Religious diversity, intolerance and civil conflict

First draft- April 2010, This draft- May 2013

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Abstract

We compute new measures of religious diversity and intolerance and study their effects on civil conflict. Using a religion tree that describes the relationship between different religions, we compute measures of religious diversity at three different levels of aggregation. We find that religious diversity is a significant and robust correlate of civil conflict. While religious fractionalization significantly reduces conflict, religious polarization increases it. This is most robust at the second level of aggregation which implies that the cleavage between Hindus, Muslims, Jews, and Christians etc. is more relevant than that between either subgroups of religions like Protestants and Catholics, Shias and Sunnis, etc. or that between higher levels of aggregation like Abrahamic and Indian religions. We find religious intolerance to be a significant and robust predictor of conflict. Ethnic polarization ceases to be a robust predictor of civil conflict once we control for religious diversity and intolerance. We find no evidence that some religions are more violent than others.

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1 Introduction

Does religious diversity affect the probability of civil conflict? If we are to take seriously the popular perception supported by the views of political scientists like Samuel Huntington then the answer to this question should be in the affirmative. Huntington (1993a,1993b, 1998), in his well-known *Clash of Civilizations* hypothesis, proposes that people's cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the post-cold war period. Surprisingly, the few studies that try to empirically answer this question suggest otherwise. We resolve this apparent contradiction by improving on some of the major shortcomings of the existing empirical literature. We argue that the groupings used so far in the literature to calculate religious diversity are unsatisfactory. Moreover, we show that one cannot ignore religious intolerance while investigating the effects of religious diversity on civil conflict. Using newly constructed measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance we find that both religious diversity and religious intolerance are important correlates of civil conflict.

Twenty per cent of all nations have experienced at least ten years of civil war during the period 1960-2006 (Blattman and Miguel (2010)). Apart from the huge human costs, the economic costs of conflict are also enormous. Hess (2003) finds that a lower bound estimate of the average benefit from eliminating conflict is about 8 per cent of per capita annual consumption for the average country. Thus, understanding the determinants of conflict is no doubt important. In this paper we focus on the relevance of religious diversity and religious intolerance on civil conflicts.

Empirically, there are numerous studies that have tried to pin down the relation between ethnic diversity and civil conflict.[2]. However, most of these studies focus on ethno-linguistic diversity and very few of them rigorously study the relation between religious diversity and civil conflict. This is surprising since religion is an important aspect of ethnicity. "In virtually every heterogeneous society, religious difference serves as a source of potential conflict" (Brahm (2005)). Moreover, as Fox (1997) points out, conflicts such as the civil wars in Afghanistan, the former Yugoslavia and the Sudan, the peace process in Israel and the conflict in Northern Ireland are essentially all conflicts between ethnic groups of different religions.

The few papers that have actually controlled for religious diversity while investigating the correlates of civil conflict have found it to be insignificant. Both Fearon and Laitin (2003),

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[2]E.g. Fearon and Laitin (2003), Miguel et al. (2004), Collier (2001), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon (2005), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005).

and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) find that religious diversity has no significant effect on conflict once we control for other relevant variables. Fox (1997) finds that while religion does play a role in some ethno-religious conflicts, it is important in only a minority of ethnic conflicts.[3] Fox (2004), on the other hand is the only paper that finds evidence in favour of relgion being important for conflicts. He finds that not only can religion influence conflict, its influence has been increasing. However, the accepted paradigm in this literature is that ethno-linguistic diversity is relevant for civil conflicts while religious diversity is not.

There are several reasons why we revisit the relationship between religious diversity and civil conflicts. First, the definition of religious groups used in the literature so far has been highly unsatisfactory and unclear. Desmet et al. (2012) underscore the importance of properly defining the ethno-linguistic groups used as primitives to construct the different measures of heterogeneity. They demonstrate that the degree of coarseness of ethno-linguistic classifications has profound implications for inference on the role of diversity. Studying the effects of ethno-linguistic cleavages on civil conflict, redistribution, public goods and growth, they find that the same cleavages do not affect all outcomes similarly. For example, they find that less aggregate measures representing shallower cleavages matter more than more aggregate measures representing deeper cleavages for public good provision, whereas for civil conflicts deeper cleavages are more relevant than shallower ones.

This leads us to the question on whether the no-effects result of religious diversity on civil conflict is a consequence of the way in which religious diversity has been measured so far. Religious diversity is always calculated using the currently existing religious sub-groups like Protestants, Catholics, Shias and Sunnis etc. as the relevant groupings. However, it is hardly obvious why these groupings should be more relevant than broader groupings of Christians, Muslims and Hindus etc. Also, Christianity and Islam both share the same origin (Abraham), whereas Hinduism is an Indian religion. Thus the difference between Hindus and Muslims might arguably be more relevant than that between Christians and Muslims. Furthermore if there is any truth in the *Clash of Civilizations* idea of Huntington (1993a,1993b, 1998), all sects of Christianity belong to the same civilization, whereas Christianity and Islam clearly belong to different civilizations. Thus, a conflict between the different sects of Christianity might be less likely than that between Christians and Muslims. Theoretically, it is clear that there could be differences in the diversity indices calculated using different group definitions but does it make

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[3]Strictly speaking, Fox (1997) investigates whether religious issues are salient in conflict and not if religious diversity can predict civil conflict.

a difference empirically?

To illustrate our approach let us consider a comparison of two countries - India and Switzerland. The religious composition of India is: Muslims -13.4%, Christians - 2.3%, Hindus-80.5%, Sikhs -1.9%, other religions - 1.8% (including some other Indian religions like Buddhism, Jainism etc.), and none - 0.1%. Switzerland's religious composition is: Muslims - 4.3%, Christians - 78.5% (Roman Catholics- 41%, Protestants - 35.3%, Orthodox 1.8%, Other Christians -0.4 %), other religions - 1%, and none -15.4.%. Evidently Switzerland has high religious diversity if we consider all the sub-sects of Christianity along with its 4.3% Muslim population. However, not only do all the sub-sects of Christianity share the same origins, Christianity and Islam themselves are both Abrahamic religions and thus share the same origin. On the other hand, in India, not only are the three biggest groups of Hindus, Muslims and Christians culturally more dissimilar than the different denominations of Christianity that are present in Switzerland, but more importantly, Hinduism and Sikhism on the one hand and Islam and Christianity on the other hand represent completely different civilizations. Hinduism and Sikhism are both Indian religions whereas Islam and Christianity originated from Abraham.

Not surprisingly, calculating religious polarization (fractionalization) for India at the level of existing religious sub-groups or sects[4] its ranking is 138 (139) which is quite low. However, as soon as we move up levels of aggregation to take into account the origins/cultural similarity of the religions, its ranking changes to 78 (70) at level 2, and to 57 (56) at level 1. Thus, from level 3 to level 2 its ranking moves up 60 places. India is a country which has indeed experienced several violent riots between the Hindus and the Muslims right from the pre-independence period to the present times. Looking at the diversity index calculated at the most disaggregated level, India looks like a below average religiously diverse country. However, once we move up levels it's religiously diversity ranking is quite high. On the other hand if we look at Switzerland, it is one of the most religiously diverse countries calculating diversity at the most disaggregated level. Its religious polarization (fractionalization) ranking is 9 (76) at level 3. However once we move up levels its religious polarization (fractionalization) ranking changes to 128 (128) at level 2, and to 156 (156) at level 1. Switzerland is indeed one of the most peaceful countries in the world. These are some examples that help us illustrate the importance of aggregating at different levels.[5] Whether this aggregation at different levels actually increases the explanatory

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[4]This is what is done in all the existing studies that calculate religious diversity.

[5]More examples are provided in the data section and the entire list of country rankings according to the different diversity indices is provided in the appendix Tables B.15 and B.16. Figures A.6 to A.11 map the

power of religious diversity is of course an empirical question which we aim to answer in this paper through rigorous analysis of the data.

Second, the issue of religious intolerance has been entirely ignored in the literature. Since, religious intolerance could lead to both lower religious diversity and higher conflict, not controlling for it would lead to meaningless results. Let us consider some illustrative examples. Afghanistan is one of the least religiously diverse countries in the world with 99% of the population being Muslims. However, it is the 5th most intolerant country in our dataset. Not surprisingly, it has faced years of violent domestic conflict. Moreover, religious intolerance might itself directly lead to lower religious diversity but a higher probability of civil conflict. For example, Pakistan is the third most intolerant country in our dataset. During its partition from India and later on right through to the present day there has been a mass movement of Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan to India, leading to a fall in religious diversity.[6] On the other hand Pakistan has continuously experienced conflict throughout the years. Thus, without controlling for intolerance Pakistan appears to be a not so diverse country with significant civil violence. In order to correctly identify the effects of religious diversity on civil conflict we need to control for religious intolerance. We thus argue that the finding that religious diversity is irrelevant for conflict while ethno-linguistic diversity is important for it is as much a consequence of not controlling for religious intolerance as it is for constructing religious diversity measures at an erroneous level of aggregation.

Finally, we would like to verify whether some religions are more conflict-prone or peace-loving than others. If so, it would lead to the conclusion that it is not religious diversity that matters but some religions, by virtue of being more violent lead to more conflict. In other words, we want to understand not only whether indeed civil conflicts stem from a *Clash of Civilizations*, but also whether some civilizations are more prone to clashes. In the same vein we would also like to verify if having more religious people in the population has any impact on civil conflict. Previous research has found religious beliefs to have an effect on crime rates Shariff and Rhemtulla (2012). Thus, it is interesting to test whether having more religious or non-religious people in a country affects its probability of experiencing civil conflict.

We have several novel findings in this paper. First, we find that religious diversity has a significant and robust correlation with both civil and ethnic conflict. Contrary to the findings

different diversity indices.

[6] Hindu refugees continue coming to India as recently as 2012: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/hindu-refugees-from-pakistan-continue-to-reach-india/1/214086.html

in the existing literature, religious diversity remains a significant correlate of conflict even after controlling for ethno-linguistic diversity. Furthermore, the correlations between our measures of religious diversity and the different measures of ethno-linguistic diversity are very low which further ensures that we are not picking up the effects of ethno-linguistic diversity and that religious diversity is an important correlate of civil conflict in its own right.[7]

We find that while religious fractionalization has significantly negative correlation with conflict, religious polarization has a significantly positive correlation with it. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) argue that a high number of different groups increase the coordination problems and, therefore, given a level of polarization, the probability of civil wars may fall in fractionalization. Moreover, we find that religious diversity, at the second level of aggregation is the most robust correlate of conflict. The cleavage between Hindus, Muslims, and Christians etc. is more relevant than that between Abrahamic and Indian religions or that between different denominations of Christians - like Protestants and Catholics, or of Muslims - like Shias and Sunnis. This result further indicates that aggregating the data at different levels is crucial. Following Huntington's hypothesis, Hinduism, Christianity and Islam all represent different civilizations and that explains the potential for clash among them.

We also find that religious intolerance is a significant and robust predictor of civil conflict. Since our measure of religious intolerance is composed of several components we investigate which specific aspects of intolerance are more important than others. We find that intolerance arising out of social and government regulation of religion significantly lead to more conflict. Government favouritism on the other hand is not a significant predictor of conflict. This is not surprising since social and government regulation of religion are arguably related to the more fundamental right of freedom to worship or to practice a religion of one's own choice.

Finally, we find no evidence in favour of the popular perception that some religions (specifically looking at Islam and Christianity) are more violent or peace loving than others. Nor do we find any evidence that being religious by itself leads to more conflict. We argue that what matters is having distinct groups which are culturally dissimilar, like Christians, Hindus, and Muslims etc. leading to more diversity at the level of aggregation that takes into account the cultural dissimilarity between the groups. The actual combination of religions that leads to more diversity does not matter. More importantly, the intolerance of the government and

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[7]In appendix Table B.3 we see that the correlation between our measures of religious diversity and the ethno-linguistic diversity measures of Desmet et al. (2012) are very low. Most are below 0.2 and the highest is 0.37 which is the correlation between their elf10 and our rfrac2.

society of a country is more relevant for conflict than the presence of any particular religion.

Our results are robust to the use of alternate datasets and specifications, viz. Desmet et al. (2012) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). We then add a host of additional controls including ethnic fractionalization, ethnic polarization, percentage of different religious groups including Muslims, Christians and even Atheists and Non-religious. Our results remain robust.

The literature puts forward several theories on why religious diversity or for that matter any form of ethnic diversity should be at all germane to conflict once we control for say, per-capita income.[8] Most of these theories can be categorized as pertaining to either primordialist theories - where ethnic considerations directly enter an agent's utility function, or instrumentalist theories - where ethnicity plays a strategic role.[9]

Our results can be explained as much by the "primordial" theories as by the "instrumental" theories. We do not take any stand on which of the two approaches best explains our findings. Huntington's view, which is arguably primordialist suggests, " that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural." "The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future" (Huntington (1993a)). "Civilizations" refers to groups "... differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, *most important, religion*"(Huntington (1993a). One could interpret Hindusim, Christianity, and Islam etc. as representing different civilizations.

On the other hand, thinking in terms of the instrumental approach (say a la Caselli and Coleman (2012)), ethnicity acts as a boundary-enforcement device. Ethnic markers help enforce group membership and allow restricting the spoils to a smaller set of individuals (Esteban et al. (2012b)). Caselli and Coleman (2012) underscore that the ethnic distance between religions might be fairly high since there might be huge psychological costs associated with abandoning one's religious identity. It is arguably more costly for a Christian to pass off as a Hindu, than say a Protestant to pass off as a Catholic. The "ethnic distance" is a lot lower between a Catholic and a Protestant individual than that between a Hindu and a Christian.

In this paper we seek to make a four-fold contribution to the diversity and conflict literature. As discussed above most of the existing literature has focused on the relation between

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[8]The relation between low per-capita income and conflict is one of the most robust results in the literature. See Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004), and Fearon and Laitin (2003) for example.

[9]Examples of primordialist models: Alesina et al. (1999), Alesina and La Ferrara (2000); Esteban and Ray (1999) (from Blattman and Miguel (2010)). Examples of instrumental models: Esteban et al. (2012a), Mitra and Ray (2010), Chandra (2004), Caselli and Coleman (2012)

ethno-linguistic diversity and civil conflict. This is a serious gap in the literature. As Huntington (1993b) highlights, "In the modern world, religion is a central, perhaps the central, force that motivates and mobilizes people." Thus, our first contribution is that we rigorously investigate the relation between religious diversity and civil conflict by calculating indices of diversity at three different levels of aggregation. We then and let the data tell us what level of aggregation matters for civil conflict.

The second contribution is that we highlight the importance of intolerance in the debate on diversity and conflict. Religious diversity may or may not be important in predicting conflict depending on how tolerant or intolerant society is towards other religions. Moreover, both diversity and conflict might be correlated to intolerance. Thus, it is impossible to over emphasize the importance of intolerance.

Thirdly, one often heard argument is that some religions are more peace-loving or more violent than others. Thus one could argue that it is not religious diversity that matters per se but some religions by virtue of being more violent than others lead to more civil conflicts. Controlling for the percentage of Christians, Muslims and Atheists/Non-religious populations we are partly able to answer this question. We find no evidence whatsoever of some religion being more violent than others or that being religious by itself makes countries more or less violent.

Our final contribution is in terms of the new dataset that we create. We construct six different measures of religious diversity (fractionalization and polarization) at three different levels of aggregation corresponding to different historical depths of cleavages. Moreover, we generate a completely new index of religious intolerance.

To the best of our knowledge no other study has done such a rigorous analysis of the relation between religious diversity, religious intolerance and civil conflict. Moreover, no data on such detailed measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance currently exist for such an exhaustive list of countries.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our data sources and explain the construction of our measures in detail. In Section 3 we report our results and in Section 4 we conclude.

2   Data & Methodology

2.1   Religious diversity

In order to construct our measures of religious diversity we follow the methodology of Desmet et al. (2012). They compute ethno-linguistic diversity measures at different levels of aggregation by exploiting the information of language trees. They refer to this as a phylogenetic approach, since tree diagrams describe the family structure of world languages. Depending on how finely or coarsely groups are defined the measure of diversity will be different.

