. In 1985 the proportions were 0.62 per cent and 0.93 per cent (the minimum wage being 40,140 pesetas) (Coll and Martín, 1989:70).

7. 20 February 1989 (Nº 45) Constitutional Court Sentence, 28 July 1989 (Nº 20) and 6 June 1991 (Nº 18) Acts.
8. These data are taken from Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda (1981-1993). They do not include the tax payers of Navarra and the Basque Country, two regions which have a different tax system.
9. The part of this section related to the feminist movement is largely based on Scanlon (1990) and Threlfall (1985), and some in-depth interviews with activists carried out for another article (Valiente, 1995).
10. The two main IM programmatic documents are the two Equality Plans (IM 1987; 1993). They provide the main sources of this section of the paper, together with in-depth interviews carried out with femocrats, and Matilde Fernández, the Minister of Social Affairs from 1988 to 1993 (Valiente, 1995).
11. Accordingly, I have analysed the programmes of the parties that held government positions from 1977 to 1982: the centre-right Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) from 1977 until 1982; and subsequently the PSOE. I have also looked at the main parties in opposition: the PSOE up to 1982, and the conservative party (under the names of Alianza Popular (AP), Coalición Popular (CP) and Partido Popular (PP) since 1982.
12. Personal interview with Matilde Fernández, former Minister of Social Affairs (1988-1993), 13 April 1994.

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