This approach has two advantages. Firstly, it allows the classification of diversity at different levels of aggregation. Secondly and perhaps more interestingly this approach gives a historical dimension to the analysis. Coarse divisions, obtained at high levels of aggregation, describe cleavages that go back thousands of years. In contrast, finer divisions, obtained at low levels of aggregation, are the result of more recent cleavages. Moreover, calculating our diversity measure at three different levels we are able to introduce in our indices a measure of cultural dissimilarity between religions. Hindus and Christians are culturally more dissimilar than Protestants and Catholics. This cultural dissimilarity aspect is a crucial point in the *Clash of Civilizations* hypothesis.

The data on religious diversity comes from three distinct sources. We primarily use the CIA World Factbook,[10] and the Alesina et al. (2003) data from Encyclopedia Britannica (EB). Both of these datasets give the proportion of adherents to different religions in the different countries of the world. This data is supplemented by data from http://www.worldstatesmen.org/[11] in case of missing values or lack of detail for some country. Our criteria was to have the most detailed data possible on sub-categories of religions which would allow us to construct meaningful indices at the different levels. For example for Papua New Guinea, the different groups following the CIA World factbook are Baha'i, Indigenous religions, Roman Catholic, Evangelical Lutheran, United Church, Seven day Adventist, Pentecostal, Evangelical Alliance, Anglican, Baptist and Other Protestant. Whereas following the EB there are only the four following groups: Protestant, Roman Catholic, Anglican, and Others. Thus, in this case we prefer to use the CIA data instead of the EB data.

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[10]Fearon and Laitin (2003) use a similar dataset based on estimates derived using the CIA Factbook by R. Quinn Mecham.

[11]Allan Drazen also uses data from "World Statesmen" but on some different variables. See: $http : //econweb.umd.edu/ drazen/Data\_Sets/Appendix\_Composition\_and\_Elections\_revision22012.pdf$

Finally using this data on the percentage of followers of the different religions in each country, we construct six different measures of religious diversity (three of fractionalization and three of polarization) following the below explained methodology. All religions in the world can be classified into several broad groups owing to their origins or cultural traditions. For example, Christianity and Islam are both Abrahamic religions, while Hinduism and Buddhism are both Indian religions. Again, Protestants and Catholics are two sects of Christianity, while Sunnis and Shias are two sects of Islam. For the purposes of this paper we represent this information as tree diagram as given in Figure 1. As evident in Figure 1, sects like Protestants, Catholics, Shias and Sunnis form our Level 3, which is the most disaggregated level. Then at Level 2 come the parent religions of these sects (Christianity and Islam in this case). And finally at the highest level i.e. Level 1 we have the broad groupings like Abrahamic and Indian religions. Our final data comprises of 118 religious groups at the third level, 45 groups at the second level and 5 groups at the first level (excluding Atheists and Non-religious).[12]


Figure 1: The religion tree

As evident in Figure 1, classifying the above broad groups and their corresponding divisions and subdivisions as a tree diagram we have three different levels at which we can measure

[12]The entire list of the divisions can be found in the appendix Table B.13.

religious diversity. We thus construct three indices of religious fractionalization (rfrac1, rfrac2, and rfrac3) and three indices of religious polarization (rpol1, rpol2, and rpol3) corresponding to the three different levels of aggregation. Rfrac1 (rpol1) corresponds to the highest level of aggregation i.e. it is the most aggregated. Rfrac2 (rpol2) corresponds to the second level of aggregation. And rfrac3 (rpol3) corresponds to the lowest level of aggregation i.e. it is the least aggregated.

The idea behind the measures at each level is identical to the measures of ethno-linguistic diversity (ELF) in Desmet et al. (2012). The different measures of fractionalization and polarization are constructed as follows:

Fractionalization:

$$rfrac(j) = 1 - \Sigma[S_{i(j)}]^2. \tag{1}$$

Polarization:

$$rpol(j) = 4\Sigma[S_{i(j)}]^2[1 - S_{i(j)}]. \tag{2}$$

where $S_{i(j)}$ is the proportion of the population pertaining to religious group i at level of aggregation j.[13] The fractionalization measure $rfrac(j)$ gives the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a given country belong to different religious groups. The polarization measure $rpol(j)$ on the other hand measures how far the distribution of the religious groups is from the bipolar distribution (i.e. the (1/2, 0, 0, ... , 0, 1/2) distribution) which represents the highest level of polarization (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005)). The fractionalization index is maximized when each individual in the country belongs to a different religious group, while the polarization index is maximized when there are only two groups in the country and they are equally sized. The reader is directed to Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) for a detailed discussion and comparison of the two measures.

In order to better illustrate the importance of aggregating at the three different levels let us consider a few countries that have experienced civil conflicts in the past few decades. Consider Angola for example. It is a highly religiously polarized country at any of the three levels of aggregation. At aggregation level 3, it is the 13th most polarized country in the world. However, once we move up levels, it comes out to be the most and second most polarized

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[13]In case of ethno-linguistic diversity as in Desmet et al. (2012), $S_{i(j)}$ refers to the share of population speaking a particular language i at level of aggregation j.

country in the world considering the 2nd and 1st levels of aggregation respectively. Moreover, if we consider countries like India, Nepal or Indonesia, their religious diversity rankings change by about 60 places moving from the third to the second level of aggregation. The movement from the 3rd to the 2nd level and that from the 2nd to the 1st level need not always be in the same direction. For instance for India, the ranking keeps going up if we move from the 3rd to the 2nd level or the 2nd to the 1st level. However, for Indonesia and Nepal, the ranking goes up from the 3rd to the 2nd level, and falls while moving from the 2nd to the 1st level. These examples help illustrate how changes in the level of aggregation could lead to non-trivial changes in the rankings according to religious diversity.[14]

At any given level, religious fractionalization and religious polarization are highly correlated. While moving from one level to another in many cases both religious fractionalization and polarization seem to move in the same direction. However, the relative changes in the rankings are often different. Consider Nigeria for example. Its polarization ranking is 96 at level 3 making it not a very polarized country. Its fractionalization ranking is 28, making it highly fractionalized country. But when we move to level 2, its fractionalization ranking goes up 19 places to 7, while its polarization ranking goes up 65 places to 31. Moreover, there are cases when the rankings by fractionalization and polarization move in opposite directions while moving from one level to the other. For example, Lebanon is a highly fractionalized country with its fractionalization ranking being 16 at level 3. But it is not a very polarized country placed at rank 116 at level 3. Once we move up one level to level 2, its fractionalization ranking goes down by a marginal 4 places, placing it at 20. On the other hand, its polarization ranking shoots up by 90 places taking it to a rank of 26.[15]

In Tables 1 and 2 we provide the summary statistics and the correlations between the six different measures of religious diversity. In the appendix Tables B.2 and B.3 we have the correlations of our measures of religious diversity with those of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and Desmet et al. (2012) respectively. We notice that there is not a very high correlation between our measures and those of either Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) (most are below 0.5 and the highest is 0.7 which is the correlation between their relfrac and our rfrac2) or Desmet et al. (2012) (most are below 0.2 and the highest is 0.37 which is the correlation between their

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[14]In view of the recent happenings in the Arab world, it is interesting in its own right to look at the religious diversity indices of the Arab Spring countries. While none of these countries have very high levels of religious diversity, their rankings go up significantly while moving up from the 3rd to the 2nd level of aggregation.

[15]See maps in appendix figures A.6 to A.11 to visualize how the rankings change across countries moving from one level to another.

elf10 and our rfrac2).[16]

Table 1: Summary statistics for the religious diversity indices

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Religious fractionalization at level 1	0.156	0.178	0	0.643
Religious fractionalization at level 2	0.239	0.206	0	0.703
Religious fractionalization at level 3	0.432	0.25	0	0.891
Religious polarization at level 1	0.295	0.325	0	1
Religious polarization at level 2	0.412	0.321	0	0.996
Religious polarization at level 3	0.570	0.259	0	0.992
N		222		

Table 2: Correlation between the religious diversity indices

	rfrac1	rpol1	rfrac2	rpol2	rfrac3
rpol1	0.9906				
rfrac2	0.8235	0.8132			
rpol2	0.7818	0.7906	0.9669		
rfrac3	0.5472	0.5504	0.5845	0.5721	
rpol3	0.5022	0.5146	0.5864	0.6281	0.7821

2.2 Religious Intolerance

One obvious concern with any study analysing the effects of religious diversity on conflict is the possible endogeneity of religious diversity. Societies that are more tolerant towards other religions are likely to sustain more religions and thus experience more religious diversity on the one hand, and less civil conflict on the other. Thus if we are to say anything interesting about the effects of religious diversity on civil conflict we must take into account how tolerant the society is. If we do not control for religious intolerance we would be facing the risk of endogeneity arising from the omitted variable bias.

Measuring religious intolerance is not an easy task since getting reliable data is a big challenge. We use the cross-national, International Religious freedom data, from the Association of Religious Data Archives (ARDA). The specific dataset used is the "International Religious Freedom Data, Aggregate File (2001-2005)."[17]

Each year (since 1999) the U.S. State Department releases International Religious Freedom Reports on approximately 196 countries or territories.[18] Based on the text in these reports, ARDA researchers systematically coded the measures using a survey questionnaire for the years

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[16]A list of all the 222 countries along with their corresponding rankings according to the different rfrac and rpol values is provided in the appendix Tables B.15 and B.16.

[17]http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Descriptions/IRFAGG.asp

[18]http://www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/

2001, 2003, and 2005. The most immediate goal was to develop measures for religious regulation and favouritism. For all variables, the coders were asked to make substantive observations of the qualitative data and to base their codes on empirical observations of actions or patterns of behaviour that were documented in the reports.

The three different years of coding are not three discrete measures, but rather represent trend information that continues to be reported for several years running. Thus, ARDA advises researchers to not treat the data as separate measures from which time lines are developed since it may be possible that later years report newly arising problems in addition to old ones. The aggregate dataset for the three years of coding contains the mean score of each ordinal variable across the three years. ARDA suggests that those using the data for social scientific modelling and analysis use the aggregate data set, which has the benefit of greater variation in the variables and lesser error since random errors from one year will be attenuated in the aggregate data. We thus use this aggregate dataset which contains the different indices measured as averages of the three years 2001, 2003 and 2005.[19]

In order to construct our measures of religious intolerance we take into account three different broad level indices which are related to religious intolerance.

1. *Government Regulation Index* (GRI): This index takes into account the following factors: whether foreign or other missionaries are allowed to operate; if proselytizing, public preaching, or conversion is limited or restricted; if the government interferes with an individual's right to worship; how freedom of religion is described in the report; and, if the Introduction section of the Report mentions that the government "generally respects" the right (to religious freedom) in practice.

2. *Social Regulation Index* (SRI): This index takes into account the following factors: the societal attitudes toward other or non-traditional religions; social attitudes towards conversions to other religions; if traditional attitudes and/or edicts of the clerical establishment strongly discourage proselytizing [trying to win converts]; if established or existing religions try to shut out other religions in any way; and the situation regarding social movements in relation to religious brands in the country.

3. *Government Favouritism Index* (GFI): This index takes into account the following factors: What is the balance of government funding (including 'in kind' such as funding buildings)

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[19]The reader is directed to the ARDA website for a more detailed description of the data.

to the religious sector; how does the government subsidize religion (including 'in kind' to organizations run by religions, e.g., hospitals, schools, etc.); and if the government funds some things related to religion.

Making use of the above indices we construct our measure of religious intolerance via a principal component analysis for 197 countries. Religious intolerance is defined as the first principal component of the three variables, GRI, SRI and GFI. This allows us not only to reduce the dimensionality i.e. have one measure of religious intolerance instead of multiple ones, but also since we use the first principal component we are able to explain about 74% of the orthogonal variation in the data with our measure of religious intolerance.

It is of course possible that our measure of religious intolerance is itself endogenous to conflict. If individuals of any religion experience more conflict with individuals of other religions they might become more intolerant towards other religions and thus the possibility of reverse causality. This is very much a realistic possibility and given our data we partly solve this problem by using a time invariant measure of intolerance. Moreover, we leave out other available variables that also indicate religious intolerance but are more prone to endogeneity. For example variables like, ESTIMAAG - estimated number of people who were physically abused or displaced due to religion and PERSECAG - estimated number of people who were physically abused, displaced from home, imprisoned, or killed due to religion, are left out. Government and Social regulation of religion are variables that are relatively stable over long periods of time.[20]

In Table 3, we provide the summary statistics of the religious intolerance variable and its components. Higher values of the variable indicate more intolerance. In Table B.17 of the appendix there is a list of all countries with the corresponding value of religious intolerance of that country. The ten most intolerant countries in our sample are Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, Burma (or Myanmar), Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and the Maldives, in that order.[21]

In appendix Table B.1 we provide the correlations of religious intolerance with the measures of diversity calculated at different aggregation levels. We notice that as expected religious intolerance is negatively correlated with religious diversity at all levels of aggregation. The correlations are not very high, the highest correlation being of about -0.4 between religious

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[20]As a robustness check we do include both ESTIMAAG and PERSECAG in the calculation of our intolerance index. But due to their potential endogeneity we leave them out from our final calculations. However, results remain qualitatively unchanged to their inclusion. Results are not provided, but are available upon request.

[21]Appendix Figure A.5 gives a world map for religious intolerance.

intolerance and religious fractionalization at the third level of aggregation.

Table 3: Summary statistics - Religious intolerance

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Government Regulation Index	3.293	3.076	0	9.722
Social Regulation Index	3.605	2.928	0	10
Government Favouritism Index	4.837	2.778	0	9.388
Religious intolerance	-0.008	1.489	-2.299	3.258
N		197		

2.3 Specification

We use the above constructed measures to study the effects of religious diversity and intolerance on the onset of civil conflict. Our baseline econometric specification follows Desmet et al. (2012) who in turn borrow it from the baseline specification of Fearon and Laitin (2003) and augment it with a number of additional control variables.

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \delta D_i(j) + \gamma I_i + \beta X_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \tag{3}$$

where, y_{it} is the the onset of civil conflict (ethnic conflict in some specifications) in country i in year t, $D_i(j)$ is a time invariant measure of religious diversity at aggregation level j in country i, I_i is the time invariant religious intolerance in country i, α is the constant term and ϵ_{it} the error term. The vector of controls X_{it} come from major contributions in the literature. They include, lagged civil war, the log of per capita GDP (lagged), the percentage of the country that is mountainous, non-contiguous state dummy, oil exporter dummy, new state dummy, instability dummy, democracy lagged (polity2), continent dummy variables for Sub-Saharan Africa, East and Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and legal origin dummies from La Porta et al. (1999). A pooled panel probit approach is used. Since we want to study the partial effects of religious diversity and religious intolerance on civil conflict, δ and γ are the main coefficients of interest.[22]

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[22]Causality is not the main focus of this paper and thus caution should be exercised when interpreting δ and γ causally.

3 Results

3.1 Civil Conflict

First, using the data, estimation method and dependent variable (the onset of civil conflict) of Desmet et al. (2012), we examine how religious diversity and religious intolerance affect civil conflict. The difference is that instead of using their measures of ethno-linguistic diversity we use our measures of religious diversity in addition to controlling for religious intolerance in some of the specifications. Also, following Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) we include both fractionalization and polarization in the same specification.[23]

Table 4 gives our baseline results. The dependent variable is the onset of civil war. Columns 1 to 3 each correspond to a different level of aggregation in the calculation of religious diversity. Column 1 corresponds to the highest level of aggregation while column 3 to the lowest level. Columns 4 to 6 are identical to the specifications of columns 1 to 3, but in these three columns we also control for religious intolerance.

In the first three columns we notice that while religious polarization is marginally significant at the third level of aggregation neither religious fractionalization nor polarization are significant in any of the other specifications. In columns 4 to 6, where we control for religious intolerance in the specifications of columns 1 to 3, the results change substantially. We see that religious intolerance is associated with more civil conflict and the relation is significant. Religious diversity on the other hand becomes significant at the second level of aggregation. While religious fractionalization is negatively significant, religious polarization is positively significant. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) argue, "this means that, conditional on a given degree of polarization, more religious diversity decreases the probability of a civil war. ... a high number of different groups increases the coordination problems and, therefore, given a level of polarization, the probability of civil wars may be smaller."[24]

In Table 4 we see that religious intolerance is an important correlate of civil conflict. Thus any study investigating the correlates of civil conflict needs to control for this variable. Moreover, both religious fractionalization and polarization become significant at the second level of aggregation once we control for religious intolerance. Thus it is evident that the non-inclusion

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[23]In the appendix we have a specification where the measures enter separately rather than together without intolerance - Table B.5, and with intolerance - Table B.6.

[24]Like Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) we also find that if religious fractionalization and religious polarization enter the specification separately, they are not significant. Results in appendix Tables B.5 and B.6.

Table 4: Correlates of Civil Conflict

	(1) Level1	(2) Level2	(3) Level3	(4) Level1	(5) Level2	(6) Level3
Religious fractionalization	-8.280	-2.859	-1.639	-10.27*	-3.791*	-1.077
	(5.297)	(2.100)	(1.257)	(5.805)	(2.154)	(1.283)
Religious polarization	4.068	1.595	1.755*	5.255	2.240*	1.473
	(2.987)	(1.314)	(0.974)	(3.208)	(1.339)	(0.958)
Lagged civil war	-0.872***	-0.892***	-0.899***	-0.931***	-0.956***	-0.928***
	(0.262)	(0.267)	(0.260)	(0.249)	(0.247)	(0.245)
Log lagged GDP/capita	-0.603***	-0.607***	-0.553***	-0.512***	-0.510***	-0.496***
	(0.148)	(0.147)	(0.151)	(0.158)	(0.156)	(0.158)
Log lagged population	0.336***	0.319***	0.301***	0.275***	0.254***	0.238***
	(0.0827)	(0.0766)	(0.0736)	(0.0937)	(0.0862)	(0.0846)
% mountainous	0.00931*	0.00805	0.00757	0.00848	0.00652	0.00640
	(0.00481)	(0.00497)	(0.00511)	(0.00548)	(0.00578)	(0.00565)
Noncontiguos state dummy	0.373	0.417	0.441	0.478	0.527	0.568
	(0.370)	(0.368)	(0.353)	(0.365)	(0.357)	(0.347)
Oil exporter dummy	0.683***	0.707***	0.710***	0.467*	0.494**	0.538**
	(0.239)	(0.238)	(0.230)	(0.253)	(0.243)	(0.239)
New state dummy	1.771***	1.781***	1.793***	1.713***	1.730***	1.746***
	(0.371)	(0.371)	(0.377)	(0.382)	(0.383)	(0.383)
Instability dummy	0.606***	0.626***	0.646***	0.602***	0.619***	0.641***
	(0.217)	(0.215)	(0.217)	(0.218)	(0.216)	(0.219)
Democracy lagged (Polity 2)	0.0200	0.0194	0.0231	0.0274	0.0279	0.0295
	(0.0209)	(0.0209)	(0.0207)	(0.0206)	(0.0205)	(0.0207)
French legal origin dummy	1.258*	1.547**	1.842**	1.082	1.373*	1.612*
	(0.679)	(0.706)	(0.799)	(0.749)	(0.770)	(0.858)
UK legal origin dummy	1.027	1.308*	1.601**	0.724	1.040	1.198
	(0.669)	(0.685)	(0.797)	(0.750)	(0.766)	(0.871)
Socialist legal origin dummy	1.289*	1.347**	1.445*	1.224	1.257*	1.276
	(0.708)	(0.684)	(0.783)	(0.761)	(0.745)	(0.833)
Latin America and Carribean Dummy	0.172	0.112	-0.0117	0.581	0.566	0.370
	(0.404)	(0.397)	(0.431)	(0.393)	(0.394)	(0.422)
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy	0.295	0.288	0.235	0.770*	0.834*	0.614
	(0.401)	(0.479)	(0.481)	(0.435)	(0.491)	(0.473)
East and Southeast Asia Dummy	0.600*	0.404	0.344	0.812**	0.620*	0.440
	(0.354)	(0.349)	(0.336)	(0.387)	(0.366)	(0.357)
Rel intolerance				0.240**	0.250**	0.219**
				(0.102)	(0.104)	(0.108)
Constant	-4.491***	-4.553***	-5.359***	-4.728***	-4.815***	-5.232***
	(1.732)	(1.685)	(1.797)	(1.788)	(1.739)	(1.869)
Observations	5733	5733	5733	5678	5678	5678
Pseudo R^2	0.100	0.098	0.101	0.105	0.103	0.104
ll	-453.6	-454.5	-453.3	-450.3	-451.0	-450.7

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses.

The dependent variable is the onset of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to religious diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from Desmet et al. (2012) except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the author's own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section.

of the religious intolerance variable would have led us to erroneously conclude that religious diversity is not relevant for civil conflict, while it clearly is.

This significance of the measures of religious diversity constructed at the second level of aggregation implies that the cleavage between Hindus, Muslims, and Christians etc. is more relevant than a higher or lower level of aggregation. This gives further support to our hypothesis

that the level of aggregation at which the measures of diversity are constructed is important.

Next, we specifically investigate the effects of religious diversity and intolerance on the onset of ethnic conflict in particular rather than civil conflict in general. In Table 5, we have the onset of ethnic conflict as the dependent variable in the otherwise identical specification of Table 4. We again find that religious fractionalization significantly reduces conflict while religious polarization significantly increases the onset of conflict, at the second level of aggregation. Religious intolerance however, becomes insignificant and thus seems not to matter for ethnic conflict. However, it is still evident that in order to correctly identify the effects of religious diversity we still need to control for religious intolerance.

3.2   Components of intolerance

Our measure of religious intolerance is constructed using three different components viz. government regulation, social regulation and government favouritism. Next we analyse which of these specific components of religious intolerance are more important. In Table 6 we use the identical specifications of the last three columns of Tables 4 and 5, but in place of religious intolerance we control for its different components separately in the 3 panels. The columns 1 to 3 (and thus 4 to 6) each correspond to a different level of aggregation in the calculation of religious diversity. The dependent variable in the columns 1 to 3 is the onset of civil conflict, while in the columns 4 to 6 it is the onset of ethnic conflict.

In Table 6, we see that government and social regulation of religion are significant and robust correlates of civil conflict. On the other hand, government favouritism of religion does not seem to be important. Moreover, this result holds true equally for the onset of civil and ethnic conflicts, even though our overall measure of religious intolerance did not seem to matter for ethnic conflict. This result is not surprising since government and social regulation of religion are arguably more fundamental types of intolerance since they relate to the more fundamental right of freedom to religion, while government favouritism is less so.

We also notice that when we control for each component of religious intolerance separately our religious diversity measures become somewhat less robust in predicting civil conflict. However, as far as ethnic conflict is concerned, religious diversity at the second level of aggregation still continues to be significant.

Table 5: Correlates of ethnic conflict

	(1) Level1	(2) Level2	(3) Level3	(4) Level1	(5) Level2	(6) Level3
Religious fractionalization	-6.509	-4.036	-1.708	-7.618	-4.730*	-1.188
	(6.466)	(2.485)	(1.762)	(6.964)	(2.602)	(1.847)
Religious polarization	2.970	2.502	2.299*	3.651	2.979*	2.047
	(3.606)	(1.578)	(1.267)	(3.850)	(1.672)	(1.292)
Lagged civil war	-0.900***	-0.981***	-0.971***	-0.926***	-1.010***	-0.965***
	(0.310)	(0.322)	(0.325)	(0.305)	(0.306)	(0.316)
Log lagged GDP/capita	-0.550***	-0.540***	-0.474***	-0.451***	-0.423***	-0.410**
	(0.147)	(0.143)	(0.157)	(0.164)	(0.157)	(0.163)
Log lagged population	0.461***	0.471***	0.446***	0.433***	0.424***	0.397***
	(0.111)	(0.108)	(0.103)	(0.130)	(0.128)	(0.127)
% mountainous	0.0101*	0.00824	0.00789	0.0102	0.00760	0.00757
	(0.00601)	(0.00627)	(0.00623)	(0.00653)	(0.00715)	(0.00675)
Noncontiguos state dummy	0.363	0.286	0.323	0.477	0.424	0.468
	(0.369)	(0.369)	(0.329)	(0.381)	(0.378)	(0.352)
Oil exporter dummy	1.015***	1.021***	1.007***	0.841***	0.820***	0.852***
	(0.286)	(0.277)	(0.287)	(0.301)	(0.294)	(0.299)
New state dummy	1.654***	1.669***	1.673***	1.623***	1.631***	1.639***
	(0.434)	(0.434)	(0.440)	(0.445)	(0.445)	(0.446)
Instability dummy	0.413	0.436*	0.471*	0.404	0.421*	0.455*
	(0.253)	(0.249)	(0.255)	(0.255)	(0.250)	(0.260)
Democracy lagged (Polity 2)	0.0318	0.0303	0.0355	0.0356	0.0365	0.0400*
	(0.0230)	(0.0230)	(0.0234)	(0.0236)	(0.0234)	(0.0242)
French legal origin dummy	15.19***	15.60***	16.07***	15.21***	15.59***	16.02***
	(1.558)	(1.439)	(1.725)	(1.586)	(1.471)	(1.682)
UK legal origin dummy	15.03***	15.43***	15.85***	14.98***	15.36***	15.66***
	(1.597)	(1.461)	(1.694)	(1.602)	(1.470)	(1.653)
Socialist legal origin dummy	15.23***	15.31***	15.45***	15.31***	15.36***	15.44***
	(1.630)	(1.579)	(1.845)	(1.668)	(1.611)	(1.843)
Latin America and Carribean Dummy	-2.089**	-2.151**	-2.349**	-1.868*	-1.827*	-2.100**
	(1.052)	(1.050)	(1.011)	(1.081)	(1.077)	(1.042)
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy	0.986**	0.841	0.745	1.293***	1.290**	0.992
	(0.394)	(0.543)	(0.634)	(0.488)	(0.561)	(0.644)
East and Southeast Asia Dummy	0.450	0.280	0.223	0.567	0.444	0.272
	(0.361)	(0.354)	(0.396)	(0.374)	(0.349)	(0.400)
Rel intolerance				0.134	0.180	0.145
				(0.138)	(0.140)	(0.142)
Constant	-20.47	-21.04	-22.19	-21.14	-21.70	-22.35
	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
Observations	5733	5733	5733	5678	5678	5678
Pseudo R^2	0.153	0.153	0.156	0.156	0.157	0.158
ll	-320.1	-320.1	-318.9	-318.6	-318.1	-317.5

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses.

The dependent variable is the onset of ethnic conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to religious diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from Desmet et al. (2012) except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the author's own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section.

3.3 Are some religions more problematic than others?

One often heard argument is that some religions are more violent than others. Thus, one could argue that it is not religious diversity that matters per se but some religions by virtue of being more violent than others lead to more civil conflicts. In this section we investigate this claim

Table 6: Components of Intolerance

	(1) Level1	(2) Level2	(3) Level3	(4) Level1	(5) Level2	(6) Level3
Religious fractionalization	**-10.02***	**-3.728***	-1.178	-8.558	**-5.264****	-1.098
	(5.739)	(2.119)	(1.274)	(7.203)	(2.591)	(1.857)
Religious polarization	4.990	2.094	1.434	4.125	**3.283****	1.896
	(3.157)	(1.302)	(0.981)	(3.953)	(1.629)	(1.352)
Government Regulation Index	**0.108****	**0.110****	0.0849	**0.115****	**0.136****	0.0999
	(0.0442)	(0.0463)	(0.0521)	(0.0548)	(0.0563)	(0.0652)
Observations	5678	5678	5678	5476	5476	5476
Pseudo R^2	0.104	0.102	0.102	0.153	0.154	0.154
ll	-450.6	-451.5	-451.5	-317.5	-316.9	-317.0
Religious fractionalization	-8.915	-3.246	-0.920	-7.237	**-4.407***	-0.951
	(6.210)	(2.126)	(1.190)	(7.482)	(2.587)	(1.758)
Religious polarization	4.612	1.896	1.313	3.618	**2.820***	1.897
	(3.363)	(1.333)	(0.893)	(4.094)	(1.666)	(1.248)
Social Regulation Index	**0.163*****	**0.170*****	**0.164*****	**0.135****	**0.150****	**0.148****
	(0.0530)	(0.0525)	(0.0559)	(0.0639)	(0.0656)	(0.0701)
Observations	5678	5678	5678	5476	5476	5476
Pseudo R^2	0.109	0.108	0.109	0.154	0.156	0.158
ll	-448.2	-448.5	-448.2	-317.0	-316.3	-315.6
Religious fractionalization	-8.501	-3.036	-1.425	-5.167	-3.591	-1.540
	(5.412)	(2.134)	(1.275)	(6.336)	(2.370)	(1.790)
Religious polarization	4.190	1.716	1.662*	2.144	2.117	2.035
	(3.055)	(1.344)	(0.967)	(3.532)	(1.545)	(1.248)
Government Favoritism Index	0.0110	0.0145	0.0146	-0.0918	-0.0751	-0.0725
	(0.0505)	(0.0517)	(0.0517)	(0.0702)	(0.0727)	(0.0751)
Observations	5678	5678	5678	5476	5476	5476
Pseudo R^2	0.100	0.098	0.100	0.151	0.150	0.153
ll	-452.8	-453.7	-452.7	-318.0	-318.3	-317.5

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses.

The dependent variable is the onset of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to religious diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from Desmet et al. (2012) except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the author's own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section. The other controls are: a constant term, lagged civil war, the log of per capita GDP (lagged), the percentage of the country that is mountainous, non-contiguous state dummy, oil exporter dummy, new state dummy, Instability dummy, democracy lagged (polity2), continent dummy variables for Sub-Saharan Africa, East and Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and legal origin dummies from La Porta et al. (1999).

and find no evidence whatsoever in its favour. Since Christians and Muslims are the biggest religious groups in the world and are widely distributed across countries we consider these two religions. We also consider the presence of Atheists/Agnostics and Non-religious populations.

In Table 7 we have religious diversity at the second level of aggregation and religious intolerance as before. We however, also control for the percentage of Muslims, Christians, and Non-religious etc. entering in different combinations. We find no evidence whatsoever of some religion being more violent or peace loving than others since the coefficients of these variables are always insignificant. Religious diversity and intolerance continue to be significant.

Table 7: Controlling for percentage of different groups (Aggregation Level 2)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Religious fractionalization	-3.805*	-3.834*	-3.782*	-3.794*	-3.844*	-3.879*	-3.908*
	(2.187)	(2.190)	(2.150)	(2.176)	(2.219)	(2.172)	(2.198)
Religious polarization	2.363*	2.231*	2.215	2.333*	2.353*	2.114	2.218
	(1.358)	(1.343)	(1.353)	(1.360)	(1.361)	(1.374)	(1.379)
Rel intolerance	0.236**	0.268**	0.240**	0.219*	0.253**	0.273**	0.257**
	(0.108)	(0.120)	(0.112)	(0.117)	(0.123)	(0.121)	(0.124)
Percentage Nonreligious/Atheists	-0.00753			-0.00825	-0.00751		-0.00945
	(0.00945)			(0.00949)	(0.00947)		(0.00954)
Percentage Muslims		-0.00118			-0.00115	-0.00364	-0.00454
		(0.00417)			(0.00413)	(0.00635)	(0.00612)
Percentage Christians			-0.000990	-0.00166		-0.00339	-0.00472
			(0.00419)	(0.00422)		(0.00639)	(0.00630)
Observations	5678	5678	5678	5678	5678	5678	5678
Pseudo R^2	0.104	0.104	0.104	0.104	0.104	0.104	0.105
ll	-450.7	-450.9	-450.9	-450.6	-450.6	-450.8	-450.3

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses.

The dependent variable is the onset of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to religious diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from Desmet et al. (2012) except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the author's own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section. The other controls are: a constant term, lagged civil war, the log of per capita GDP (lagged), the percentage of the country that is mountainous, non-contiguous state dummy, oil exporter dummy, new state dummy, Instability dummy, democracy lagged (polity2), continent dummy variables for Sub-Saharan Africa, East and Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and legal origin dummies from La Porta et al. (1999).

Looking at the list of countries ranked by our measure of religious intolerance in appendix Table B.17, one could argue that since most of the Muslim majority countries figure high up on the list, our insignificance of the percentage of Muslims in the data is driven by the inclusion of the religious intolerance variable. In appendix Table B.9 we use the same specification of Table 7 but leave the religious intolerance variable out. As expected, the exclusion of the religious intolerance variable makes our diversity measures insignificant. However, the variables giving the percentages of the different groups continue to be insignificant. Thus, the insignificance of these variables are not driven by the inclusion of religious intolerance in the specification.[25]

In the diversity measures we have been using so far, each religious group existing at a particular level enters as a separate entity at that level. One might argue that if a particular religion is more problematic than others then the relevant conflict inducing cleavage is the one between that problematic religion and all other religions. Thus, a diversity index which includes all religions separately might not be the best one to pick this effect up. In order to verify this, we construct three new measures of religious diversity dividing the population of each country

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[25]As seen in the Table B.4 the correlation between religious intolerance and the percentage of different groups is not especially high.

into only two mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups for each of the three measures. In the first one, we consider only Muslims and Non-Muslims as the relevant groups, in the second one we consider only Christians and Non-Christians as the relevant groups and finally, in the third one we consider only Religious and Atheists/ Non-Religious as the relevant groups. Since, in this case there are only two groups entering the calculation of diversity, both polarization and fractionalization yield the same ranking of countries. We use fractionalization without loss of generality.[26] Neither of these new measures of diversity are significant with or without the inclusion of religious intolerance. Religious intolerance continues to have a significant effect on civil conflict.[27]

The insignificance of the diversity measures that include only the division between Muslims and Non-Muslims or that between Christians and Non-Christians further supports our previous finding that neither Christianity nor Islam is particularly problematic. The insignificance of the diversity index that includes only Religious and Atheists/ Non-Religious as the relevant groups, indicates that the cleavage between the religious and Non-religious people in the country is not relevant in predicting civil conflict.

3.4   Robustness checks

Next, we try to ensure that our results are robust to other datasets and specifications. In order to do so we look specifically at the dataset and specification of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). They use a sample of 138 countries for the 1960-1999 period and divide the sample into 5 five-year periods. The data comes from the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) dataset for civil wars and their basic endogenous variable corresponds to the incidence of civil wars following the definition of PRIO which includes intermediate and high-intensity armed conflicts (PRIOCW). [28]

Their main finding is that ethnic polarization has a positive and statistically significant effect on the incidence of civil wars. Then in some of their specifications they also look at the effects of religious heterogeneity. They find that neither religious fractionalization nor religious polarization have a significant effect on conflict when they enter separately. On the other hand,

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[26]Using polarization instead would produce identical results. For only two groups polarization = 2*fractionalization (see Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) page 798 for a discussion.)

[27]Results are not provided and are available upon request. In the first two of these indices we have tried including the atheists and Non-religious in the calculation. The inclusion or non-inclusion of the atheists and Non-religious has no qualitative effect on the results.

[28]See Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) for more details.

Table 8: Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) specification with Religious diversity & intolerance

	(1) Level1	(2) Level2	(3) Level3	(4) Level1	(5) Level2	(6) Level3
Religious fractionalization	**-33.14***	**-11.39***	**-3.563***	**-52.84****	**-14.19***	-2.273
	(12.55)	(3.765)	(1.923)	(23.68)	(4.379)	(2.167)
Religious polarization	**15.68****	**6.924***	**3.809****	**26.03****	**8.882***	**3.392***
	(6.803)	(2.296)	(1.806)	(12.46)	(2.897)	(1.930)
LGDPC	-0.584**	-0.415	-0.427*	-0.400*	-0.243	-0.309
	(0.237)	(0.253)	(0.225)	(0.227)	(0.235)	(0.213)
LPOP	0.549***	0.479***	0.412**	0.410**	0.327*	0.238
	(0.180)	(0.151)	(0.207)	(0.202)	(0.167)	(0.222)
PRIMEXP	0.0697	-0.457	-0.569	-0.863	-1.167	-1.830
	(2.068)	(1.778)	(1.694)	(2.126)	(1.679)	(1.910)
MOUNTAINS	-0.00478	-0.00391	-0.00582	-0.00660	-0.00659	-0.00562
	(0.00925)	(0.00921)	(0.0105)	(0.0103)	(0.0105)	(0.0100)
NONCONT	0.106	0.000484	0.330	0.185	0.0433	0.404
	(0.581)	(0.536)	(0.622)	(0.635)	(0.550)	(0.670)
DEMOCRACY	0.0675	0.0332	0.115	0.303	0.315	0.225
	(0.348)	(0.357)	(0.354)	(0.398)	(0.397)	(0.370)
ETHPOL	2.175**	2.276**	2.360**	1.896	1.804	1.885
	(1.088)	(1.109)	(1.132)	(1.155)	(1.149)	(1.180)
ETHFRAC	0.257	0.526	0.270	1.096	1.476	0.647
	(0.920)	(0.968)	(1.004)	(1.036)	(1.007)	(1.054)
Religious intolerance				0.395*	0.448**	0.407**
				(0.212)	(0.195)	(0.192)
CONSTANT	-7.160**	-7.859***	-7.234**	-6.728**	-7.151**	-5.542
	(3.284)	(2.862)	(3.584)	(3.343)	(2.930)	(3.691)
N	846	846	846	838	838	838
pseudo R^2	0.178	0.154	0.157	0.215	0.202	0.190
ll	-294.1	-302.7	-301.5	-279.9	-284.5	-288.6

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses.

The dependent variable is the incidence of civil wars from PRIO following the definition which includes intermediate and high-intensity armed conflicts (PRIOCW). Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to religious diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the author's own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section.

in the basic logit regressions using both religious fractionalization and religious polarization, they find that religious fractionalization is marginally insignificant, while religious polarization is statistically significant. However, once ethnic polarization is included only ethnic polarization is significant and all the other diversity measures become insignificant. They argue that "It seems clear that ethnic polarization has a robust and powerful explanatory power on civil wars in the presence of other indices of fractionalization and polarization, while the statistical relevance of religious polarization depends on the particular specification." Thus, we try to verify if this is indeed true or does our measure of religious diversity still have a significant effect on civil conflict once we control for ethnic fractionalization and polarization. At the same time we also ensure that our results are robust to using the PRIO dataset.

In Table 8 we use the data and specification of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and

add to it our measures of religious diversity instead of theirs.[29] Columns 1 to 3 correspond to the 3 different levels of aggregation. Columns 4 to 6 are identical to columns 1 to 3 but also control for religious intolerance. Unlike them we find that religious fractionalization and religious polarization continue to be highly significant in predicting civil conflict even after controlling for ethnic fractionalization and polarization. While this result holds at almost all levels of aggregation, it is the second level of aggregation that is the most significant once we control for religious intolerance. Also, religious intolerance is highly significant in all the specifications. Moreover, while our measures of religious diversity continue to be significant, ethnic polarization becomes insignificant once we control for religious intolerance. Most of the literature has so far found ethnic polarization to be significant and religious diversity to be insignificant in explaining civil conflict. But our finding indicates that the result was driven by the non-inclusion religious intolerance in the specifications.

In Table B.11, we re-investigate which of the three components of religious intolerance are more relevant. This is similar to Table 6, but while in Table 6 we use the data and specification of Desmet et al. (2012), here we use the data and specification of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). In the first three columns we do not control for any component of intolerance whereas in the last three we do control for each of the three components in the three different panels. Again we clearly notice that government and social regulation of religion are highly significant in explaining civil conflict. Moreover, religious diversity continues to be highly significant and robust.

We finally subject our analysis to some more robustness checks. We control explicitly for ethnic fractionalization and polarization from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) in the Desmet et al. (2012) data and specification (Appendix Table B.10). Our results remain qualitatively unchanged. We also added the percentage of Muslims, Christians and Non-religious/atheists in the countries, both entering together and separately in of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) (Appendix Table B.12). As before, these variables have no significant impact on conflict leaving our results qualitatively unchanged.[30]

In all the above analyses we do not consider the Non-religious/Atheists/Agnostics as a relevant group in the calculation of the diversity indices. As a further robustness test we

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[29]This corresponds to Table 1, Column 8 of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005)

[30]Actually, the variable representing the proportion of atheists/Non-religious in the population, is marginally significant in some of the specifications but is not robust to the inclusion of a broader range of controls as in Desmet et al. (2012)

re-calculated our religious diversity measures including these groups. We find that when we do not control for religious intolerance, and religious fractionalization and polarization enter the specifications separately, both religious polarization and fractionalization are significant (only) at the highest level of aggregation. But the sign is negative i.e. religious diversity (both fractionalization and polarization) at the highest level of aggregation seems to reduce conflict. This significance however, disappears when we control for religious intolerance.[31]

Further, unlike our other specifications if religious fractionalization and polarization enter the specifications together, neither is significant. We argue that "since what we are trying to capture is religious interaction, it is reasonable not to treat the no-religion group as other religions because the only things that people in this group have in common is the fact they do not belong to any religious group. Therefore, there are not specific common interests that permit to identify them as a collective and that distinguish them from the interest of all the other groups. This means that from a political point of view there is no common point of reference that keeps them together. Moreover, the non-religious group does not have the necessity to reaffirm its identity because, as a group, it has no identity. This means that social friction caused by religious differences with other groups will not be present" (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2000)).

4   Conclusion

In this paper we create measures of religious diversity at three different levels of aggregation corresponding to different historical depths of cleavages. We also construct a new measure of religious intolerance. Using our newly constructed measures we do an in-depth empirical analysis of the relation between religious diversity, intolerance and the probability of civil conflict.

Through our empirical analysis, we find that religious diversity is a significant and robust correlate of civil conflict. Religious fractionalization significantly reduces conflict while religious polarization significantly increases it. Moreover, religious intolerance is a significant and robust correlate of civil conflict. In particular intolerance arising out of social and government regulation of religion significantly leads to more conflict. We find no evidence in favour of the perception that some religions are more violent than others, at least controlling explicitly for the percentage of Christians and Muslims in the country. Neither is having more religious people or Non-religious people in the country relevant for predicting civil conflict.

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[31]These results are not provided and are available upon request.

We also find that religious diversity measured at the second level of aggregation is the most robust one. In other words, the cleavage between Hindus, Muslims, and Christians etc. is more relevant than that between Abrahamic and Indian religions or that between different denominations of Christians - like Protestants and Catholics, or of Muslims - like Shias and Sunnis. Thinking in terms of Huntington (1993a), the relevant groups that define civilizations which potentially clash are the groups like Hindus, Muslims, and Christians etc. as defined by the second level of aggregation. On the other hand, thinking in terms of Caselli and Coleman (2012), these religious identies or groups are seperated by an ethnic distance which imposes a high enough cost on individuals of one group to pass themselves off as members of the other.

Our results are robust to a host of specifications, data and controls including controls for other forms of ethnic diversity. We conclude from the above empirical analysis that both religious diversity and intolerance are important predictors of civil conflict and must be taken into account in any analysis investigating the correlates of civil conflict.

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A Figures

(a) Rel1   (b) Rel2   (c) Rel3

Figure A.1: Histograms

(a) Rel_pol1   (b) Rel_pol2   (c) Rel_pol3

Figure A.2: Histograms Religious diversity

(a) Religious Fractionalization   (b) Religious Polarization

Figure A.3: Densities Religious diversity

(a) Level 1   (b) Level 2   (c) Level 3

Figure A.4: Scatter plots Religious diversity

Figure A.5: Religious Intolerance (no data for the U.S.)

Figure A.6: Religious Fractionalization at Level 1

Figure A.7: Religious Fractionalization at Level 2

Figure A.8: Religious Fractionalization at Level 3

Figure A.9: Religious Polarization at Level 1


Figure A.10: Religious Polarization at Level 2

Figure A.11: Religious Polarization at Level 3

B Tables

Table B.1: Cross-correlation table Religious diversity and Intolerance (197 obs)

Variables	rfrac1	rpol1	rfrac2	rpol2	rfrac3	rpol3
rpol1	0.991					
rfrac2	0.823	0.813				
rpol2	0.782	0.791	0.967			
rfrac3	0.547	0.550	0.585	0.572		
rpol3	0.502	0.515	0.586	0.628	0.782	
Religious Intolerance	-0.266	-0.286	-0.107	-0.118	-0.395	-0.244

Table B.2: Correlation with Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) measures (137 obs)

	rfrac1	rpol1	rfrac2	rpol2	rfrac3	rpol3
ethpol	0.0256	0.0175	0.1026	0.0648	0.1542	0.1013
ethfrac	0.2659	0.2728	0.4165	0.381	0.2798	0.2539
relpol	0.5898	0.5957	0.6666	0.6564	0.487	0.5801
relfrac	0.6684	0.6597	0.7466	0.7133	0.499	0.5746

Table B.3: Correlation of religious diversity with Desmet et al. (2012) measures (208 obs)

	rfrac1	rpol1	rfrac2	rpol2	rfrac3	rpol3
elf1	0.1445	0.1421	0.1782	0.1682	0.1363	0.1627
elf2	0.0706	0.069	0.1855	0.1797	0.1052	0.1741
elf3	0.1238	0.1088	0.2362	0.21	0.1015	0.1814
elf4	0.1439	0.1276	0.2745	0.2324	0.1352	0.1891
elf5	0.1334	0.1186	0.2805	0.2405	0.1113	0.1703
elf6	0.1036	0.0921	0.2664	0.2292	0.074	0.1621
elf7	0.1233	0.112	0.2829	0.2389	0.0803	0.1549
elf8	0.1115	0.1007	0.2733	0.2312	0.0754	0.1456
elf9	0.1822	0.178	0.3463	0.3034	0.1492	0.1865
elf10	0.2109	0.2099	0.3712	0.3297	0.2059	0.2091
elf11	0.2103	0.2111	0.3702	0.3288	0.2214	0.2102
elf12	0.2094	0.2103	0.3676	0.3265	0.2228	0.2129
elf13	0.2093	0.2102	0.3674	0.3264	0.2229	0.2129
elf14	0.2098	0.211	0.3665	0.326	0.2244	0.2167
elf15	0.2098	0.211	0.3664	0.3259	0.2244	0.2168
pol1	0.1324	0.1317	0.1742	0.1692	0.1245	0.1585
pol2	0.043	0.0431	0.1546	0.1532	0.0715	0.1568
pol3	0.0642	0.0548	0.1728	0.161	0.0684	0.1618
pol4	0.0898	0.0791	0.2064	0.1788	0.1063	0.172
pol5	0.0708	0.0587	0.1855	0.1655	0.0579	0.1363
pol6	0.0271	0.0168	0.1419	0.1267	0.0101	0.1114
pol7	-0.0025	-0.0138	0.1033	0.0936	-0.0232	0.0753
pol8	-0.0358	-0.047	0.0469	0.0371	-0.0781	0.0168
pol9	0.0208	0.0127	0.1123	0.1042	-0.0204	0.0537
pol10	0.0131	0.0034	0.0981	0.0939	-0.0456	0.0461
pol11	-0.0169	-0.0281	0.0529	0.0479	-0.1202	-0.0015
pol12	-0.0175	-0.029	0.0549	0.0495	-0.1269	-0.0085
pol13	-0.0173	-0.0288	0.0551	0.0498	-0.1274	-0.0087
pol14	-0.0169	-0.0284	0.0547	0.0496	-0.1266	-0.007
pol15	-0.017	-0.0285	0.0548	0.0496	-0.1268	-0.0075

Table B.4: Cross-correlation table between groups and intolerance (197 obs)

Variables	%Muslims	%Christians	%None/Atheists
%Christians	-0.739		
%None/Atheists	-0.254	-0.118	
Religious intolerance	0.560	-0.519	-0.057

Table B.5: Religious diversity and Conflict

	(1) rfrac1	(2) rfrac2	(3) rfrac3	(4) pol1	(5) pol2	(6) pol3
rel	-1.022	-0.548	0.0277	-0.485	-0.206	0.652
	(0.714)	(0.837)	(0.728)	(0.416)	(0.554)	(0.674)
Lagged civil war	-0.850***	-0.854***	-0.851***	-0.847***	-0.847***	-0.866***
	(0.256)	(0.261)	(0.259)	(0.256)	(0.259)	(0.258)
Log lagged GDP/cap	-0.616***	-0.621***	-0.617***	-0.618***	-0.621***	-0.605***
	(0.149)	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.149)	(0.148)	(0.146)
Log lagged population	0.297***	0.299***	0.295***	0.292***	0.294***	0.299***
	(0.0727)	(0.0726)	(0.0704)	(0.0717)	(0.0708)	(0.0708)
% mountainous	0.00853*	0.00895*	0.00883*	0.00849*	0.00903*	0.00785
	(0.00494)	(0.00479)	(0.00491)	(0.00495)	(0.00482)	(0.00507)
Noncontiguos state dummy	0.487	0.520	0.514	0.507	0.531	0.456
	(0.354)	(0.358)	(0.361)	(0.353)	(0.364)	(0.358)
Oil exporter dummy	0.724***	0.751***	0.728***	0.730***	0.746***	0.721***
	(0.239)	(0.239)	(0.239)	(0.239)	(0.241)	(0.234)
New state dummy	1.777***	1.769***	1.775***	1.777***	1.770***	1.785***
	(0.371)	(0.368)	(0.370)	(0.371)	(0.367)	(0.374)
Instability dummy	0.625***	0.630***	0.646***	0.631***	0.637***	0.657***
	(0.219)	(0.216)	(0.218)	(0.219)	(0.217)	(0.217)
Democracy lagged (Polity 2)	0.0207	0.0195	0.0195	0.0206	0.0195	0.0203
	(0.0210)	(0.0210)	(0.0207)	(0.0210)	(0.0209)	(0.0211)
French legal origin dummy	1.160*	1.324*	1.478**	1.194*	1.363*	1.757**
	(0.701)	(0.697)	(0.676)	(0.711)	(0.723)	(0.723)
UK legal origin dummy	0.958	1.079	1.172*	0.981	1.091	1.380**
	(0.698)	(0.684)	(0.660)	(0.705)	(0.701)	(0.693)
Socialist legal origin dummy	1.096	1.212*	1.245*	1.095	1.210*	1.322*
	(0.719)	(0.710)	(0.703)	(0.726)	(0.713)	(0.705)
Latin America and Carribean Dummy	0.183	0.111	0.0969	0.171	0.105	-0.0132
	(0.403)	(0.395)	(0.421)	(0.402)	(0.390)	(0.422)
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy	0.394	0.335	0.143	0.369	0.257	-0.0494
	(0.384)	(0.475)	(0.482)	(0.390)	(0.476)	(0.413)
East and Southeast Asia Dummy	0.461	0.353	0.267	0.414	0.309	0.232
	(0.347)	(0.351)	(0.335)	(0.340)	(0.342)	(0.318)
Constant	-3.904**	-4.014**	-4.203***	-3.873**	-4.024**	-4.800***
	(1.629)	(1.622)	(1.610)	(1.641)	(1.650)	(1.710)
Observations	5733	5733	5733	5733	5733	5733
Pseudo R^2	0.098	0.097	0.096	0.098	0.097	0.098
ll	-454.5	-455.1	-455.5	-454.8	-455.4	-454.6

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses.

The dependent variable is the onset of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to religious diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from Desmet et al. (2012) except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the author's own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section.

Table B.6: Religious diversity, religious intolerance & Conflict

	(1) rfrac1	(2) rfrac2	(3) rfrac3	(4) pol1	(5) pol2	(6) pol3
rel	-0.878	-0.525	0.377	-0.385	-0.147	0.758
	(0.760)	(0.812)	(0.732)	(0.441)	(0.539)	(0.633)
Rel intolerance	0.209**	0.221**	0.240**	0.210**	0.221**	0.241**
	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.111)	(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.106)
Lagged civil war	-0.900***	-0.902***	-0.899***	-0.897***	-0.896***	-0.913***
	(0.246)	(0.250)	(0.244)	(0.246)	(0.247)	(0.243)
Log lagged GDP/cap	-0.537***	-0.538***	-0.537***	-0.538***	-0.539***	-0.517***
	(0.159)	(0.158)	(0.156)	(0.159)	(0.158)	(0.157)
Log lagged population	0.238***	0.237***	0.227***	0.233***	0.231***	0.230***
	(0.0853)	(0.0861)	(0.0824)	(0.0842)	(0.0841)	(0.0827)
%mountainous	0.00755	0.00795	0.00735	0.00754	0.00795	0.00645
	(0.00562)	(0.00547)	(0.00567)	(0.00563)	(0.00550)	(0.00573)
Noncontiguos state dummy	0.609*	0.648*	0.643*	0.628*	0.656*	0.600*
	(0.353)	(0.354)	(0.348)	(0.351)	(0.357)	(0.349)
Oil exporter dummy	0.543**	0.566**	0.530**	0.550**	0.558**	0.522**
	(0.256)	(0.250)	(0.248)	(0.254)	(0.251)	(0.241)
New state dummy	1.728***	1.720***	1.726***	1.728***	1.723***	1.736***
	(0.381)	(0.377)	(0.380)	(0.381)	(0.377)	(0.383)
Instability dummy	0.624***	0.626***	0.645***	0.629***	0.634***	0.647***
	(0.220)	(0.217)	(0.219)	(0.220)	(0.217)	(0.219)
Democracy lagged (Polity 2)	0.0272	0.0265	0.0267	0.0271	0.0265	0.0284
	(0.0207)	(0.0207)	(0.0206)	(0.0207)	(0.0206)	(0.0209)
French legal origin dummy	0.996	1.102	1.297*	1.038	1.155	1.532*
	(0.782)	(0.776)	(0.755)	(0.789)	(0.791)	(0.820)
UK legal origin dummy	0.696	0.762	0.826	0.721	0.780	1.029
	(0.789)	(0.780)	(0.758)	(0.793)	(0.789)	(0.804)
Socialist legal origin dummy	1.011	1.091	1.102	1.015	1.090	1.186
	(0.785)	(0.780)	(0.768)	(0.789)	(0.779)	(0.786)
Latin America and Carribean Dummy	0.549	0.512	0.491	0.538	0.506	0.411
	(0.409)	(0.400)	(0.403)	(0.408)	(0.395)	(0.423)
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy	0.825*	0.829*	0.555	0.794*	0.729	0.479
	(0.424)	(0.492)	(0.466)	(0.428)	(0.488)	(0.443)
East and Southeast Asia Dummy	0.595	0.516	0.389	0.542	0.456	0.379
	(0.385)	(0.379)	(0.360)	(0.376)	(0.372)	(0.352)
Constant	-4.029**	-4.105**	-4.337**	-4.012**	-4.120**	-4.916***
	(1.721)	(1.723)	(1.717)	(1.732)	(1.735)	(1.826)
Observations	5678	5678	5678	5678	5678	5678
Pseudo R^2	0.102	0.101	0.101	0.101	0.101	0.103
ll	-451.7	-452.1	-452.2	-452.0	-452.3	-451.2

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses.

The dependent variable is the onset of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to religious diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from Desmet et al. (2012) except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the author's own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section.

Table B.7: Civil conflict - Components of religious Intolerance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	r1	r2	r3	rr1	rr2	rr3
religious fractionalization	-8.280	-2.859	-1.639	-10.02*	-3.728*	-1.178
	(5.297)	(2.100)	(1.257)	(5.739)	(2.119)	(1.274)
religious polarization	4.068	1.595	1.755*	4.990	2.094	1.434
	(2.987)	(1.314)	(0.974)	(3.157)	(1.302)	(0.981)
GRI: Government Regulation Index				0.108**	0.110**	0.0849
				(0.0442)	(0.0463)	(0.0521)
Observations	5733	5733	5733	5678	5678	5678
Pseudo R^2	0.100	0.098	0.101	0.104	0.102	0.102
ll	-453.6	-454.5	-453.3	-450.6	-451.5	-451.5
religious fractionalization	-8.280	-2.859	-1.639	-8.915	-3.246	-0.920
	(5.297)	(2.100)	(1.257)	(6.210)	(2.126)	(1.190)
religious polarization	4.068	1.595	1.755*	4.612	1.896	1.313
	(2.987)	(1.314)	(0.974)	(3.363)	(1.333)	(0.893)
SRI: Social Regulation Index				0.163***	0.170***	0.164***
				(0.0530)	(0.0525)	(0.0559)
Observations	5733	5733	5733	5678	5678	5678
Pseudo R^2	0.100	0.098	0.101	0.109	0.108	0.109
ll	-453.6	-454.5	-453.3	-448.2	-448.5	-448.2
religious fractionalization	-8.280	-2.859	-1.639	-8.501	-3.036	-1.425
	(5.297)	(2.100)	(1.257)	(5.412)	(2.134)	(1.275)
religious polarization	4.068	1.595	1.755*	4.190	1.716	1.662*
	(2.987)	(1.314)	(0.974)	(3.055)	(1.344)	(0.967)
GFI: Government Favoritism Index				0.0110	0.0145	0.0146
				(0.0505)	(0.0517)	(0.0517)
Observations	5733	5733	5733	5678	5678	5678
Pseudo R^2	0.100	0.098	0.101	0.100	0.098	0.100
ll	-453.6	-454.5	-453.3	-452.8	-453.7	-452.7

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses.

The dependent variable is the onset of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to religious diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from Desmet et al. (2012) except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the author's own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section.

Table B.8: Ethnic conflict: Components of religious intolerance

	(1) r1	(2) r2	(3) r3	(4) rr1	(5) rr2	(6) rr3
religious fractionalization	-6.509	-4.036	-1.708	-8.558	-5.264**	-1.098
	(6.466)	(2.485)	(1.762)	(7.202)	(2.591)	(1.857)
religious polarization	2.970	2.502	2.299*	4.125	3.283**	1.896
	(3.606)	(1.578)	(1.267)	(3.953)	(1.629)	(1.352)
GRI: Government Regulation Index				0.115**	0.136**	0.0999
				(0.0548)	(0.0563)	(0.0652)
Observations	5733	5733	5733	5678	5678	5678
Pseudo R^2	0.153	0.153	0.156	0.159	0.160	0.160
ll	-320.1	-320.1	-318.9	-317.5	-316.9	-317.0
religious fractionalization	-6.509	-4.036	-1.708	-7.237	-4.407*	-0.951
	(6.466)	(2.485)	(1.762)	(7.481)	(2.586)	(1.757)
religious polarization	2.970	2.502	2.299*	3.618	2.820*	1.897
	(3.606)	(1.578)	(1.267)	(4.093)	(1.665)	(1.247)
SRI: Social Regulation Index				0.135**	0.150**	0.148**
				(0.0639)	(0.0656)	(0.0701)
Observations	5733	5733	5733	5678	5678	5678
Pseudo R^2	0.153	0.153	0.156	0.160	0.162	0.164
ll	-320.1	-320.1	-318.9	-317.0	-316.3	-315.6
religious fractionalization	-6.509	-4.036	-1.708	-5.167	-3.591	-1.540
	(6.466)	(2.485)	(1.762)	(6.336)	(2.370)	(1.790)
religious polarization	2.970	2.502	2.299*	2.144	2.117	2.035
	(3.606)	(1.578)	(1.267)	(3.532)	(1.545)	(1.247)
GFI: Government Favoritism Index				-0.0918	-0.0751	-0.0725
				(0.0702)	(0.0727)	(0.0751)
Observations	5733	5733	5733	5678	5678	5678
Pseudo R^2	0.153	0.153	0.156	0.157	0.156	0.158
ll	-320.1	-320.1	-318.9	-318.0	-318.3	-317.5

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses.

The dependent variable is the onset of ethnic conflict. Column 1(4) , 2(5) and 3(6) correspond to religious diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from Desmet et al. (2012) except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the author's own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section.

Table B.9: Controlling for percentage of different groups (Aggregation Level 2)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Religious fractionalization	-2.891	-2.932	-2.979	-3.048	-2.966	-2.982	-3.048
	(2.130)	(2.095)	(2.076)	(2.100)	(2.124)	(2.077)	(2.101)
Religious polarization	1.783	1.760	1.584	1.802	1.919	1.651	1.793
	(1.341)	(1.298)	(1.284)	(1.304)	(1.326)	(1.337)	(1.343)
Percentage Nonreligious/Atheists	-0.00995			-0.0112	-0.00922		-0.0112
	(0.00957)			(0.00918)	(0.00958)		(0.00956)
Percentage Muslims		0.00359			0.00325	0.00127	-0.000181
		(0.00356)			(0.00359)	(0.00579)	(0.00561)
Percentage Christians			-0.00433	-0.00478		-0.00335	-0.00492
			(0.00388)	(0.00386)		(0.00628)	(0.00608)
Observations	5733	5733	5733	5733	5733	5733	5733
Pseudo R^2	0.099	0.099	0.099	0.101	0.100	0.099	0.101
ll	-454.0	-454.1	-453.9	-453.2	-453.6	-453.9	-453.2

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses.

The dependent variable is the onset of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to religious diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from Desmet et al. (2012) except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the author's own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section. The other controls are: a constant term, lagged civil war, the log of per capita GDP (lagged), the percentage of the country that is mountainous, non-contiguous state dummy, oil exporter dummy, new state dummy, Instability dummy, democracy lagged (polity2), continent dummy variables for Sub-Saharan Africa, East and Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and legal origin dummies from La Porta et al. (1999).

Table B.10: Controlling ETHFRAC and ETHPOL in Desmet et al. (2012)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	r1	r2	r3	r4	r5	r6
Religious fractionalization 2	-4.150*	-4.130*	-3.998*	-3.879	-3.360	-3.642
	(2.261)	(2.247)	(2.264)	(2.582)	(2.474)	(2.729)
Religious polarization 2	2.426*	2.402*	2.302*	2.029	1.733	1.884
	(1.388)	(1.380)	(1.396)	(1.700)	(1.642)	(1.765)
elf1	0.972*		-2.818			
	(0.573)		(3.200)			
Religious intolerance	0.221**	0.219**	0.222**	0.196	0.172	0.179
	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.127)
pol1		0.607*	2.208			
		(0.330)	(1.748)			
Ethnic fractionalization MRQ				0.508		0.333
				(0.546)		(0.761)
Ethnic polarization MRQ					0.531	0.345
					(0.549)	(0.769)
Observations	5678	5678	5678	4898	4898	4898
Pseudo R^2	0.106	0.106	0.107	0.104	0.104	0.104
ll	-449.7	-449.5	-449.3	-391.6	-391.6	-391.5
Religious fractionalization 3	-1.113	-1.099	-1.044	-2.304*	-2.272*	-2.266*
	(1.287)	(1.292)	(1.301)	(1.248)	(1.212)	(1.210)
Religious polarization 3	1.402	1.377	1.322	2.488**	2.435**	2.435**
	(0.966)	(0.970)	(0.975)	(1.055)	(1.030)	(1.027)
elf1	0.768		-2.744			
	(0.593)		(3.398)			
Religious intolerance	0.184	0.182	0.189*	0.141	0.119	0.118
	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.113)	(0.117)	(0.118)
pol1		0.487	2.045			
		(0.340)	(1.873)			
Ethnic fractionalization MRQ				0.199		-0.0508
				(0.522)		(0.720)
Ethnic polarization MRQ					0.472	0.501
					(0.598)	(0.802)
Observations	5678	5678	5678	4898	4898	4898
Pseudo R^2	0.105	0.106	0.106	0.107	0.108	0.108
ll	-450.0	-449.8	-449.6	-390.0	-389.7	-389.7

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses.

The dependent variable is the onset of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to religious diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from Desmet et al. (2012) except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the author's own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section.

Table B.11: Components of intolerance in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) specification

	(1) Level1	(2) Level2	(3) Level3	(4) Level1	(5) Level2	(6) Level3
religious fractionalization	-33.14***	-11.39***	-3.563*	-47.53**	-14.44***	-2.859
	(12.55)	(3.765)	(1.923)	(20.52)	(4.464)	(2.223)
Religious polarization	15.68**	6.924***	3.809**	23.14**	8.855***	3.566*
	(6.803)	(2.296)	(1.806)	(10.86)	(2.866)	(2.002)
ETHPOL	2.175**	2.276**	2.360**	2.051*	1.935*	2.134*
	(1.088)	(1.109)	(1.132)	(1.134)	(1.148)	(1.192)
ETHFRAC	0.257	0.526	0.270	0.996	1.440	0.602
	(0.920)	(0.968)	(1.004)	(0.986)	(0.988)	(1.044)
Government Regulation Index				**0.179***	**0.201****	**0.151***
				(0.0947)	(0.0937)	(0.0915)
N	846	846	846	838	838	838
pseudo R^2	0.178	0.154	0.157	0.210	0.191	0.176
ll	-294.1	-302.7	-301.5	-281.8	-288.4	-293.8
religious fractionalization	-33.14***	-11.39***	-3.563*	-50.09**	-12.80***	-2.030
	(12.55)	(3.765)	(1.923)	(24.49)	(4.140)	(1.966)
Religious polarization	15.68**	6.924***	3.809**	24.60*	7.932***	3.207*
	(6.803)	(2.296)	(1.806)	(12.83)	(2.731)	(1.709)
ETHPOL	2.175**	2.276**	2.360**	1.927*	1.908*	1.850*
	(1.088)	(1.109)	(1.132)	(1.086)	(1.075)	(1.115)
ETHFRAC	0.257	0.526	0.270	1.020	1.248	0.480
	(0.920)	(0.968)	(1.004)	(1.019)	(0.984)	(1.038)
Social Regulation Index				**0.222****	**0.248*****	**0.246*****
				(0.0986)	(0.0916)	(0.0910)
N	846	846	846	838	838	838
pseudo R^2	0.178	0.154	0.157	0.226	0.217	0.211
ll	-294.1	-302.7	-301.5	-275.7	-279.2	-281.3
religious fractionalization	-33.14***	-11.39***	-3.563*	-39.72***	-12.80***	-2.720
	(12.55)	(3.765)	(1.923)	(14.68)	(4.038)	(2.005)
Religious polarization	15.68**	6.924***	3.809**	19.30**	8.068***	3.505*
	(6.803)	(2.296)	(1.806)	(7.938)	(2.633)	(1.875)
ETHPOL	2.175**	2.276**	2.360**	2.139*	2.135*	2.190*
	(1.088)	(1.109)	(1.132)	(1.162)	(1.161)	(1.162)
ETHFRAC	0.257	0.526	0.270	0.553	0.981	0.461
	(0.920)	(0.968)	(1.004)	(0.961)	(0.997)	(1.023)
Government Favoritism Index				0.0802	0.114	0.0990
				(0.0962)	(0.0962)	(0.0999)
N	846	846	846	838	838	838
pseudo R^2	0.178	0.154	0.157	0.191	0.171	0.164
ll	-294.1	-302.7	-301.5	-288.5	-295.6	-297.9

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses.

The dependent variable is the incidence of civil war (intermediate and high-intensity civil wars of PRIO). Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to religious diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the author's own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section. The sample is divided into 5 year periods. The other controls are: a constant term, the log of per capita GDP, the log of population (both at the beginning of the period), the percentage of the country that is mountainous, non-contiguous state dummy, level of democracy (Polity IV dataset).

Table B.12: Controlling for percentage of different groups in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) (Aggregation Level 2)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	c1	c2	c3	c4	c5	c6	c7
Religious polarization	8.151***	8.948***	8.970***	8.237***	8.978***	8.155***	8.165***
	(2.808)	(2.914)	(2.871)	(2.782)	(2.877)	(2.776)	(2.717)
religious fractionalization	-12.58***	-14.56***	-14.19***	-12.57***	-14.45***	-12.90***	-12.88***
	(4.117)	(4.462)	(4.370)	(4.109)	(4.566)	(4.108)	(4.200)
LGDPC	-0.124	-0.286	-0.283	-0.159	-0.294	-0.168	-0.169
	(0.242)	(0.235)	(0.258)	(0.263)	(0.248)	(0.237)	(0.250)
LPOP	0.438***	0.306*	0.335**	0.445***	0.316*	0.419**	0.420**
	(0.166)	(0.171)	(0.168)	(0.167)	(0.187)	(0.166)	(0.178)
PRIMEXP	-1.559	-1.036	-1.117	-1.516	-1.046	-1.408	-1.409
	(1.731)	(1.622)	(1.709)	(1.761)	(1.633)	(1.658)	(1.658)
MOUNTAINS	-0.00765	-0.00886	-0.00846	-0.00935	-0.00920	-0.0107	-0.0108
	(0.0105)	(0.0115)	(0.0108)	(0.0109)	(0.0114)	(0.0117)	(0.0118)
NONCONT	0.0218	0.0257	0.00640	-0.0121	0.0105	-0.00224	-0.00513
	(0.573)	(0.545)	(0.547)	(0.575)	(0.545)	(0.568)	(0.572)
DEMOCRACY	0.242	0.229	0.285	0.214	0.239	0.119	0.121
	(0.382)	(0.396)	(0.410)	(0.393)	(0.383)	(0.380)	(0.368)
ETHPOL	2.264*	1.783	1.853	2.301**	1.819	2.265*	2.270*
	(1.191)	(1.142)	(1.137)	(1.173)	(1.163)	(1.172)	(1.195)
ETHFRAC	1.097	1.485	1.358	0.979	1.417	1.082	1.069
	(1.040)	(1.000)	(1.015)	(1.049)	(1.071)	(1.023)	(1.116)
Rel intolerance	0.366*	0.525**	0.519***	0.433**	0.540***	0.464**	0.467**
	(0.187)	(0.229)	(0.188)	(0.182)	(0.209)	(0.221)	(0.201)
Percentage Nonreligious/Atheists	-0.0336*			-0.0337		-0.0362*	-0.0361*
	(0.0202)			(0.0205)		(0.0209)	(0.0212)
Percentage Muslims		-0.00489			-0.00345	-0.00656	-0.00629
		(0.00697)			(0.0105)	(0.00712)	(0.0103)
Percentage Christians			0.00454	0.00421	0.00243		0.000458
			(0.00659)	(0.00629)	(0.0101)		(0.00960)
_cons	-9.723***	-6.240*	-7.181**	-9.748***	-6.537*	-8.733***	-8.781**
	(3.159)	(3.197)	(2.925)	(3.153)	(3.509)	(3.317)	(3.517)
N	838	838	838	838	838	838	838
pseudo R^2	0.213	0.204	0.204	0.215	0.204	0.217	0.217
ll	-280.5	-283.8	-283.9	-279.9	-283.7	-279.2	-279.2

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses.

The dependent variable is the onset of civil conflict. Column 1 (4) , 2 (5) and 3 (6) correspond to religious diversity measured at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd levels of aggregation respectively. All the data are from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) except for the measures of religious diversity and religious intolerance which are based on the author's own calculations using data from myriad sources explained in detail in the data section.

Table B.13: List of Religions

Religion Level 1	Religion Level 2	Religion Level 3
Abrahamic	Baha'i	Baha'i
Abrahamic	Christian	African Christian
Abrahamic	Christian	African Methodist Episcopal
Abrahamic	Christian	African Protestant
Abrahamic	Christian	Aglipayan
Abrahamic	Christian	Albanian Orthodox
Abrahamic	Christian	Anglican
Abrahamic	Christian	Apostolic Faith
Abrahamic	Christian	Armenian Apostolic (Orthodox)
Abrahamic	Christian	Armenian Gregorian
Abrahamic	Christian	Assemblies of God
Abrahamic	Christian	Baptist
Abrahamic	Christian	Belarusian Orthodox
Abrahamic	Christian	Black Independent Churches
Abrahamic	Christian	Bulgarian Orthodox
Abrahamic	Christian	Roman Catholic
Abrahamic	Christian	Christian
Abrahamic	Christian	Christian unaffiliated
Abrahamic	Christian	Church of Christ
Abrahamic	Christian	Congregational
Abrahamic	Christian	Coptic Orthodox
Abrahamic	Christian	Czechoslovak Hussite
Abrahamic	Christian	Dutch Reformed Church
Abrahamic	Christian	Eastern Orthodox
Abrahamic	Christian	Eritrean Orthodox
Abrahamic	Christian	Estonian Orthodox
Abrahamic	Christian	Ethiopian Orthodox
Abrahamic	Christian	Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren
Abrahamic	Christian	Evangelical Lutheran
Abrahamic	Christian	Evangelical Protestant
Abrahamic	Christian	Free Wesleyan
Abrahamic	Christian	Full Gospel
Abrahamic	Christian	Georgian Orthodox
Abrahamic	Christian	Greek Catholic (Melchite)
Abrahamic	Christian	Greek Orthodox
Abrahamic	Christian	Independent
Abrahamic	Christian	Kimbanguist
Abrahamic	Christian	Lutheran
Abrahamic	Christian	Methodist
Abrahamic	Christian	Mormon
Abrahamic	Christian	New Apostolic
Abrahamic	Christian	Orthodox
Abrahamic	Christian	Other Apostolic
Abrahamic	Christian	Other Black Independent
Abrahamic	Christian	Other Christian
Abrahamic	Christian	other Protestant
Abrahamic	Christian	Pentecostal
Abrahamic	Christian	Polish Orthodox
Abrahamic	Christian	Presbyterian
Abrahamic	Christian	Protestant
Abrahamic	Christian	Reformed Churches
Abrahamic	Christian	Romanian Orthodox
Abrahamic	Christian	Russian Orthodox
Abrahamic	Christian	Salvation Army
Abrahamic	Christian	Serbian Orthodox
Abrahamic	Christian	Seventh Day Adventist
Abrahamic	Christian	Silesian Evangelical
Abrahamic	Christian	Slovak Evangelical
Abrahamic	Christian	Swiss Christian

Table B.14: List of Religions

Religion Level 1	Religion Level 2	Religion Level 3
Abrahamic	Christian	Ukrainian Catholic
Abrahamic	Christian	Ukrainian Orthodox (Autocephalous)
Abrahamic	Christian	Ukrainian Orthodox (Kiev)
Abrahamic	Christian	Ukrainian Orthodox (Russian)
Abrahamic	Christian	United Congregational
Abrahamic	Christian	Uniting Church
Abrahamic	Druze	Druze
Abrahamic	Jewish	Jewish
Abrahamic	Muslim	Ibadiyah Muslim
Abrahamic	Muslim	Muslim
Abrahamic	Muslim	other Muslim
Abrahamic	Muslim	Shii Muslim
Abrahamic	Muslim	Sunni Muslim
Indian	Buddhist	Buddhist
Indian	Buddhist	Hoa Hao
Indian	Buddhist	Lamaistic Buddhist
Indian	Buddhist	Tantric Buddhist
Indian	Hindu	Hindu
Indian	Jain	Jain
Indian	Sikh	Sikh
Indigenous	Animist	Animist
Indigenous	Buddhist and Taoism	Buddhist and Taoism
Indigenous	Burkinan Traditional	Burkinan Traditional
Indigenous	Chinese Folk	Chinese Folk
Indigenous	Chondogyo	Chondogyo
Indigenous	Confucian	Confucian
Indigenous	Ethnic Religionist	Ethnic Religionist
Indigenous	Indigenous	Indigenous
Indigenous	GB Traditional	GB Traditional
Indigenous	Hsuan Yuan Chiao	Hsuan Yuan Chiao
Indigenous	Indigenous	Cao Dai
Indigenous	Indigenous	I Kuan Tao
Indigenous	Indigenous	Tien Te Chiao
Indigenous	Ivoirian Traditional	Ivoirian Traditional
Indigenous	Laos Traditional	Laos Traditional
Indigenous	Madagascar Traditional	Madagascar Traditional
Indigenous	Malawi Traditional	Malawi Traditional
Indigenous	Modekngei (Indigenous)	Modekngei (Indigenous)
Indigenous	Mozambique Traditional	Mozambique Traditional
Indigenous	Myanmar Traditional	Myanmar Traditional
Indigenous	Niger Traditional	Niger Traditional
Indigenous	Nigeria Traditional	Nigeria Traditional
Indigenous	NK Traditional	NK Traditional
Indigenous	Ratana	Ratana
Indigenous	Senegal Traditional	Senegal Traditional
Indigenous	Shintoist	Shintoist
Indigenous	SL Traditional	SL Traditional
Indigenous	Swaziland Traditional	Swaziland Traditional
Indigenous	Tanzania Traditional	Tanzania Traditional
Indigenous	Taoist	Taoist
Indigenous	Togo Traditional	Togo Traditional
Indigenous	Traditional	Traditional
Indigenous	Voodoo	Voodoo
Indigenous	Wonbulgyo	Wonbulgyo
Indigenous	Zambia Traditional	Zambia Traditional
Indigenous	Zimbabwe Traditional	Zimbabwe Traditional
Iranian	Zoroastrian	Zoroastrian
Other	New Religionist	New Religionist
Other	Other	Other

Table B.15: Ranking of countries by religious fractionalization (High to Low)

Ranks	rfrac1	rfrac2	rfrac3
1	Macau	Benin	Jamaica
2	China	Singapore	Antigua and Barbuda
3	Mongolia	Taiwan	Papua New Guinea
4	Singapore	Malawi	New Zealand
5	Taiwan	Cote d'Ivoire	Trinidad and Tobago
6	Laos	Tanzania	South Africa
7	Japan	Nigeria	Guyana
8	Vietnam	Suriname	Malawi
9	Mauritius	Macau	Ghana
10	Korea, South	Mauritius	Vanuatu
11	Trinidad and Tobago	Zimbabwe	Benin
12	Togo	Cameroon	Solomon Islands
13	Angola	Central African Republic	United States
14	Estonia	Togo	Samoa
15	French Guiana	China	American Samoa
16	Benin	Guinea-Bissau	Lebanon
17	Tonga	Malaysia	Bahamas, The
18	Guinea-Bissau	Mongolia	Bermuda
19	Malawi	Trinidad and Tobago	Zambia
20	Isle of Man	Lebanon	Saint Kitts and Nevis
21	Guyana	Chad	Barbados
22	Suriname	Korea, North	Kenya
23	Madagascar	Guyana	Fiji
24	Central African Republic	Burkina Faso	Suriname
25	Tanzania	Brunei	Australia
26	Botswana	Laos	Mozambique
27	Brunei	Japan	Moldova
28	Kenya	Sierra Leone	Nigeria
29	Cuba	Vietnam	Cameroon
30	Congo, Republic of the	Kenya	Botswana
31	Malaysia	Korea, South	Central African Republic
32	Sierra Leone	Eritrea	Lesotho
33	Lesotho	Madagascar	Swaziland
34	Slovenia	Angola	Ukraine
35	Hong Kong	Estonia	Grenadine
36	Fiji	French Guiana	Cote d'Ivoire
37	Czech Republic	Fiji	Tanzania
38	American Samoa	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Nauru
39	Cote d'Ivoire	Ethiopia	Singapore
40	New Zealand	Liberia	Congo, Democratic Republic of the
41	Zimbabwe	Burundi	Taiwan
42	Cameroon	Sri Lanka	Virgin Islands
43	Nigeria	Tonga	Mauritius
44	Burundi	Russia	Uganda
45	Northern Mariana Islands	Isle of Man	Netherlands
46	Namibia	Mozambique	Belize
47	Liberia	Macedonia	Zimbabwe
48	Sudan	Congo, Republic of the	Congo, Republic of the
49	Jamaica	Botswana	Namibia
50	CZECHOSLOVAKIA	Slovenia	Gabon
51	Liechtenstein	Cuba	Ethiopia
52	Vanuatu	Sudan	Togo
53	Faroe Islands	Ghana	Palau
54	Burkina Faso	East Timor	Macau
55	Belize	Kuwait	Guernsey
56	India	Albania	Bosnia and Herzegovina
57	Sri Lanka	Lesotho	Jersey
58	Bermuda	Hong Kong	Germany
59	Nauru	New Zealand	Latvia
60	Palau	Czech Republic	Vietnam

Ranking of countries by religious fractionalization (High to Low)

Ranks	rfrac1	rfrac2	rfrac3
61	Zambia	American Samoa	Chad
62	Qatar	Israel	Grenada
63	Saint Kitts and Nevis	Gabon	Korea, South
64	Kuwait	Bhutan	Canada
65	Hungary	Qatar	Tonga
66	Guam	Yugoslavia	Estonia
67	Sweden	Congo, Democratic Republic of the	Angola
68	Dominican Republic	Moldova	Marshall Islands
69	Bangladesh	Northern Mariana Islands	Kuwait
70	Niger	India	New Caledonia
71	Moldova	Namibia	China
72	Swaziland	Montenegro	Eritrea
73	French Polynesia	West Bank	Rwanda
74	Gabon	Bahrain	Guinea-Bissau
75	Burma (Myanmar)	Zambia	Uruguay
76	Guernsey	Kazakhstan	Switzerland
77	Chad	Cyprus	Hungary
78	Congo, Democratic Republic of the	Jamaica	Malaysia
79	Ghana	CZECHOSLOVAKIA	Mongolia
80	San Marino	Nepal	Burkina Faso
81	Mali	Liechtenstein	Northern Mariana Islands
82	Mozambique	Sweden	Kiribati
83	Oman	Vanuatu	Korea, North
84	Norway	Faroe Islands	Bahrain
85	Panama	Belize	United Kingdom
86	Bahrain	Guinea	French Polynesia
87	Guinea	Bermuda	Dominica
88	Virgin Islands	Nauru	Brunei
89	Korea, North	Palau	Burundi
90	Grenadine	Netherlands	Laos
91	Australia	Uganda	Micronesia
92	Lithuania	Panama	Japan
93	Barbados	Saint Kitts and Nevis	Sierra Leone
94	Thailand	Indonesia	Cuba
95	Aruba	Hungary	Russia
96	Nepal	Oman	Madagascar
97	Costa Rica	Guam	Guatemala
98	Chile	Palestine	Yemen
99	New Caledonia	Bulgaria	Slovenia
100	Equatorial Guinea	Swaziland	Czech Republic
101	Ecuador	Bangladesh	French Guiana
102	Austria	Dominican Republic	Azerbaijan
103	United Arab Emirates	Syria	Belarus
104	Iceland	Niger	Liberia
105	Micronesia	Burma (Myanmar)	Sri Lanka
106	Sao Tome	Reunion	Iraq
107	Israel	Georgia	Isle of Man
108	Netherlands	French Polynesia	Macedonia
109	Seychelles	Grenadine	Saint Lucia
110	Slovakia	Gambia, The	El Salvador
111	Cambodia	Mali	CZECHOSLOVAKIA
112	Peru	Norway	Albania
113	Canada	Guernsey	Nicaragua
114	Ethiopia	Egypt	Panama
115	Papua New Guinea	San Marino	Yugoslavia
116	Indonesia	France	Oman
117	Pakistan	Austria	Sudan
118	Lebanon	Australia	East Timor
119	Haiti	Kosovo	Hong Kong
120	Guatemala	Equatorial Guinea	Guam

Ranking of countries by religious fractionalization (High to Low)

Ranks	rfrac1	rfrac2	rfrac3
121	Martinique	Jordan	Puerto Rico
122	Honduras	New Caledonia	Israel
123	El Salvador	Belgium	Sweden
124	Argentina	Kyrgyzstan	Chile
125	Solomon Islands	Virgin Islands	Liechtenstein
126	Brazil	Philippines	Syria
127	United States	Azerbaijan	Pakistan
128	Ireland	Switzerland	Bhutan
129	Guadeloupe	Lithuania	Qatar
130	Antigua and Barbuda	Senegal	Montenegro
131	Puerto Rico	Barbados	Slovakia
132	Nicaragua	United States	Cyprus
133	Gambia, The	Djibouti	Costa Rica
134	Venezuela	Germany	Brazil
135	Denmark	Canada	Haiti
136	Jordan	Aruba	Bolivia
137	Iran	Thailand	United Arab Emirates
138	Eritrea	Pakistan	Philippines
139	Paraguay	Denmark	India
140	Samoa	Costa Rica	Afghanistan
141	Philippines	Chile	Dominican Republic
142	Colombia	Seychelles	West Bank
143	Azerbaijan	Argentina	Kazakhstan
144	Kiribati	Rwanda	Bulgaria
145	Uganda	Grenada	Seychelles
146	Dominica	Serbia and Montenegro	Nepal
147	Macedonia	United Kingdom	Equatorial Guinea
148	Grenada	Ecuador	Netherlands Antilles
149	United Kingdom	Kiribati	Peru
150	France	United Arab Emirates	Aruba
151	Netherlands Antilles	Iceland	Georgia
152	Uruguay	Libya	Faroe Islands
153	Mayotte	Micronesia	Guinea
154	Armenia	Sao Tome	Austria
155	Libya	Slovakia	Norway
156	Switzerland	Papua New Guinea	Martinique
157	Portugal	Mayotte	Romania
158	Saint Lucia	Cambodia	Honduras
159	Andorra	Saint Lucia	Sao Tome
160	Marshall Islands	Peru	Indonesia
161	Tunisia	Serbia	Lithuania
162	Senegal	Saudi Arabia	Argentina
163	Afghanistan	Dominica	Belgium
164	Croatia	Puerto Rico	Palestine
165	Yemen	Haiti	Bangladesh
166	Bahamas, The	Guatemala	France
167	Georgia	Martinique	Serbia and Montenegro
168	Greece	Iraq	Iceland
169	Jersey	Honduras	San Marino
170	South Africa	El Salvador	Niger
171	Montenegro	Turkmenistan	Guadeloupe
172	Mauritania	Luxembourg	Iran
173	Tuvalu	Solomon Islands	Burma (Myanmar)
174	Bolivia	Croatia	Reunion
175	Malta	Brazil	Serbia
176	Germany	Monaco	Gambia, The
177	Mexico	Ireland	Mali
178	Saudi Arabia	Netherlands Antilles	Egypt
179	Turkey	Guadeloupe	Paraguay
180	Morocco	Antigua and Barbuda	Kosovo

Ranking of countries by religious fractionalization (High to Low)

Ranks	rfrac1	rfrac2	rfrac3
181	Somalia	Ukraine	Mexico
182	Finland	Nicaragua	Jordan
183	Rwanda	Tunisia	Colombia
184	Serbia and Montenegro	Greece	Ecuador
185	Gaza Strip	Colombia	Tajikistan
186	Poland	Venezuela	Croatia
187	Tajikistan	Iran	Ireland
188	Serbia	Comoros	Kyrgyzstan
189	Egypt	Paraguay	Saudi Arabia
190	Palestine	Samoa	Portugal
191	Bulgaria	Uruguay	Monaco
192	Syria	Spain	Andorra
193	Cyprus	Andorra	Luxembourg
194	Russia	Tajikistan	Senegal
195	Western Sahara	Tuvalu	Djibouti
196	Maldives	Italy	Thailand
197	Algeria	Armenia	Armenia
198	Uzbekistan	South Africa	Denmark
199	Italy	Belarus	Malta
200	Spain	Portugal	Venezuela
201	Comoros	Yemen	Cape Verde
202	Turkmenistan	Uzbekistan	Libya
203	Cape Verde	Marshall Islands	Mayotte
204	Luxembourg	Malta	Cambodia
205	Djibouti	Afghanistan	Tuvalu
206	Monaco	Mauritania	Turkmenistan
207	Kyrgyzstan	Romania	Finland
208	Kosovo	Bahamas, The	Poland
209	Reunion	Gaza Strip	Tunisia
210	Belgium	Jersey	Greece
211	Romania	Bolivia	Comoros
212	West Bank	Mexico	Spain
213	Kazakhstan	Algeria	Italy
214	Belarus	Turkey	Uzbekistan
215	Ukraine	Morocco	Mauritania
216	Yugoslavia	Somalia	Algeria
217	Bhutan	Finland	Gaza Strip
218	Albania	Poland	Turkey
219	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Western Sahara	Morocco
220	East Timor	Maldives	Somalia
221	Iraq	Cape Verde	Western Sahara
222	Latvia	Latvia	Maldives

Table B.16: Ranking of countries by religious polarization (High to Low)

Ranks	rpol1	rpol2	rpol3
1	Togo	Angola	French Guiana
2	Angola	Estonia	Yemen
3	Estonia	French Guiana	Isle of Man
4	French Guiana	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Guatemala
5	Mauritius	Eritrea	Korea, North
6	Korea, South	Korea, South	Japan
7	Tonga	Tonga	Micronesia
8	Guinea-Bissau	Isle of Man	Guinea-Bissau
9	Isle of Man	Korea, North	Switzerland
10	Taiwan	Japan	Russia
11	Japan	Russia	Tonga
12	Vietnam	Guinea-Bissau	Mongolia
13	Madagascar	Vietnam	Angola
14	Mongolia	Botswana	Eritrea
15	Central African Republic	Mongolia	Latvia
16	Tanzania	Central African Republic	Iraq
17	Botswana	Togo	Laos
18	Macau	Ethiopia	Cuba
19	Laos	Macau	Macedonia
20	Singapore	Laos	Kiribati
21	Cuba	Chad	Korea, South
22	Congo, Republic of the	Tanzania	French Polynesia
23	China	Cuba	Congo, Republic of the
24	Kenya	Macedonia	Sierra Leone
25	Guyana	Congo, Republic of the	Macau
26	Sierra Leone	Lebanon	East Timor
27	Lesotho	Cameroon	Bosnia and Herzegovina
28	Slovenia	Sierra Leone	Ethiopia
29	Suriname	Zimbabwe	Uruguay
30	Fiji	Mauritius	Germany
31	Czech Republic	Nigeria	Slovenia
32	American Samoa	Kenya	Vietnam
33	Trinidad and Tobago	East Timor	Estonia
34	Malaysia	Albania	Tanzania
35	Malawi	Slovenia	Virgin Islands
36	Benin	Guyana	Canada
37	Zimbabwe	Lesotho	Czech Republic
38	Cameroon	Fiji	Azerbaijan
39	Burundi	Cote d'Ivoire	Rwanda
40	Cote d'Ivoire	Madagascar	Northern Mariana Islands
41	Hong Kong	Suriname	China
42	New Zealand	Burkina Faso	Gabon
43	Brunei	China	Uganda
44	Nigeria	Taiwan	Nauru
45	Northern Mariana Islands	Czech Republic	Madagascar
46	Namibia	American Samoa	Jersey
47	Liberia	Trinidad and Tobago	Guernsey
48	Jamaica	Malawi	Burundi
49	CZECHOSLOVAKIA	Burundi	Togo
50	Sudan	Benin	El Salvador
51	Liechtenstein	Mozambique	Marshall Islands
52	Faroe Islands	Liberia	Nicaragua
53	Belize	Malaysia	Burkina Faso
54	Burkina Faso	Bhutan	Palau
55	Bermuda	Singapore	Taiwan
56	Nauru	Sri Lanka	Mauritius
57	India	Brunei	Chad
58	Sri Lanka	New Zealand	Bahrain
59	Zambia	Ghana	Central African Republic
60	Vanuatu	Hong Kong	Liberia

Ranking of countries by religious polarization (High to Low)

Ranks	rpol1	rpol2	rpol3
61	Saint Kitts and Nevis	Sudan	Cote d'Ivoire
62	Qatar	Yugoslavia	Cameroon
63	Palau	Kuwait	Zimbabwe
64	Kuwait	Israel	New Caledonia
65	Hungary	Northern Mariana Islands	Hungary
66	Guam	Gabon	Namibia
67	Sweden	Qatar	Albania
68	Dominican Republic	Namibia	Malaysia
69	Bangladesh	Montenegro	Bhutan
70	Niger	Kazakhstan	Lesotho
71	Moldova	Cyprus	Botswana
72	Swaziland	Congo, Democratic Republic of the	Yugoslavia
73	French Polynesia	Jamaica	Ukraine
74	Gabon	CZECHOSLOVAKIA	Congo, Democratic Republic of the
75	Guernsey	Moldova	Belarus
76	Congo, Democratic Republic of the	Liechtenstein	United Kingdom
77	Burma (Myanmar)	Zambia	Swaziland
78	Ghana	India	Netherlands
79	San Marino	Faroe Islands	Kuwait
80	Chad	West Bank	Sri Lanka
81	Mali	Belize	Brunei
82	Mozambique	Bahrain	Grenadine
83	Oman	Bermuda	Grenada
84	Norway	Nauru	Singapore
85	Panama	Nepal	Suriname
86	Virgin Islands	Sweden	Sudan
87	Guinea	Vanuatu	CZECHOSLOVAKIA
88	Bahrain	Saint Kitts and Nevis	Moldova
89	Korea, North	Guinea	Hong Kong
90	Grenadine	Uganda	Belize
91	Australia	Palau	Mozambique
92	Lithuania	Hungary	Guam
93	Barbados	Netherlands	Saint Kitts and Nevis
94	Thailand	Guam	Pakistan
95	Aruba	Bulgaria	Panama
96	Nepal	Indonesia	Nigeria
97	Costa Rica	Panama	Oman
98	Chile	Swaziland	Liechtenstein
99	New Caledonia	Dominican Republic	Bermuda
100	Equatorial Guinea	Oman	Dominica
101	Ecuador	Bangladesh	Israel
102	Austria	Niger	Kenya
103	United Arab Emirates	Palestine	Montenegro
104	Iceland	Reunion	American Samoa
105	Micronesia	Syria	Chile
106	Sao Tome	French Polynesia	Cyprus
107	Israel	Georgia	Fiji
108	Netherlands	Guernsey	Australia
109	Slovakia	Egypt	Zambia
110	Seychelles	Burma (Myanmar)	Saint Lucia
111	Peru	Mali	Puerto Rico
112	Cambodia	Gambia, The	Qatar
113	Papua New Guinea	Norway	Barbados
114	Canada	San Marino	Afghanistan
115	Ethiopia	Grenadine	United States
116	Indonesia	Kosovo	Lebanon
117	Lebanon	France	Brazil
118	Haiti	Austria	Bahamas, The
119	Pakistan	Australia	Sweden
120	Martinique	Equatorial Guinea	Costa Rica

Ranking of countries by religious polarization (High to Low)

Ranks	rpol1	rpol2	rpol3
121	Guatemala	Jordan	Bolivia
122	Honduras	New Caledonia	Samoa
123	El Salvador	Belgium	Syria
124	Argentina	Kyrgyzstan	Solomon Islands
125	Solomon Islands	Virgin Islands	United Arab Emirates
126	Brazil	Philippines	Benin
127	Ireland	Azerbaijan	Malawi
128	United States	Switzerland	Ghana
129	Guadeloupe	Lithuania	Vanuatu
130	Antigua and Barbuda	Barbados	Slovakia
131	Puerto Rico	Djibouti	Kazakhstan
132	Nicaragua	Germany	Dominican Republic
133	Gambia, The	Senegal	Haiti
134	Venezuela	United States	Faroe Islands
135	Eritrea	Aruba	West Bank
136	Iran	Canada	Guyana
137	Denmark	Thailand	Bulgaria
138	Jordan	Costa Rica	India
139	Paraguay	Chile	New Zealand
140	Samoa	Pakistan	Peru
141	Philippines	Denmark	Trinidad and Tobago
142	Azerbaijan	Rwanda	Philippines
143	Colombia	Seychelles	Nepal
144	Kiribati	Argentina	South Africa
145	Dominica	Serbia and Montenegro	Papua New Guinea
146	Uganda	Grenada	Georgia
147	Macedonia	United Kingdom	Guinea
148	Grenada	Ecuador	Seychelles
149	United Kingdom	United Arab Emirates	Netherlands Antilles
150	France	Iceland	Equatorial Guinea
151	Netherlands Antilles	Kiribati	Antigua and Barbuda
152	Uruguay	Micronesia	Aruba
153	Mayotte	Sao Tome	Austria
154	Armenia	Libya	Norway
155	Libya	Slovakia	Honduras
156	Switzerland	Papua New Guinea	Martinique
157	Saint Lucia	Mayotte	Romania
158	Portugal	Peru	Lithuania
159	Andorra	Serbia	Indonesia
160	Marshall Islands	Saint Lucia	Sao Tome
161	Afghanistan	Cambodia	Belgium
162	Senegal	Saudi Arabia	Bangladesh
163	Tunisia	Dominica	Argentina
164	Croatia	Haiti	Niger
165	Yemen	Puerto Rico	Palestine
166	Bahamas, The	Martinique	Reunion
167	Georgia	Iraq	San Marino
168	Greece	Guatemala	Jamaica
169	Jersey	Honduras	Iran
170	South Africa	El Salvador	Serbia and Montenegro
171	Montenegro	Turkmenistan	France
172	Tuvalu	Luxembourg	Iceland
173	Mauritania	Solomon Islands	Guadeloupe
174	Bolivia	Croatia	Egypt
175	Malta	Brazil	Mali
176	Germany	Monaco	Burma (Myanmar)
177	Mexico	Ireland	Serbia
178	Saudi Arabia	Netherlands Antilles	Gambia, The
179	Turkey	Guadeloupe	Paraguay
180	Morocco	Antigua and Barbuda	Kosovo

Ranking of countries by religious polarization (High to Low)

Ranks	rpol1	rpol2	rpol3
181	Somalia	Ukraine	Jordan
182	Finland	Nicaragua	Mexico
183	Rwanda	Venezuela	Tajikistan
184	Serbia and Montenegro	Iran	Kyrgyzstan
185	Poland	Comoros	Ecuador
186	Gaza Strip	Colombia	Colombia
187	Serbia	Greece	Croatia
188	Tajikistan	Tunisia	Ireland
189	Cyprus	Paraguay	Saudi Arabia
190	Russia	Samoa	Portugal
191	Bulgaria	Spain	Monaco
192	Egypt	Uruguay	Andorra
193	Palestine	Andorra	Djibouti
194	Syria	Tajikistan	Senegal
195	Kazakhstan	Tuvalu	Luxembourg
196	Belarus	Italy	Thailand
197	Iraq	Armenia	Armenia
198	Belgium	South Africa	Denmark
199	Monaco	Belarus	Malta
200	Albania	Portugal	Cape Verde
201	Reunion	Yemen	Venezuela
202	Cape Verde	Uzbekistan	Libya
203	Spain	Marshall Islands	Mayotte
204	Luxembourg	Malta	Cambodia
205	Djibouti	Afghanistan	Tuvalu
206	Italy	Romania	Turkmenistan
207	Algeria	Mauritania	Finland
208	Ukraine	Bahamas, The	Poland
209	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Gaza Strip	Comoros
210	Latvia	Jersey	Greece
211	Yugoslavia	Bolivia	Tunisia
212	East Timor	Mexico	Spain
213	Bhutan	Algeria	Italy
214	West Bank	Turkey	Uzbekistan
215	Romania	Morocco	Algeria
216	Kosovo	Somalia	Mauritania
217	Kyrgyzstan	Finland	Gaza Strip
218	Turkmenistan	Poland	Turkey
219	Comoros	Cape Verde	Morocco
220	Uzbekistan	Latvia	Somalia
221	Western Sahara	Western Sahara	Western Sahara
222	Maldives	Maldives	Maldives

Table B.17: Ranking of countries by religious intolerance (High to Low)

Rank	Country	Religious intolerance	Govt. Regulation	Social regulation	Govt. Favouritism
1	Saudi Arabia	3.2583	9.444	9.556	9.278
2	Iran	3.2449	8.796	10	9.389
3	Pakistan	3.1382	8.796	10	8.811
4	Burma (Myanmar)	2.8537	9.259	8.667	8.289
5	Afghanistan	2.8437	7.685	9.778	8.644
6	Egypt	2.7928	8.333	9.556	7.933
7	Iraq	2.6477	7.315	9.333	8.478
8	Uzbekistan	2.5316	8.982	7.778	7.844
9	Kuwait	2.4743	7.87	8.445	7.956
10	Maldives	2.4462	9.722	6	8.611
11	Armenia	2.4217	7.87	7.556	8.678
12	Algeria	2.3786	6.759	8.222	8.867
13	Jordan	2.3708	8.333	6.889	8.667
14	Sudan	2.3605	8.056	9.111	6.389
15	Indonesia	2.3583	6.667	9.556	7.344
16	Comoros	2.2839	8.796	8.445	5.944
17	Belarus	2.2443	7.963	7.778	7.367
18	Georgia	2.2312	7.037	8.445	7.522
19	Bhutan	2.2106	8.056	6.667	8.344
20	Bahrain	2.1737	7.5	6.667	8.733
21	Malaysia	2.1726	7.593	7.556	7.622
22	Qatar	2.1101	8.796	5.111	8.778
23	India	2.1059	6.296	10	5.867
24	Romania	2.0645	6.296	8.222	7.656
25	Greece	2.0601	6.759	7.111	8.4
26	Israel	2.0222	4.815	9.111	7.989
27	Turkmenistan	2.0127	8.982	4.667	8.556
28	Palestine	1.9677	4.352	9.333	7.933
29	Bangladesh	1.9431	7.13	7.333	7.122
30	Mauritania	1.9167	7.778	5.334	8.556
31	Brunei	1.9149	9.445	5.778	6.278
32	Nigeria	1.9040	6.852	7.111	7.456
33	Turkey	1.8874	5.185	9.111	6.867
34	China	1.8830	8.796	5.556	7.044
35	Morocco	1.8495	6.482	7.334	7.3
36	Azerbaijan	1.8170	8.056	8.444	4.2
37	Tunisia	1.7436	5.926	6.445	8.322
38	Russia	1.7297	6.482	7.556	6.4
39	Nepal	1.7056	6.389	9.333	4.356
40	Sri Lanka	1.6337	5.556	9.111	5.1
41	United Arab Emirates	1.6217	6.389	5.556	8.178
42	Cyprus	1.5932	4.63	7.556	7.622
43	Oman	1.5858	6.759	6	7.089
44	Yemen	1.5792	5.926	7.778	5.922
45	Chad	1.5471	6.574	5.556	7.578
46	Somalia	1.5221	7.222	8	3.989
47	Yugoslavia	1.4264	6.111	5.333	7.667
48	Bulgaria	1.2264	7.5	4	6.622
49	Lebanon	1.1631	5.741	6.667	5.122
50	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.1402	5.833	5.333	6.411
51	Libya	1.1284	6.667	4.222	6.722
52	Syria	1.0031	5.741	6	5.011
53	Ethiopia	0.9920	4.167	6.889	5.611
54	Colombia	0.9720	4.167	4.889	7.767
55	Laos	0.9150	8.889	3.556	3.967
56	Kazakhstan	0.7505	6.574	5.111	3.767
57	Moldova	0.6914	4.445	3.778	7.211
58	Kosovo	0.6853	3.056	6	6.133
59	Singapore	0.6560	7.87	1.778	5.656
60	Eritrea	0.6557	8.148	4.667	2.089
61	Kyrgyzstan	0.6111	6.019	6.445	2.089
62	Vietnam	0.6083	8.241	4	2.489
63	Djibouti	0.5956	5.833	4.445	4.467
64	Ukraine	0.5778	4.722	4.889	5.044
65	Cote d'Ivoire	0.5504 53	4.259	3.778	6.644

Ranking of countries by religious religious intolerance (High to Low)

Rank	Country	Religious intolerance	Govt. Regulation	Social regulation	Govt. Favouritism
66	Thailand	0.5261	4.815	2.445	7.433
67	Belgium	0.5068	3.148	4	7.333
68	Cuba	0.4870	7.222	4.667	2.156
69	France	0.4650	4.445	4.667	4.978
70	Macedonia	0.4453	5.278	4.667	3.989
71	Argentina	0.4003	2.037	4	7.933
72	Guinea	0.3986	2.315	4.222	7.378
73	Vanuatu	0.3920	1.667	5.111	7.022
74	Serbia and Montenegro	0.3913	2.222	4.667	6.933
75	Germany	0.3905	3.333	4.222	6.256
76	Kenya	0.3398	3.333	4	6.233
77	Austria	0.3385	1.945	4.889	6.689
78	Tajikistan	0.3230	5	5.333	2.867
79	Mongolia	0.3207	5.556	2.889	5.033
80	Croatia	0.2610	1.667	3.778	7.822
81	Tanzania	0.2126	5.185	3.111	4.589
82	Lithuania	0.1507	3.889	2.222	6.633
83	Western Sahara	0.1146	5.278	2.889	4.211
84	Spain	0.1023	1.019	3.556	7.9
85	Italy	0.0904	1.204	4.445	6.633
86	Latvia	0.0879	3.889	2	6.544
87	Mexico	0.0846	3.333	5.556	3.089
88	Liberia	0.0330	3.056	3.556	5.367
89	Korea, North	0.0215	8.889	2	0.889
90	Zimbabwe	-0.0040	3.056	2.889	5.922
91	Peru	-0.0086	2.778	0.889	8.456
92	Nicaragua	-0.0144	0.741	3.778	7.311
93	Venezuela	-0.0527	1.204	2.445	8.122
94	Norway	-0.1221	1.759	2.889	6.656
95	Hungary	-0.1424	1.389	2.667	7.189
96	Central African Republic	-0.1571	5.278	3.778	1.733
97	Niger	-0.1581	2.5	4.222	4.167
98	Guatemala	-0.1633	1.204	4.222	5.511
99	Nauru	-0.1732	5.185	3.778	1.744
100	Slovakia	-0.1761	1.204	3.111	6.7
101	Iceland	-0.2247	0.926	2	7.989
102	Uganda	-0.2403	3.889	5.111	1.244
103	Cameroon	-0.2864	2.778	4.889	2.422
104	Equatorial Guinea	-0.3115	4.259	2	3.989
105	Philippines	-0.3207	1.759	4.667	3.567
106	Dominican Republic	-0.3207	1.574	1.111	7.789
107	Cambodia	-0.3227	2.315	0.222	8
108	Monaco	-0.3418	5.185	2.667	2.089
109	Switzerland	-0.3469	1.019	2.889	6.222
110	Czech Republic	-0.3689	0.185	2.445	7.489
111	Finland	-0.3749	1.574	2	6.489
112	Denmark	-0.3899	1.759	1.333	6.967
113	Slovenia	-0.4111	0.926	4.445	4.211
114	Chile	-0.4477	2.222	1.556	5.911
115	East Timor	-0.4888	1.667	5.333	2
116	United Kingdom	-0.4920	1.204	3.111	4.989
117	Costa Rica	-0.5578	1.019	0.889	7.344
118	Ghana	-0.5688	2.037	1.778	5.2
119	Poland	-0.5769	0	3.556	5.3
120	Netherlands	-0.5819	0	3.778	5.022
121	Portugal	-0.6084	1.574	0	7.489
122	Mauritius	-0.6351	0.556	3.111	4.9
123	Panama	-0.6529	1.296	1.333	6.033
124	Bolivia	-0.6700	0	0.667	8.067
125	Japan	-0.6704	2.315	2.445	3.6
126	Malta	-0.7644	0	0	8.311
127	Andorra	-0.8143	0.741	0	7.256
128	Haiti	-0.8287	0.278	2.445	4.9
129	Canada	-0.8677	0.278	1.778	5.444
130	Luxembourg	-0.8800	0.185	0	7.489

Ranking of countries by religious religious intolerance (High to Low)

Rank	Country	Religious intolerance	Govt. Regulation	Social regulation	Govt. Favouritism
131	Hong Kong	-0.9017	1.019	0.667	5.733
132	Saint Lucia	-0.9167	1.019	4	1.878
133	Rwanda	-0.9295	4.074	1.111	1.844
134	Malawi	-0.9339	0	2.889	4.122
135	Congo, Democratic Republic of the	-0.9706	3.704	2.889	0
136	Solomon Islands	-0.9707	0.556	2.222	4.089
137	San Marino	-0.9776	0	0	7.156
138	Fiji	-1.0125	0.741	3.556	2.156
139	Swaziland	-1.0228	2.963	0.222	3.522
140	Madagascar	-1.0508	1.204	0.889	4.478
141	Liechtenstein	-1.0595	0.463	0	6.222
142	Tuvalu	-1.0987	0.741	3.556	1.689
143	Papua New Guinea	-1.1082	0	2.222	3.933
144	Palau	-1.1830	0.648	1.778	3.344
145	Honduras	-1.2031	1.296	0.222	4.311
146	South Africa	-1.2341	0	3.778	1.489
147	Korea, South	-1.2461	0.463	0.667	4.456
148	Cape Verde	-1.2930	0	0.445	4.944
149	Senegal	-1.3079	0	0	5.367
150	Gabon	-1.3127	1.759	0	3.478
151	Brazil	-1.3158	0.833	3.334	0.667
152	Belize	-1.3643	0.278	0	4.767
153	Suriname	-1.3921	0	0.667	4.156
154	Zambia	-1.4113	0.185	0	4.611
155	Sweden	-1.4194	0.278	1.111	3.211
156	Trinidad and Tobago	-1.4277	0.833	1.111	2.578
157	Seychelles	-1.4434	0	0	4.633
158	Jamaica	-1.4979	1.482	2.445	0
159	Gambia, The	-1.5163	0.278	0	3.944
160	Tonga	-1.5313	1.019	0	3.078
161	Samoa	-1.5458	0.37	2.667	0.667
162	Bahamas, The	-1.5595	0.463	0.444	3.011
163	Lesotho	-1.5787	0	0	3.9
164	Estonia	-1.6004	0.278	0.667	2.733
165	El Salvador	-1.6384	1.111	0	2.4
166	Grenadine	-1.6407	0	2	1.3
167	Angola	-1.7055	0.741	1.556	0.667
168	Mozambique	-1.7153	1.111	1.556	0.222
169	Sierra Leone	-1.7386	0.278	1.556	0.978
170	Australia	-1.7492	0.463	2	0.222
171	Paraguay	-1.7596	0	1.333	1.411
172	Albania	-1.7626	0.463	1.111	1.156
173	New Zealand	-1.7703	0	0.222	2.611
174	Dominica	-1.8285	0.741	0.222	1.511
175	Guyana	-1.8294	0.278	0.445	1.744
176	Ireland	-1.8626	0	0.222	2.111
177	Barbados	-1.8729	0	0.889	1.3
178	Macau	-1.8758	1.296	0.222	0.667
179	Mali	-1.8861	0	1.778	0.222
180	Congo, Republic of the	-1.9271	0	1.778	0
181	Saint Kitts and Nevis	-1.9846	0	1.111	0.444
182	Guinea-Bissau	-2.0042	0.556	0.889	0
183	Ecuador	-2.0115	0	0	1.556
184	Togo	-2.0259	0.556	0	0.889
185	Taiwan	-2.0639	0.278	0	0.978
186	Burundi	-2.0745	0.463	0.444	0.222
187	Burkina Faso	-2.1129	0	0.889	0
188	Uruguay	-2.1129	0	0.889	0
189	Botswana	-2.1437	0.556	0.222	0
190	Benin	-2.1551	0	0	0.778
191	Antigua and Barbuda	-2.1629	0.695	0	0
192	Namibia	-2.2578	0	0	0.222
193	Sao Tome	-2.2578	0	0	0.222
194	Grenada	-2.2988	0	0	0
195	Kiribati	-2.2988	0	0	0
196	Marshall Islands	-2.2988	0	0	0
197	Micronesia	-2.2988	0	0	0